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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the factors that influence firms' value with empirical 
analyses of the UK and Western Europe. The aim is to measure the effects of 
intangible capital, ownership structure (managerial ownership and largest con- 
trollers) and country specific characteristics related with investors' protection on 
corporate value. The first original work of this thesis is with respect to Intangible 
capital. Specifically, the effect of previous and present R&D expenditures on To- 
bin's Q is explored. Although, this type of analysis has been previously carried 
out, this thesis aims to specify the model including financial variables as it is 
considered that they are fundamental to estimate the "true model" of corporate 
value. Under this specification, simultaneity of the financial variables might intro- 
duce endogeneity problems in the estimation. Therefore, an estimation method 
which aims to control for endogeneity of the variables is applied. A second objec- 
tive of this thesis is to explore the relationship created by the ultimate control in 
the firm. In particular, it examines the effect of agency costs created by two type 
of relationships: a) managers and owners and b) largest controllers and minority 
shareholders. The firms' value might be affected depending of the number of 
shares that are on the hands of either the managers or/and largest controllers. 
Other issues are also questioned in this part of the thesis, such as, the effect on 
firms' value of both specific controllers (miscellaneous, family, state, etc) and ways 
in which control is delegated (pyramids, control-chains, dual shares). Finally, this 
thesis focuses on the legal differences for investors' protection among 12 Western 
European countries. This study combines the ownership structure variables at 
a firm level with variables at a country level. It is argued that corporate value 
is influenced by the investors' protection of a country. External investors would 
rather finance firms in countries where laws are more protective, as the risk of 
losing their investment would be reduced. Nevertheless, it is shown that firms 
from countries where laws are weak, have on exchange an ownership structure 
which seems to be more appealing for external investors. 
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Introduction 
A positive corporate performance refers to the excess of market value of equity 
shares in relation to the replacement cost of the company assets. The discrepancy 
of these two values has been studied from both microeconomic effects and country 
specific corporate governance characteristics. To date, the interest of keeping a 
firm's value high is important as it represents high investment opportunities and 
consequently attracts external funding for future projects, via shareholders or 
bondholders. 
This thesis investigates how market reactions to several characteristics of a 
company and the surrounding legal environment might influence firms' values. 
The aim is to measure the effect of three main concepts, which are not necessar- 
ily related; two of them are studied from a firm level perspective for the UK, i. e. 
Research and Development (R&D, as a measure for intangible capital) and owner- 
ship structure (specifically, it is examined the effect of both managerial ownership 
and the largest controllers with separation of cash flow rights and voting rights). 
The third concept incorporates law requirements via country specific characteris- 
tics for investors' protection in Western Europe, i. e. legal origin, creditors' rights, 
shareholders' rights and enforcement of law. A chapter dedicated to the relevant 
literature review with concern to these concepts follows this introduction. 
The basic model of corporate value includes financial variables, such as, in- 
vestment in productive capital, dividends paid, leverage and size. Although the 
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analyses of these variables are not the main objective of this thesis, they are con- 
sidered as a fundamental element to constitute the "true" model. Nevertheless, 
in some cases, as it will be shown in the thesis, the inclusion of financial variables 
introduce some estimation problems. Chapter 2 focuses in introducing the finan- 
cial variables to the thesis by discussing some of the previous findings of their 
relationship with corporate value. It also describes the statistical properties of 
the financial variables as this data is consistently used for the following chapters. 
The original contribution of this thesis commences on Chapter 3 which aims 
to study the effect of R&D on the Tobin's Q ratio, where Tobin's Q is used as a 
proxy of firms' market value (this same measure is applied for the remainder of the 
chapters). Although this type of relationship has been previously studied', the 
originality of Chapter 3 can be numerated as follows. First, with the use of a panel 
dataset, it intends to assess the significant and positive influence of R&D activities 
on corporate value by using an econometric technique that controls for both 
endogeneity of the variables and fixed effects. Endogeneity might be created from 
external shocks caused by omitted variables in the model. These omitted effect 
might impact both the dependent and independent variables. The recognition of 
these characteristics of the data is important as popular econometric estimators 
become inconsistent under this case, i. e. OLS and Within estimator. A solution 
for this problem is the application of instrumental variables that are correlated 
with the explanatory variable but uncorrelated with the error term. In this study, 
instrumental variables are used by the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), 
which can also eliminate the firm-fixed effects by a first-differences transformation. 
Second, the construction of the basic model is based in previous literature, 
'See for example: Hirschey (1982), Megna and Klock (1993), Chan et al (1999), Chen and 
Steiner (2000), Klock and Megna (2000), Toivanen et al (2002), Xu and Zhang (2004), among 
others. All these literature is further discussed in the Chapter of "literature review" 
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such as Fama and French (1998), Brennan (1970), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Miller and Scholes (1978,1982), Brainard et al (1980), Masulis (1980), Eckbo 
(1986), Baker et al (2001,2002), among others'. These studies highlight the 
importance of financial variables to explain the market value of the firm. As a 
difference with other studies, Chapter 3 considers both financial variables and 
R&D activities to determine corporate value. 
Third, the impact of R&D activities is measured over time by the construc- 
tion of a R&D stock to capture not only present but past effects in a static 
specification. 
There are interesting results obtained from Chapter 3. The main findings can 
be summarized in two points. Firstly, it seems that the market positively reacts to 
new "news" about R&D activities of a corporation, Chan et al (1991), Toivanen 
et al (2002). Nevertheless, this effect seems to be lagged for one period to be 
recognized by the market. In addition, the effect of dividends paid was positive, 
although not very significant, probably due to the weakness of the instruments 
for this specific variable. Nevertheless, dividends paid seem to impact on the 
corporate value only when "special dividends" are paid, possibly because "special 
dividends" might be close related with restructures or reorganization of the firm. 
To further explore the factors that affect corporate value, Chapter 4 aims 
to include additional attributes at the firm level. Specifically, those attributes 
related with managerial structure and ultimate controllers. Initially, it is assumed 
that managers without ownership would find a higher benefit in directing the 
free cash flow to situations that do not maximise the firms' wealth. Specifically, 
managers would pursue their own interests at expense of shareholders. Therefore, 
2 Note that these studies are mainly based in US data which might bring different results than 
for the UK or European countries. This difference is likely due to specific country characteristics, 
such as tax laws. 
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if managers possess a certain number of shares from the firm, this would align 
the objectives of both managers and corporations. Consequently, the number of 
shares owned by managers might be significant in determining firm's value. 
In addition, the level of separation of corporate ownership (cash flow rights) 
and corporate control (voting rights) in the controlling stake is likely to create 
conflicts of interests among shareholders. This is an agency problem, which often 
arises because the decision made by the controlling shareholder might not be in 
the interest of minority shareholders, Becht and Mayer (2001). 
Therefore, Chapter 4 has two main objectives. First, it aims to explain the 
impact of directors' shareholdings (also known as inside ownership) in corporate 
value. The first step is to explore which type of functional form is appropriate. 
Different studies from Morck et al (1988), McConnell & Servaes (1990), Short & 
Keasey (1999) and Cui & Mak (2002), among others, have drawn different con- 
clusions about the functional form of managerial ownership, but all have agreed 
that it is non linear. There is no certainty as to which hypothesis is most accept- 
able. Findings in Chapter 4 suggest that there is not evidence of a relationship 
with managerial ownership and Tobin's Q. However, opposite results are obtained 
when financial variables are included in the model as controls. Specifically, a cu- 
bic relationship (where management is aligned at low and possibly high levels 
but is entrenched at intermediate ownership levels) was found significant. This 
finding suggests that as these types of variables are likely to be endogenous, the 
significant coefficients found for managerial ownership might be biased. This is in 
line with studies by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Himmelberg et al (1999). 
By contrast with the previous chapter, the analysis is based on cross sectional 
data. This is followed as managerial ownership might stay stable over time and 
the use of panel data might be inadequate (Zhou (2001), La Porta et al (2000)). 
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To this extent, the problem of endogeneity is considered from two perspectives. 
First, the "reverse" causality of managerial ownership and corporate value, as 
managers could be awarded with shares depending on the performance/value of 
the firm. Second, endogeneity is likely to arise as a result of omitted shocks that 
might be correlated with more than one of the variables included in the model. 
The model aims to correct for endogeneity following the methodology suggested 
by Rajan and Zingales (1995), where instruments of the explanatory variables are 
applied by averaging and lagging them for one period to reduce the noise and to 
account for slow adjustments. 
The second aim of Chapter 4 is to measure if the divergence between corporate 
ownership and control could determine corporate value. In general, international 
evidence indicates that the accumulation of control rights in excess of cash flow 
rights reduces the observed market value of firms, which reflects their good per- 
formance (see Denis and McConnell (2003)). This might be explained by the 
limitation of monitoring activities of minority shareholders, as their supervision 
is restricted by the dominant shareholder (the one with the largest number of 
controlling shares). 
Some of the questions that are addressed in this part of the chapter are: Is 
there an effect on firm performance when the largest controller possess differ- 
ent levels of voting rights than cash flow rights?; In the case of the presence of 
an ultimate controller: Is there a significant impact on firm's value depending 
on "who" is the ultimate controller? (such as family, widely held corporations, 
widely held financial institutions, state and miscellaneous (voting trusts, chari- 
ties, pension funds, etc. )). How is corporate value affected with respect to the way 
that control is delegated? (such as, pyramids, control chains and cross-holdings). 
Given the regulations that protect minority investors in the UK, the ultimate 
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largest controllers may not have enough legal power to extract reýollrcýý from 
the firm. The protection to minority investors might bring aa consequence that 
the value of the firm is unaffected by the way that control is exerted. which in 
siicli a case would mean that legal rules are beneficial to prevent for any negative 
effect on firms' value. To this respect, evidence of a negative effect of high levels of 
separation of ownership and control (at least 2 votes per share) on firms' value was 
found. Nevertheless, for the UK, this effect might be limited as legal regulations 
protect minority shareholders. 
IvIoreover. firms that are controlled by Thliscellaneous" were shown to have 
on average lower Tobin's Q ratios than firms with other ultimate controllers. A 
possible explanation for this finding is that the negative effect of "Miscellaneous" 
is, partially caused because of the high levels of separation of ownership and control 
in t11(' group of firms. 
Based on the findings of Chapter 4 for the UK, Chapter 5 aims to extend the 
scope of the data by introducing information of 11 more countries from \Vest- 
eru Europe. To this extent, Chapter 5 aims to examine the effect of country 
specific cliairactcri. st ics, which together with the previous findings, might deter- 
mine an overall conclusion for the link between companies' value and corporate 
ß(\'(`1'I 1 ýI 11('(`. 
The data used in this Chapter contains information of both firm level data 
iind coiiiitrv specific legal information. The unique database is a combination 
of tlircvice sources of information: Datastrearii. La Porta et al (1998) and Faccio 
and Lang (2002). The data utilized from La Porta (1998) refers to country 
specific characteristics divided in: a) legal origin, b) investors protection and c) 
law enforcement. 
There are methodological alspcct s in estimations concerning t his type of data. 
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First, it is likely that there are differences among countries, which are not in- 
cluded the model. Consequently, these omitted variables should be controlled. 
For instance, country dummies might be an alternative with the initial model. 
However, when country specific variables (which do not have within-country vari- 
ation) are incorporated, the use of country dummies originates perfect collinearity 
with the country specific variables. The same problem is drawn from the fixed 
effects model. Moreover, a popular approach to control for these effects is the 
use of random effects, as La Porta et al (2002), Claessens et al (2002). There 
again, the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that errors are independent within countries, so it rejects the ran- 
dom effects model as an option. Therefore, an alternative to control for omitted 
country variables follows Nenova (2003), who controls for possible within-country 
correlation by using OLS firm-level regressions with clustered robust standard 
errors. Under this method each country is defined as a cluster, where weights 
are sums over each cluster. These approach aims to alleviate the effects of omit- 
ted country variables that could introduce biasness to the results. In addition, 
all the models are specified with and without financial variables to account for 
endogeneity issues as in previous chapters. 
After selecting a suitable technique to estimate the models, Chapter 5 exam- 
ines the effect of laws regarding investor's protection on corporate value. To this 
respect, countries' laws may be an important issue for corporations in obtaining 
external finance. External investors may prefer to finance firms in countries where 
laws are more protective. Therefore, if there are laws that protect shareholders, 
it is probable that firms which belong to those countries are valued higher. More- 
over, firms in countries which have poor laws to protect investors might offer in 
exchange another type of incentives to overcome the risks originated from weak 
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investor protection. To this extent, the ownership structure of companies may be 
of relevance to external investors. For instance, minority investors might be aware 
of the agency costs created by the separation of ownership and control. Agency 
costs are created when the interests of the controllers are not aligned to those of 
minority shareholders, Jensen and Meckling (1976). Particularly, as pointed out 
by Dyck and Zingales (2004), controllers might get private benefits from the firm, 
such as perquisites or in some few cases outright theft. Thus, expropriation by 
larger shareholders is limited by the enforcement of protective laws. 
Chapter 5 looks at three ways that laws and their origins might be relevant for 
firm valuation. Initially, legal origin is used as a proxy for investor's protection 
as it has been found that it matters for corporate value, Beck et al (2003), La 
Porta et al (2002). 
Thereafter, indices of investor's protection are used and they are represented 
by the number of shareholder's rights and/or creditor rights in a country. Under 
this case, investors are of different types, shareholders and bondholders, respec- 
tively. To this respect, the impact that they might have on value is likely to 
be the opposite. Shareholder's rights might attract external investors to fund 
firms of a specific country. External investors might feel more confident about 
investing in a country were financial risks are lower. On the contrary, creditor's 
rights might have a different influence on value. For instance, Claessens and Kap- 
pier (2002) found that bankruptcies are higher in common law countries, where 
there are both stronger creditor rights and greater judicial efficiency. Rossi and 
Volpin (2004) found that attempted hostile takeovers are associated with better 
creditor's protection. This suggests that firms in countries with higher indices 
of creditors rights are more susceptible to hostile takeovers which in turn might 
negatively impact firm's value. 
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Finally, the last country specific characteristic, explored in Chapter 5, is with 
respect to the enforcement of law. Specifically, enforcement of law is represented 
with the index of efficiency in the judicial system, as in Kappler and Love (2004), 
La Porta et al (2000). The index for efficiency of the judicial system is con- 
structed by investors' assessments of conditions in the country in question. It is 
likely that investors' have assessed the judicial system of the country based on 
other characteristics related with issues of law enforcement, such as, rule of law, 
corruption, risk of expropriation and risk of contract repudiation. The indices of 
investor's rights are also incorporated in this specification of the model as they do 
not present correlation with the efficiency of the judicial system. In other words, 
it might seem that the level of country protection to investors and the level to 
which law is enforced may be independently determined by countries' laws. For 
example, firms with the highest average investors protection are those from Eng- 
lish origin countries. Contrary, firms from Scandinavian legal origin countries 
present the highest index of law enforcement. 
The main findings in this chapter are as follows. First, as in Chapter 4 for the 
UK, the presence of a controller has a negative effect in firm's value. Moreover, 
as voting rights and cash flow rights become equal, corporate value is greater. 
However, the latter effect seems to disappear when country specific variables are 
integrated to the analysis. This finding suggests that firms in countries where 
the protection to investors and the law enforcement is low, might have stronger 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as, lower levels of separation between 
ownership and control, in order to attract external investors. For instance, firms 
from a French legal origin, where investors protection and law enforcement is the 
lowest, showed to have higher average Tobin's Q values than firms in countries 
from other origins. All the same, firms from French legal origin have the lowest 
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level of separation of ownership and control, situation that then might result on 
higher corporate values. 
Generally, a firm which belongs to a country with poor investors' protection 
might set control mechanisms that favour external investors in order to make 
the firm more attractive to the external market. This analysis also gives insight 
to the preferences of investors to select a specific corporation for buying stock; 
with this knowledge, managers can follow actions to increase firm's value and as 
a consequence attract further external investment. 
On the whole, this thesis offers some contributions with respect to the un- 
derstanding of factors that might be of significance to determine firms' value. 
Interesting implications, such as the influence from differences among countries, 
are shown to be a fundamental aspect in corporate governance. This can be an 
exception when the nature of the experiment is a specific study of a single country 
as in Chapters 3 and 4, so particular conclusions could be drawn. Generally, the 
three factors under analysis: intangible capital, ultimate controllers and country 
specific characteristics, were shown significant in influencing firms' value. 
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Chapter 1 
An Overview of the Literature 
The behaviour of a firm has puzzled researchers about finding a rational expla- 
nation that can help to predict future returns and to choose the most adequate 
investment opportunities. As Dow and Gorton (1997) poiiitHHHl out, the stock 
market indirectly guides investment by transferring two kinds of information: in- 
formation about investment opportunities and information about managers' past 
decisions. A high stock price may signal to the ma mager that the market believes 
the firm has profitable investment opportunities. However, this does not mean 
t hd the manager will take the best decisions for the welfare of the firm. For this 
reason, managers must be given incentives to make good investment decisions. 
Then, are different characteristics of the company that might well influence the 
r(' wt ions of the market to value such stock. In this thesis three diffvreiit elements 
that are likely to be important to influence corporate value are studied and the 
iiioýýt relevant literature attach to them is discussed below. 
") ") 
1.1 Measuring corporate performance 
Market value ratios show how highly the firm is valued by investors and are part 
of the tools for the analysis of firm's financial performance. A market value ratio 
which has been broadly applied in empirical work is Tobin's Q. 
Tobin's Q is a ratio of the market value of the firm to its replacement cost. 
This ratio was originally developed by J. Tobin (1969), and represents a measure 
of profitable investment opportunities. The numerator must include the market 
value of both debt and equity and the denominator is the present value to replace 
the assets. 
In Tobin's Q theory, the objective of a firm is to maintain this ratio as unity, 
which means that if the market value of the firm is greater than its replacement 
cost, the firm should invest in capital stock. Likewise, if the firm's market value 
is less than its replacement cost, the firm should disinvest in its capital stock. 
Tobin's Q ratio has been compared with other performance ratios as in Mc- 
Farland (1988). He compared Tobin's Q ratio with the rate of return using Monte 
Carlo experiments, to determine which of these ratios is superior. He pointed out 
that Q has several advantages over the rate of return. The measure for market 
value in the numerator of Tobin's Q, reflects a firm's expected future profits, while 
the accounting rate of return measures only past profits. Furthermore, a firm's 
market value is also influenced by the variance of expected profits, so Q includes 
an automatic adjustment for risk. Finally, Tobin's Q ratio should be less sen- 
sitive to the inflation rate than the accounting rate because the denominator of 
Tobin's Q is a firm's replacement value and not its book value. However, He also 
pointed out the limitations of calculating the replacement cost of firm's assets. 
This calculation often excludes any measure of the firm's intangible assets and 
includes a measure of depreciated tangible assets that is calculated using depreci- 
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ation schedules that do not adequately reflect true economic depreciation. Thus, 
the exclusion of intangibles from the firm's asset base and the use of inadequate 
depreciation schedules, which are the major objections to the accounting rate of 
return, also may cause errors in Tobin's Q. In his conclusion, McFarland argued 
that smaller average errors can be found in accounting estimates of Tobin's Q 
than in the rate of return, and that estimates of Tobin's Q have a much higher 
average correlation with the true measure than does the accounting rate of return. 
Campbell and Shiller (1998) studied the conventional performance ratios: the 
dividend-price and price-earnings ratios. They argued that it is quite possible 
that the true relation between performance ratios and long-horizon returns is non- 
linear. However, even though these performance ratios are available for empirical 
research, they are limited in that they are not forecasting variables (ex post), 
but they are ex ante forecasting relations. For instance, as the authors stated, a 
criticism of the dividend-price ratio is that it can be affected by corporate financial 
policy. Companies can repurchase their stock, as a tax-favoured alternative to 
paying dividends. Repurchases transfer cash to the shareholders who sell their 
stock, and benefit ongoing shareholders because future dividend payments will be 
divided among fewer shares. This action reduces current dividends, but increases 
the long-term growth rate of dividends per share. This in turn can permanently 
lower the dividend-price ratio, driving it outside its normal historical range. This 
study gives insight to support the idea that the Tobin's Q ratio remains the best 
option for empirical studies to forecast future corporate performance, in spite of 
its limitations. 
Due to the importance of the Tobin's Q ratio to represent corporate perfor- 
mance, its construction has been an issue for researchers, as in Lindenberg and 
Ross (1981). They pointed out that comparing accounting data and financial 
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valuation data offers the opportunity to examine performance, the difference be- 
tween inputs, on the one hand, and output, on the other. The authors developed 
a cross-sectional value of Tobin's Q and analysed its implications for industrial 
organization. Their procedure for calculating Tobin's Q ratio has been widely 
used in different empirical research, and is the market value divided by the re- 
placement cost. The firm's securities fall into three broad groups: a) common 
stock, b) preferred stock, and, c) debt. In the numerator, the complexity starts 
with the calculation of the market value of debt as the authors mentioned. They 
suggested to divide debt to: long term debt and short term debt, where the latter 
equals to its book value. Long-term debt, however, has a market value that de- 
pends, significantly, on the maturity distribution of the firm's bonds, its coupon 
rates, and the current yield to maturity. For the calculation of the replacement 
costs (denominator), they divided the assets in three broad categories: a) plant 
and equipment, b) inventories, and c) other assets. The latter is assumed to 
equal its book value as it contains mainly securities and liquid assets, such as 
cash. For the replacement cost of net plant and equipment, they considered four 
major effects: a) price level changes, b) technological change, c) real economic 
depreciation and d) investment in new plant and equipment. Finally, for the 
calculation of inventories, the authors made adjustments for the major methods 
of inventory valuation reported by individual firms. 
Although there are different methods employed to estimate Tobin's Q ratio, 
none can reach theoretical precision. The problem arises from the lack of infor- 
mation available from firm level data which is required to estimate the marginal 
Tobin's Q ratio, as theory suggests. Marginal Tobin's Q is the ratio of the mar- 
ket value of an additional unit of capital to its replacement cost; however, the 
observable ratio is the average Tobin's Q, namely the ratio of the market value 
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YORK 
of existing capital to its replacement cost. Researchers have assumed the average 
Tobin's Q as a proxy for the marginal Tobin's Q. The equivalence of marginal 
and average Tobin's Q was studied by Hayashi (1982). He stated that marginal 
and average Tobin's Q are essentially the same in the special, yet important, case 
where the firm is a price-taker and the production function and the installation 
function are homogeneous. He compared the performance of the average Tobin's 
Q with a modified ratio, which is equivalent to the marginal Tobin's Q. He found 
that the variation in the modified ratio is less pronounced than that in average 
ratio. 
The measurement error obtained from the computation of the average Tobin's 
Q has also been recognized by other researchers, as in Perfect and Wiles (1994). 
They compared of five different ratios, and found that empirical results were sen- 
sitive to the method used to estimate Tobin's Q. They pointed out the advantages 
and disadvantages of the ratios under analysis. Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) 
also examined the methods commonly employed to estimate Tobin's Q ratios and 
in contrast, found them to be faulty in design and arbitrary in implementation. 
They proposed an alternative that they argued is simpler and more accurate. 
They suggested that the key to the procedure is an improved measure of fixed 
asset replacement costs. 
Several empirical work have utilized the average Tobin's Q ratio to explain the 
excess of value of the firm in comparison with its replacement costs'. The excess 
in value of share prices has frequently been attributable to irrational behaviour 
such as "herding" or "market psychology", nevertheless recent work emphasizes 
that such sharp movements or "bubbles" may be consistent with the assump- 
'Megna and Klock (1993), Klock and Megna (2000), Chen and Steiner (2000), Himmelberg 
et al (1999), Cui and Mak (2002), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001), Hirschey 1982, La Porta et al (2002), Claessens et al (2002), among others. 
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tion of rational behaviour. In other words, "intrinsic" bubbles may depend on 
fundamentals such as dividends. 
1.1.1 Intangible capital 
Intangible capital is an alternative that has been applied to explain high corpo- 
rate valuation. The intrinsic value of intangibles such as brand name, customer 
loyalty and human knowledge are factors that are not controlled in the histori- 
cal records of the company's value. However, such factors are frequently worth 
higher than the tangible assets themselves, as they return a significant increase 
on corporate value, which reflects a good performance. To date, there does not 
exist a comprehensive system for measuring intangible assets and different empir- 
ical techniques have been studied to find a close relation that allow us to include 
these types of capital to value firms. 
The basic analysis of intangibles relies on a firm level explanation, which ar- 
gues that the excess value is caused mainly to characteristics and behaviour of 
the firm itself. Sveiby (1998) pointed out that it is useful to measure intangible 
assets and that it is possible for managers to create shareholder value, without 
relying primarily on traditional financial indicators. Previous research has ex- 
plored this issue. For instance, Hirschey (1982) found that advertising and R&D 
expenditures have positive and significant market value effects. He also encour- 
aged further investigations to be made on this aspect, considering variations over 
time and across industries; Megna and Klock (1993) studied the contribution of 
intangible capital in the semiconductor industry, to the variation in Tobin's Q 
with a model which represents a perfect equilibrium market. They found posi- 
tive and significant estimators of intangible capital. They also studied the effect 
of rivals' stock on R&D, measured with patents, which appeared to contribute 
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negatively to the variation in corporate performance. 
Several such studies have been performed, where intangible capital has been 
measured with R&D and advertisement expenditure. These types of empirical 
studies have been applied mostly to USA data, as information for advertisement is 
publicly available. The findings have been consistent for different sample periods, 
where intangible capital positively affects corporate value. See Hall (1993a and 
1993b), Klock et al (1996), Chan et al (1999), Klock and Megna (2000). For the 
impact of intangible capital on productivity (profit rates) see Megna and Mueller 
(1991), Griliches (1994), Wakelin (2001). 
Akbar and Stark (2003), used four different deflators to measure the effect 
R&D expenditure, among other variables, on corporate value in the UK. They 
found that the effect of R&D expenditure on corporate value remains positive and 
significant independently of the deflator used (similarly for dividends declared). 
Xu and Zhang (2004) argued that in Japan, the R&D effect on the stock market is 
different from that observed in the USA. They examined the R&D effect on stock 
returns in the Japanese market and found a positive and significant R&D effect 
during the period 1993-2000 (post-bubble period), but an insignificant effect for 
previous periods. They analysed the risk-reward patterns of stock returns in the 
subsequent period rather than instantaneous responses of the stock prices to the 
R&D announcements. Their results showed that overall, returns are positively 
related to the level of the R&D intensity, and to a lesser degree, the total risk of 
returns is positively related to the R&D intensity. They found an average cross- 
sectional impact of returns on R&D of ß=4.9 by creating a cumulative R&D 
intensity measure. A similar measure was constructed by Chan et al (2001) and 
Hall (1990), where current and past R&D expenditure were considered. Fama 
and French (1998) also found a positive coefficient for R&D expenditure; their 
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measure refers to the yearly expenditure in these activities. They also considered 
the future effects of its first difference. The R&D slopes for their regressions is 
about 4.5. Their study is for USA firms for 28 years (1965-1992). 
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) documented a significant intertemporal association 
between firms' R&D capital and subsequent stock returns. They suggested that 
stock prices do not fully reflect R&D capital contemporaneously but in future 
periods. They acknowledged this effect to two likely causes. First, the underre- 
action of the market to R&D information, estimated at an annual rate of 4.57 
percent. Second, the compensation in subsequent returns for extra-market risk 
factors associated with R&D. 
An important factor to measure the effect of intangible capital on firms' perfor- 
mance is the specification of the most adequate regression model. The selection 
of the proper econometric techniques has to be based in the characteristics of 
the data. In accounting data there are problems of endogeneity, where econo- 
metric methods such as OLS and Within estimator for panel data become bias. 
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), however, has shown to tackle the 
problem of endogeneity. Some studies utilizing Monte Carlo simulation have been 
performed, such as Arellano and Bond (1991). They performed simulations for 
100 units, seven time-periods and two parameters in a dynamic model, which 
by definition, have endogenous explanatory variables. They found that GMM 
performed better than the simpler Instrumental Variables estimator, as the finite 
sample bias and variances were insignificant. This technique was also applied 
to employment equations with UK data; although, the performance of the GMM 
was still better, a downward bias in the standard errors for the two-step estimator 
was observable in both the simulation and the application to real data. 
The studies applying GMM have been mainly focused on dynamic investment 
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equations as in Bond and Meghir (1994), who investigated an empirical model 
of investment based on the Euler equation with UK company data. Investment 
models with the GMM estimator, which have used Tobin's Q as a measure of 
future investment opportunities, have compared the performance of GMM with 
OLS and the Within estimator. The performance of GMM has been demon- 
strated to be more appealing based on statistical tests, but, has been shown to 
be very sensitive to the specification of the instrumental variables. See Blundell et 
al (1992), Mairesse et al (1999), Bond et al (1997 and 1999), Mulkay et al (2000), 
Bond and Cummins (2000). Studies of corporate value have also used these tech- 
niques, for example, Blundell (1999) empirically studied the relationship between 
technological innovations, market share and stock market value. 
Generally, previous literature agrees that there is a positive effect of intangible 
capital on market value. Nevertheless, the aim of Chapter 3 is to assess this 
relationship by considering financial variables in the model, subsequently, the 
endogeneity of these variables is aimed to be controlled with the use of GMM. To 
my knowledge this method has not being applied before in this particular setting. 
1.1.2 Corporate Governance 
Corporate Governance has been defined by Denis and McConnell (2003) as: 
"the set of mechanisms - both institutional and market-based - 
that induce the self-interested controllers of a company (those that 
make decisions regarding how the company will be operated) to make 
decisions that maximise the value of the company to its owners (the 
suppliers of capital)" 
Another definition has been also given by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who 
stated: 
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"Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of fi- 
nance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment" 
Based on a firm level explanation for a good firm's performance, corporate 
governance theory has become a popular argument to explicate the dissimilarity of 
company's market and book value. The separation of ownership and management 
is the main concern of corporate governance, as it can create conflicts between 
shareholders' and managers' objectives, which is an agency problem, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Agency costs are incurred when managers do not attempt to 
maximize firm value and shareholders incur costs to monitor them. 
It has been argued that the structure of corporate ownership varies system- 
atically in ways that are consistent with value maximisation (See Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985)). The inside composition of corporations gives an insight to explain 
firm's performance by its comparison with the outside environment, (e. g. stock 
market valuations). 
In this context, an effect of directors' shareholdings on corporate value is 
frequently utilized. It has been suggested in theory a non-linear relationship 
between value and managerial ownership. However, there are some controversies 
in the empirical research to this extent, particularly with regards to the kind of 
relation (positive or negative correlation) and if so, in the inflection points that 
make these relationships behave non -linearly. 
Morck et al (1988) found a non-linear relationship between firm's value - 
measured with Tobin's Q ratio- and ownership governance -measured with the 
number of shares possessed by the board of directors-. Their findings, with USA 
data, are based upon a piecewise linear relationship with these two variables, 
where Tobin's Q increased and then decreased with increases in managerial own- 
31 
ership. McConnell and Servaes (1990) further investigated the relation between 
Tobin's Q and the structure of equity ownership. They found a quadratic rela- 
tionship with ownership and Tobin's Q. In this study, they recognized the exis- 
tent causality between insider ownership and corporate value. It can be argued 
that managers are more inclined to retain a large fraction of successful firms. It 
may also be the case that the managers of successful firms are more likely to 
be rewarded with additional forms of stock ownership. Therefore, due to these 
implications, causality should be assumed. 
By contrast, Short and Keasey (1999), found that management is aligned at 
low and possibly high levels but is entrenched at intermediate ownership lev- 
els. They confirmed from their empirical analysis that UK managements become 
entrenched at higher levels of ownership than their USA counterparts. They 
identified individual effects in the data, which are controlled with a Panel data 
estimation technique. Cui and Mak (2002) further investigate this relationship 
and found that Tobin's Q initially declines with managerial ownership, then in- 
creases, then declines again and finally increases once more. Their USA data 
reduce the noise from industry, using the industrial sectors which have the high- 
est expenses on Research and Development (R&D). Their results are robust using 
2SLS regression, and with the Hausman test, which did not indicate a problem 
of endogeneity. 
Endogeneity issues between managerial ownership and firms' value have also 
caused controversy in empirical studies. Several studies have tackled this problem 
with the use of simultaneous equations. The results of Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) supported the idea that after controlling for endogeneity of ownership 
structure with a 2SLS model, there was no statistically significant relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance. Cho (1998), found that any 
32 
possible effect of director's shareholdings on value disappears once endogeneity 
is controlled. He examined the relationship among ownership structure, invest- 
ment and corporate value and found that corporate value affects ownership struc- 
ture, but not vice versa. Likewise, Himmelberg et al (1999) who also controlled 
for endogeneity derived from observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects, 
could not conclude that changes in managerial ownership affect firm performance. 
Himmelberg et al argued that all previous studies were spurious, as they did not 
control fixed effects with panel data analysis. However, this conclusions were crit- 
icized by Zhou (2001), who argued that in panel data estimations with firm fixed 
effects, it would be hard to find a meaningful relationship between ownership and 
performance, even if one existed. Zhou also analysed the variations in managerial 
ownership. He pointed out that, while there is a substantial difference in man- 
agerial ownership across firms, changes from year to year within a company are 
typically slow. In other words, Zhou's results support the idea that managerial 
ownership stays stable over time and, as a consequence, panel data estimation is 
inadequate, as it would eliminate the effects of managerial ownership on corporate 
value. 
By contrast, significant results had been found eventhough endogeneity has 
been controlled. For instance, Chen and Steiner (2000) formulated an empirical 
model where both managerial ownership and Tobin's Q, as well as, analyst cov- 
erage were jointly determined. They found that managerial ownership enhance 
firms' value. Beiner et al (2004), also controlled for endogeneity by a simultaneous 
equation model. Instead of looking at a single control mechanism (managerial 
ownership), they used a broad corporate governance index for Swiss firms. Their 
findings support the hypothesis of a positive relationship between firm-level cor- 
porate governance and Tobin's Q. Schmid (2003) used a 3SLS model also in a 
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sample of Swiss firms, finding that managerial ownership has a positive effect 
on firms' value. Similarly, Chen et al (2003) concluded that after treating To- 
bin's Q and managerial ownership as endogenous, there is significant evidence 
that Tobin's Q increases monotonically with managerial ownership in a sample 
of Japanese firms. 
Corporate governance has been studied beyond managerial ownership2. The 
separation of ownership and control has been considered as a determinant of cor- 
porate value. Stock market valuations can be used as reference points to assess 
whether corporate governance mechanisms, developed primarily to protect share- 
holder interests, have been constituted according to the firm's interests or mainly 
for the personal benefits of specific shareholders or managers. Financial poli- 
cies are essential to achieve quality management, which consequently construct 
a credible good reputation for the firm to the outside world. Firm's behaviour 
can be manipulated by shareholders, but there are also several factors that could 
affect firm's market value, such as the separation of ownership and control and 
the largest ultimate controllers. 
La Porta et al (1998) was the first study that investigated the issue of ulti- 
mate control, by tracing the chain of ownership to find who has the most voting 
rights. The authors present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 
27 wealthy economies, to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these 
firms. Their analysis raise the question of how the agency conflict between the 
controlling and the minority shareholders can be reduced. They found that con- 
trolling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of 
their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in 
management. 
'See Becht (2002) for a review of the theoretical and empirical research of the main mech- 
anisms of corporate control. 
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Similar corporate governance databases have also been constructed, such as 
by Claessens et al (2000), who improved and extend this analysis to East Asian 
countries. In their analysis, they found an extensive family control in more than 
half of East Asian corporations, and found that significant cross-country differ- 
ences exist. For East Asian countries, corporate control is typically enhanced by 
pyramid structures and cross-holdings among firms. Finally, the separation of 
ownership and control was more pronounced among family-controlled firms and 
among small firms. Likewise, Faccio and Lang (2002), documented the ultimate 
ownership and control of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries. 
The type of datasets mentioned in the above paragraph, which are concerned 
with ownership and control, have been used for different types of studies, i. e. 
dividend policy, as in Short et al (2002) and firm performance, as in Suehiro 
(2001), Joh (2001), Palia et al (1999), among others. 
The impact of the separation of cash flow and voting rights on corporate 
value has been analysed for different countries. Holderness (2002) concluded 
from a review of this type of studies, that the relation of blockholders and firms' 
value in the US is not conclusive. Sometimes has been found to be negative, 
sometimes positive and never very pronounced. Mehran (1995) found that the 
relationship of blockholders and firms' value was not significant. Similarly, he did 
not find support for a relationship of Tobin's Q and outside ownership of specific 
groups, such as, individual investors, institutional investors and corporations. 
Claessens and Djankov (1999) found that firm profitability is positively related 
to ownership concentration for Czech firms, the more concentrated the ownership 
the higher the firm profitability and labour productivity. They also found that 
certain type of owners, such as, foreign investors and non-bank funds are more 
strongly associated with improvements in performance. 
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Moreover, there are some legal rules in the UK that protect minority share- 
holders, as stated in Barca and Becht (2001). Once an investor owns 30% of 
equity shares, it has to make an offer of all the shares in the firm. The price of 
this offer has to be the highest price that the bidder paid for the target company's 
shares during the 12 months preceding the date when the stake reached 30%. This 
action benefit minority shareholders because of the presence of equal price rules 
in the case of takeovers. Moreover, minority shareholders can make a claim to 
court when majority shareholders intend to make a profit at their expense. 
To this end, protection given to shareholders in each country might affect the 
general overlook of corporate value. For instance, Goergen and Renneboog (2001) 
suggested that the agency conflict caused by voting controls by shareholders in 
the UK differs from that found in Continental Europe. In the later, expropriation 
of minority shareholders might be the key agency problem related to ownership 
concentration. As there is extensive protection to minority investors in the UK, 
the agency problem originates from the lack of ownership concentration and con- 
trol, which requires codes to prevent managers to benefit against shareholders. 
There are different ways to obtain controlling power in a corporation. As Berle 
and Means (1932) pointed out, the control of a firm can be exerted by different 
devices, such as, pyramids, dual class shares (non-voting shares, limited voting 
shares) and cross-holdings. These devices cause differences in cash flow rights 
and voting rights in a company. The separation of ownership and control in the 
UK has been compared with other countries in Europe. For example, Franks et 
al (2004), pointed out that in the UK, family ownership is of limited significance 
and there are few dual class shares. Although, non-voting shares in the UK were 
outlawed since 1968, firms may issue "preference shares" which have a prior claim 
on dividends but limited or non-voting rights at general meetings. 
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Previous literature as described in this section has explored similar issues 
which are raised in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, conclusions in both managerial 
ownership and ownership structure have varied not only from differences among 
countries, but also from differences in the estimation methods. Therefore, Chap- 
ter 4 aims to empirically assess these issues for the UK. 
1.1.3 Country specific characteristics 
Corporate governance behaviour varies in different countries. This fact has fo- 
cused research to investigate the differences among countries that could be the 
cause of the variation. Multi-country comparisons of investors' protection is a 
common approach to corporate governance as pointed out in a survey performed 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Legal protection to minority shareholders is an 
important mechanism that emphasizes the attractiveness of investing in a spe- 
cific country. Investors' protection refers to both shareholders and creditors, who 
have legal protection which varies among countries. The enforcement of credi- 
tor's rights may be beneficial for creditors themselves but not for shareholders, 
as this limits their power in the case of bankruptcy or liquidation. For instance, 
Claessens and Kappler (2002) found that bankruptcies are higher in common law 
countries, where there are both stronger creditor rights and greater judicial effi- 
ciency. This behaviour is also in accordance with a study by Rossi and Volpin 
(2004). They found that attempted hostile takeovers are associated with better 
investor protection. This suggests that firms in countries with higher indices of 
creditors rights are more susceptible to hostile takeovers which in turn might 
negatively impact corporate value. 
Country specific characteristics have been studied from both macroeconomic 
and firm level perspectives. Rom a macroeconomic point of view, Beck et al 
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(2003) assessed two different theories with respect to the determinants of financial 
development. They found a robust link between stock market development and 
legal origin to determine financial development. For instance, countries from 
Bench legal origins have less develop stock markets than countries from English 
legal origins. Beck et al (2004) found that firms from a French legal origin find 
more obstacles in obtaining external finance than firms from other countries. This 
suggests that corporate value might be influenced by this type of limitations. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) found that financial development - typically mea- 
sured by the size of the stock market and the level of credit - reduces, at least 
partially, firms' costs for external finance. Specifically, countries with greater 
financial development grow faster in economic terms. 
Berkowitz et al (2003) analysed the determinants of efficiency in the legal 
system in a group of different countries around the world. They found that the 
way that the law is transplanted has a larger indirect effect on the effectiveness of 
legal institutions rather than the legal families. Therefore, countries which have 
some familiarity with the principles of the transplanted law have a more effective 
legal system. The transplanting effect have subsequently, an indirect effect in the 
economic development in those countries. 
The relationship of external finance and investor's protection was performed 
by La Porta et al (1997). They presented evidence on the differences across coun- 
tries with respect to legal rules protecting investors and their enforcement. They 
pointed out that these rules varied systematically by legal origin, i. e. Bench, 
English, Scandinavian, German. Their specific analysis is devoted to the coun- 
tries capital markets; the main finding was that countries with poorer investor's 
protection have smaller and narrower capital markets. 
La Porta et al (1998) concluded from a study of 49 countries that investors' 
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friendlier laws are a determinant of a more effective law enforcement. In their 
study, countries from French legal origin were found to have a lower law enforce- 
ment than English legal origin countries. 
From a firm level perspective, the literature has made comparisons of firms' 
behaviour in different aspects, depending of the country to which firms belong. 
One of the aspects is the limits that firms have to set their ownership structure. 
For example, in Germany there is a legal restriction for non-voting (and limited 
voting) capital, where it may not exceed 50% of stock capital. Another example 
is in France, where there is a legal restriction for non-voting (and limited voting) 
capital, which may not exceed 25% of the stock capital, Faccio and Lang (2002). 
Furthermore, in the UK, once an investor owns 30% of equity shares, it has to 
make an offer of all the shares in the firm. The price of this offer has to be the 
highest price that the bidder paid for the target company's shares during the 
12 months preceding the date when the stake reached 30%. This action benefit 
minority shareholders because of the presence of equal price rules in the case of 
takeovers, Barca and Becht (2001). 
In addition, there is evidence in the literature, that the effect of separation 
of ownership and control varies depending on the country. For instance, Zingales 
(1994) found that in Italy, expropriation is large and consistent with voting power. 
By contrast, evidence for Sweden suggested that separation of ownership and 
control do not result in substantial expropriation by largest controllers, Bergstrom 
and Rydqvist (1990). 
Cross-country comparisons with firm level data had been performed to assess 
the effect that different laws determine firms' behaviour. La Porta et al (1998, 
1999) examined ownership concentration in the largest publicly traded compa- 
nies and found a negative correlation between concentration of ownership and the 
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quality of legal protection of investors. They argued that strong investor protec- 
tion is associated with effective corporate governance. Further research into this 
type of relationship has also been presented by Himmelberg et al (2002). who 
estimated the relationship among investor protection, inside ownership, and the 
marginal cost of capital using firm-level data from 38 countries. Their findings 
suggested that the weaker the investor protection, the higher the concentration 
of inside equity ownership, and the higher the cost of capital. Himmelberg et al's 
study is the first attempt of research focused to the relationship of ownership and 
marginal profit (measured by Tobin's Q). 
Furthermore, a study of corporate governance and investor protection in 
emerging markets was developed by Klapper and Love (2004). They used recent 
data from 14 emerging markets and found that the average firm-level governance 
is lower in countries with weaker legal systems. Good corporate governance in 
their study, refers to a high index created from six different governance character- 
istics, such as, discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibil- 
ity and fairness'. They also include a measure of corporate valuation and found 
that firms in countries with poor investor protection can improve their corporate 
governance, which may in turn improve their performance and valuation. 
Evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection to 
minority shareholders has also been found by La Porta et al (2001). This finding 
is based on a sample of the largest 20 firms by market capitalization for 27 
wealthy countries around the world. Their results confirm that poor shareholder 
protection is penalized with lower valuation, and that higher cash flow ownership 
by the controlling shareholder improves valuation, especially in countries with 
poor investor protection. 
3 For a further description of the definitions for this elements see Kappler and Love (2003) 
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Claessens and Laeven (2003) investigated the role of property rights in the 
allocation of resources in a firm. They found that in countries where property 
rights are more secure against expropriation from powerful competitors, firms 
grow faster. To this respect, property rights were more important for intangible 
assets than tangible assets. 
Similarly, Dermigüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998,2002) found that differences 
in financial and legal systems has an impact on firms with respect to acquire 
external finance to promote growth. In their study, it was shown that firms 
attract more external finance, when they belong to a country with more efficient 
financial systems. Specifically, their results demonstrated that an active stock 
market and a well developed legal system are important in facilitating firm's 
growth. 
Generally, previous literature had accounted for the importance of country 
differences with respect to the efficiency of the legal system and to the protec- 
tion offered to external investors. Country specific characteristics, may then, be 
significant in determining of corporate value. This thesis contemplates in the 
analysis, for each of the chapters, previous findings that had been mentioned in 
this literature review. 
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Chapter 2 
Accounting Variables and Data 
Description 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the accounting data that is utilized 
throughout this thesis. This data is used for the construction of three hypotheses 
which are the aims of Chapters 3,4 and 5. This chapter intends to facilitate the 
discussion of the financial elements that although are not the main issue to in- 
vest ig; 1t c in this thesis, are fundamental for the construction of the models under 
analysis. The selection of the financial variables described in this chapter follow 
t 1l(' approach of Fama and French (1998), who focused in measuring how the 
k ix of financing decisions impact on the corporate value. In this respvvct. 
debt, dividends, investment in productive capital, total assets (representing the 
size of the firm) and Research and Development were considered to affect the 
value of the compamv. Although they did not find a tax effect. they were able 
to demonstrate ai strong influence of financial variables on value. The authors 
ýirgue(l tlilt livid iidis contain information about value that «-aý not indic; tt( 1 
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by other variables. Their cross-sectional regressions also showed that the level 
of leverage and longer-term changes in debt provide reliable information about 
value missed by the remainder of the variables. The same conclusion was implied 
about Investment. 
Further studies have also considered financial variables to explain how they 
influence firms's value. These studies are cited in the corresponding sections in 
this chapter. For instance, see Brennan (1970), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Miller and Scholes (1978,1982), Brainard et al (1980), Masulis (1980), Eckbo 
(1986), Baker et al (2001,2002), among others. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the construc- 
tion of the data set. Section 3 reviews the relevant theory of empirical research for 
each of the variables discussed in this chapter. Section 4 presents the descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix for the data. Section 5 summarises. 
2.2 Data Construction 
The data discussed in this chapter is from the United Kingdom and is used for all 
subsequent chapters. This data is also further adjusted in instances where data 
limitations affect the construction of certain variables in the following chapters. 
This adjustments are discussed in the corresponding chapters. Variables were 
obtained from "Datastream" at the firm level. The sample period under analysis 
is from 1990 to 2000. The selection of this period was chosen as systematic 
disclosures of R&D expenditure (which is the main variable under analysis for 
the next chapter) are only available for UK firms since 1990 1. 
The panel data set was constructed with the following criteria: First, only 
'This treatment of information related to R&D was also followed recently by Al-Horani et 
al (2003). 
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non-financial industrial sectors were included in the sample. Second, from these 
firms, only those with at least four continuous time series observations available 
were considered. This selection aims to have as much number of observations as 
possible and, simultaneously, enough time periods to comply with the econometric 
methods for panel data which are applied in Chapter 3. Third, as there is concern 
about the effect of influential observations, outliers in the data were controlled in 
both independent and dependent variables. The construction of the dependent 
variable (Tobin's Q) is very susceptible to measurement errors, probably for data 
errors that might create extreme and non-plausible values. To address this issue, 
approximately 2% of observations (1% in each tail) were deleted. 
Furthermore, as explanatory variables are scaled by total assets, influential 
observations may result when assets are close to zero. There is also the possibil- 
ity of outliers being created by errors in the data2. There was concern, as in the 
case of the dependent variable, that influential observations changed the results 
in the regressions. Generally, outliers might be the consequence of two different 
reasons. One is given by human mistakes made in the data. The second reason 
might be the possibility that one or some of the observations differ in any char- 
acteristic from the rest of the population. In any case, the effect of the outlier 
might change the results of the estimators. ' Therefore, outliers for each of the 
explanatory variables were excluded in the same proportion as with the depen- 
dent variable (1% in each tail). Trimming was applied to individuals (firms) and 
not to observations due to the fact that the sample data is a panel. This means 
that all the time series of the corresponding firm that had an outlier in any time 
2See Fama and French (1998) for a similar discussion about the treatment of outliers in 
explanatory variables. 
'There are some changes in the regressions with and without outliers. For instance, in 
Chapter 3, the coefficient for investment is negative when outliers are included and positive 
when they are excluded. There is also a general decrease on the impact of the coefficients of all 
the variables when outliers are excluded. 
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period, were excluded to avoid biasness in the selection of specific years in the 
sample. With these modifications, the final number of observations (firms times 
years) is 7,754. The number of firms per year differs in each of the years ranging 
from 10 to 512 firms. ' 
Endogeneity problems arising from the use of accounting variables are con- 
trolled by the application of GMM models as described in Chapter 3. Another 
methodology for cross sectional data is used in the remainder of the thesis'. 
Endogeneity is expected from the accounting variables as they are likely to be 
simultaneous, that is, that they might be jointly determined with the dependent 
variable. For instance, there has been empirical research related to the impact of 
Tobin's Q on the investment rate. Significant results have been found, suggesting 
that investment is endogenous as there is a simultaneous relationship with Tobin's 
Q'. Capital structure and the level of dividends paid are very likely to be influ- 
enced by Tobin's Q i. e. the performance of the firm. There is also the possibility 
that regressors and error terms may be correlated, e. g. shocks affecting Tobin's 
Q are also likely to affect some of the regressors such as leverage and dividends. 
All these estimation problems support the specification of the model under the 
assumption of endogenous variables, and consequently use instrumental variables 
via the GMM method. 
2.3 Variables 
The dependent variable used throughout this thesis is Tobin's Q ratio, which 
represents firm performance and value. As explanatory variables, the models in- 
'See Table 2.1 for the panel data structure. 
'Refer to those chapters for a full discussion on this issue. 
6See for example Mulkay et al (2000), Mairesse et al (1999), Bond et al (1999), Toivanen et 
al (1997). Blundell et al (1992), among others. 
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clude Dividends paid, Investment in productive capital, Leverage and size. These 
variables are discussed below individually. 
2.3.1 Tobin's Q 
Tobin's Q is a ratio of the market value of the firm to its replacement cost. This 
ratio was originally developed by J. Tobin in 1969, and represents a measure 
of profitable investment opportunities. The numerator must include the market 
value of both debt and equity and the denominator is the present value to replace 
the assets. 
In Tobin's Q theory, the objective of a firm must be to maintain this ratio 
as unity, which means, on the one hand, that if the market value of the firm is 
greater than its replacement cost, the firm should invest in capital stock. On 
the other hand, if the firm's market value is less than its replacement cost, the 
firm should disinvest in its capital stock. Further, Tobin's Q ratio has been used 
in empirical research, for example in measuring the effect of intangible capital 
on the market value of a firm, as in Megna and Klock (1993), where R&D and 
patents were utilized as representatives of intangible capital to create a model in 
a perfect equilibrium market. The authors constructed their data obtained from 
11 firms in the semiconductor industry for the period 1972 to 1990. Klock and 
Megna (2000) based their study on the wireless communications industry where 
further aspects of intangible capital were incorporated, such as advertising, radio 
spectrum licenses and measures of installed customer base. 
The relationship of Tobin's Q with financial policy was also studied by Klock 
et al (1996), whereby Tobin's Q was the dependent variable representing firm 
performance. Other research has focused on the influence of ownership charac- 
teristics on firms' value, by also utilizing Tobin's Q as a measure of corporate 
46 
value. Such studies had been performed by Chen and Steiner (2000), Himmel- 
berg et al (1999), Cui and Mak (2002), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001), among others. 
The ratio utilized herein is a proxy of Tobin's Q ratio which has been widely 
used in different studies. Among others, Hirschey (1982), and Hirsch and Seaks 
(1993) have used it to explain intangible capital aspects of advertising and R&D 
expenditures on Tobin's Q. 
The general form of the ratio utilized in this research is as follows: 
TQ = 
TA - ECR + MV (2.1) 
TA 
where TA7 is the book value of total assets, ECR is the Equity, Capital and 
Reserves of the firm and MV is Market value of the firm, which does not include 
preference capital, but only common stock. The book value of preference capital 
therefore, is implicit in the value of total assets. 
This ratio does not include the market value of debt, so the book value of 
both current liabilities and long-term debt are taken as the total market value. 
The book value of total assets is assumed to represent replacement cost. 
2.3.2 Dividends paid 
The Miller and Modigliani (1961) proposition states that under perfect market 
conditions, dividends policy is irrelevant. However, market imperfections such as 
differential tax rates, information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders 
(signalling), conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (agency 
problems), transaction costs, flotation costs and irrational investor behaviour 
might make the dividend decision relevant. 
7See appendix 1 for the datastream codes of each variable 
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Financial decisions, such as the level of dividends paid, are related to value as 
they convey information about profitability. In the literature, emphasis has been 
placed on three key aspects of the impact of dividends on firms' value: tax rates, 
signalling and agency problems. 
Tax rates hypothesis implies that dividends are taxed at a higher rate than 
capital gains, Brennan (1970). His prediction was that dividends had a negative 
effect on firms' value. By contrast, Miller and Scholes (1978) argued that taxes 
on dividends can be avoided by investing in stocks via retirement plans or by 
offsetting deductions of personal interest payments. They predicted that there is 
no significant effect on firms' value. Similarly, in Miller and Scholes (1982), firm 
value is unaffected by dividend policy because of symmetric taxation of dividends 
and capital gains. Note that these studies had been based in US data, where tax 
laws differ from those that apply to the UK and Europe (regions covered in this 
thesis). 
More recently, in a study with US data, Fama and French (1998) predicted 
that the levels of expected future dividends affect firm value negatively; that is, 
the tax disadvantage of dividends depends on dollars of expected dividends. In 
this hypothesis, dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, so firms 
that pay dividends have the disadvantage of having a higher cost of equity. In 
spite of the tax hypothesis, they found that the estimated marginal relationship 
between firm value and dividends was positive. Since for their case, there is no 
reason to expect a positive tax effect in the pricing of dividends, they inferred that 
dividends convey information about profitability (expected cash flow) missed by 
a wide range of control variables. This information about profitability obscures 
any tax effects of financing decisions. The relationship between dividends and 
value of the firm observed was an unidentified mix of tax effects and factors that 
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affect profitability, as they stated. 
It is important to note that each country has a different taxation rule which 
may impact on such a behaviour in different ways. In the UK, the way in which 
dividends are taxed differs from that in the US. Bell and Jenkinson (2002) exam- 
ined the impact of a major change in dividend taxation introduced in the UK in 
1997. Before 1997, the UK dividend taxation policy was, that dividends were tax 
preferred by certain investor classes. Subject to certain rules, Advance Corpora- 
tion Tax (when applicable), could be offset against the Mainstream Corporation 
Tax liabilities of the company, and investors could use the tax credits to offset 
their personal tax liabilities and a cash refund could be obtained by tax-exempt 
investors. In 1997, the impact of the tax change was to increase the taxation of 
dividend income by £5bn per annum, and tax-exempt investors did not have the 
ability anymore to reclaim dividend tax credits. The overall result, as Bell and 
Jenkinson stated, was to make tax-exempt investors indifferent, between divi- 
dends and retained earnings. They found that dividend valuation decreased after 
the tax reforms . 
Fama and French (2001) deduced that firms that have never paid dividends 
are more profitable than former payers and also have strong growth opportunities. 
Dividend payers are, in turn, more profitable than firms that have never paid. But 
firms that have never paid invest at a higher rate, do more R&D, and have a higher 
Tobin's Q ratio than dividend payers. They found that, in general, firms have 
become less likely to pay dividends through time, whatever their characteristics9. 
Signalling is a second approach commonly used to explain the effect of div- 
'See the correlation matrix in section 3, After 1997 the correlation of dividends paid and 
Tobin's Q became low and even negative. This effect might be related with the tax reform on 
dividends. 
9 After summary statistics of the data for the UK used in this research, a general decrease 
of the firms that pay dividends is also observed. The proportion of payers decrease from 89% 
in 1990 to 74% in 2000. 
49 
idends on performance. For example, if firms use dividends to signal quality, 
dividend payments might be positively correlated with firm value. Dividend pay- 
ments and changes in dividend policies are regarded as conveying information 
about permanent earnings (Brainard et al 1980). Dividend payments can provide 
the firm a certain element of stability which may be reflected in its value. 
To explain further concepts of market imperfection, Baker et al (2002) ex- 
amined theoretical and empirical research on dividends and share repurchases 
because they are the principal mechanisms by which corporations disburse cash 
to their shareholders. Probably an important part of this work is the review of 
surveys of firm managers. The most recent of which is that of Baker et al (2001), 
whose findings are consistent in many ways with earlier results. For instance, 
factors influencing dividend policy appear to be relatively stable over time and 
managers generally believe that dividend policy affects value. Respondents ex- 
pressed a high level of agreement with the idea that signalling is a reason for the 
level of dividend payments. 
An important characteristic related with dividends was detected with the de- 
scriptive analysis of the data. The way in which the variable "dividends paid" 
is constructed may produce different results. "Ordinary dividends", datastream 
code X(187), is defined as "the net amounts proposed on ordinary shares, includ- 
ing any variable amount paid on participating preference shares, saving shares 
and preferred shares". After inspection of annual reports of some of the compa- 
nies, it was found that "ordinary dividends" from datastream coincides with the 
annual amount reported in dividends on ordinary shares. 
By contrast, if the variable is constructed as: "dividends per share" times 
"number of shares", the total value does not include special dividends, and in 
fact it seems to correspond only to cash dividends. This variable gives a more 
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stable dividend behaviour over time. 
To acknowledge the importance of this difference, the most relevant case in 
relation with the two measures is explained with the following example. Arcadia 
group present a decrease in ordinary dividends of more than five thousand percent 
from 1998 to 1999. In fact, after referring to the files obtained previously from 
datastream for all the periods under analysis, it was found that the dividend 
payment done in 1998 stands out. The amount registered in ordinary dividends 
was £851.1 million, against an average for the rest of the years of £34 million. 
This outstanding amount was related to the demerger of Debenhams in the 1998 
financial year. Dividends in specie were paid for £830 million. Dividends in 
specie are non-cash dividends which will usually be declared in a given amount, 
to be satisfied by the transfer of assets. The dividend will be equal to that given 
amountlo 
An effect of this nature could be very influential for the regression results, 
given that a demerger is an important change in the structure of the company 
that is expected to affect somehow the value of shares in the stock market. This 
might show that the influence of the dividend payment is not because of the 
payment itself but because of special changes given in the company which are 
accounted as dividends. 
Another effect of dividends paid on firms' value is related to the agency prob- 
lems between corporate insiders and outside shareholders. According to this 
theory, dividends payments might be used as a disciplining device for managers. 
Profits could be diverted for personal benefits of insiders, unless that they are 
paid out to shareholders as dividends. As a consequence, shareholders might 
prefer dividends than retained earnings. (La Porta et al, 2000) 
1°See: http: //www. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/manuals/ctl23manual/ctl520. htmCT1520 
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In summary, the inclusion of the ratio "dividends paid to total assets" is 
expected to impact the Tobin's Q ratio in a positive way for the UK. In this 
sense, this thesis argues that managers use dividends as a means of transmitting 
information to shareholders about the performance of the company. The ratio of 
"dividends paid to total assets" can be, as stated by Fama and French (1998), a 
noisy proxy of dividend policy. Noisy in the sense that it can change in response 
to a change in profits on existing assets without implying a change in the target 
payout. Both measures of dividends with and without "special dividends" were 
included in the model described in Chapter 3 to examine their effect on firms' 
value. 
2.3.3 Leverage 
As for dividends, different empirical studies have been conducted to explain the 
effect of leverage on firms' value. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that higher leverage allows a firm's man- 
ager to hold a larger fraction of its common stock. This reduces agency problems 
by aligning the manager's interests more closely with the interests of other stock- 
holders. Jensen (1986) argued that leverage also enhances value by forcing the 
firm to pay out resources that managers might otherwise waste on poor invest- 
ments. The model predicts that to control the agency costs created by free cash 
flow, firms with more profitable assets commit a larger fraction of their earnings 
to debt payments. 
There are also other studies that relate the value of the company with the tax 
advantages of issuing debt. Masulis (1980) investigated whether tax benefits of 
debt increase firm value. His tax hypothesis suggests that the increase in leverage 
exchange offers will increase tax deductions and subsequently increase firm value. 
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He found evidence consistent with his predictions: leverage-increasing exchange 
offers increase equity value by 7.6%, and leverage decreasing transactions decrease 
value by 5.4%. So, according to Masulis' prediction, tax benefits of debt increase 
firm value. However, there has been evidence of non-tax factors affecting exchange 
offers market reactions giving other tax interpretations" 
There is some evidence that the impact of leverage on stock reactions is not 
related with tax reduction. For instance, Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Eckbo 
(1986) found that straight debt issuance (without equity retirement) does not 
produce a significant reaction in the stock price. Other studies suggest that 
exchange offers convey nontax information that affects security prices, perhaps 
due to asymmetric information problems or due to signalling, Leland and Pyle 
(1977). 
Fama and French (1998) argued that a positive coefficient on interest is evi- 
dence of positive tax benefits of debt. However, in their regressions, the coefficient 
on interest is either insignificant or negative. They interpret those results as be- 
ing inconsistent with debt tax benefits having a first-order effect on firm value. 
Instead they argued that interest provides information about earnings, which is 
not captured by their controls. 
The finance literature has pointed out the benefits and costs of debt under 
the trade-off model, as Fama and French (2000) discussed. A positive impact of a 
leveraged firm is the reduction of cash flow problems and also the tax deductibility 
of interest. The costs of debt might cause agency conflicts between shareholders 
and bondholders and also potential bankruptcy costs. On the other hand, the 
pecking order model, Myers (1984), suggests that the cost of issuing new securities 
might overwhelm other costs and benefits of debt (and dividends). Such financial 
1' Myers (1984), Cornett and Travlos (1989), who did not find evidence that tax benefits 
increase value. 
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costs are, for example, transaction costs and asymmetric information costs. The 
model predicts that, holding investment fixed, leverage is lower for more profitable 
firms. So in this case, firms do not have leverage targets. Fama and French 
(2000) supported the profitability prediction of the pecking order and with reliable 
statistical evidence confirmed previous evidence that more profitable firms have 
less book leverage. However, they conclude that there is an issue where the 
pecking order model stumbles badly. After sorting leverage, it is observed that 
lower leveraged firms have higher spreads of investment over earnings (lower free 
cash flows), a situation that is consistent with the trade-off model. So in this 
respect, their results are inconclusive. 
Leverage might be an important factor in corporate finance to control man- 
agers and to monitor them, as they could spend profits in perquisites or other 
sources that do not increase value to the company12. Leverage might be inter- 
preted as a proxy of the ability of firms to issue debt, however, the excess of debt 
in a company can also cause financial distress and have a negative effect. 
A measure of leverage is included herein to capture the impact of any of the 
factors discussed above. This measure is constructed with both short and long 
term debt divided by total assets. 
2.3.4 Investment in productive capital and size 
Investment in productive capital is performed by firms mainly with the objective 
of having a future benefit. If the firm invests on productive capital, such as ma- 
chinery or merchandise, after a period of time it is sensible to forecast an increase 
in the companies' value when such investment -plus a premium- is recovered. In 
the opposite case, when the firm disinvests, a negative effect on value might be 
"See Harris and Raviv (1991) for a review of theories of capital structure concerning agency 
costs of debt. 
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expected. 
It is expected that a firm will invest when there are future prospects of profits. 
As in Hall (1999), an amount x of payout is expected depending on the investment 
in capital held for a productive use. The variable used for the investment measure 
is represented by the change in productive capital from one period to the next. 
The measure is constructed as follows: 
It=Pt - Pt-i (2.2) 
where It is the investment for period t, Pt is the total productive capital in 
time t, and Pt_1 is the total productive capital for the previous year. Productive 
capital includes both inventory and fixed assets: 
Productive capitals = St + (1 + 6) Ft (2.3) 
where S is the inventory of the firm (stocks + work in progress (WIP), datas- 
tream X(364)), ö is a rate of obsolescence which, for simplicity, could be equalized 
to an annual depreciation rate of 15% and F is the value of net fixed assets. 
To control the variety of sizes in the sample under analysis, a measure is 
included with the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 1990 prices: size = 
ln(total assets). As Fama and French (2000) pointed out, this measure of size may 
also be a proxy for other factors, such as age and ease of access to capital markets. 
2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
The distribution of the sample of 7,754 observations over the 11 years period 
1990-2000 can be observed in Table 2.1. The highest number of observations was 
concentrated in firms with 11-years of information, which represents 59% of the 
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total number of firms. The distribution of the number of years per firm is also 
more concentrated in firms with 4 time-periods, which constitutes 12% of the 
total number of firms included in the sample. 
Number of Number of % Number of % 
years firms observations 
4 104 11.9 416 5.4 
5 86 9.9 430 5.5 
6 53 6.1 318 4.1 
7 52 6.0 364 4.7 
8 23 2.6 184 2.4 
9 10 1.1 90 1.2 
10 32 3.7 320 4.1 
11 512 58.7 5,632 72.6 
Total 872 7,754 
Table 2.1: Panel data structure 
Table 4.6 presents descriptive statistics for the financial variables used in this 
thesis. From the table it can be observed that the mean value for Tobin's Q 
is 1.95, while its median is 1.38. The highest value of the dependent variable 
Tobin's Q is 35.7. This value is high in comparison with the mean value, even 
after controlling for outliers. In fact, 27% of the total number of observations 
(2,086 observations out of 7,754) have higher Tobin's Q ratio than its mean value. 
Moreover, 7% of the total number of observations have a Tobin's Q ratio greater 
than 4 (567 observations out of 7,754). This means that outliers cannot be further 
controlled, as these would represent a high biased choice against high values of 
Tobin's Q. Among observations with values greater than 4,30% correspond to the 
"computer, electrical and electronic equipment" industrial sector. The first and 
third quartiles of Tobin's Q are 1.01 and 2.04, respectively. It can be observed 
that between the 25%-75% of the observations, there is less influence from extreme 
observations. 
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UK (872 firms) 
Mean 25% Median 75% Std. Dev. Min Max 
TQ 1.95 1.01 1.38 2.04 2.20 0.37 35.7 
TL 0.18 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.15 0 1.55 
I/TA 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.09 0.19 -2.7 0.96 
D/TA 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0 0.53 
Dl/TA 0.02 0.004 0.02 0.034 0.04 0 1.94 
size 10.8 9.48 10.6 12.12 2.02 4.3 18.4 
TQ: Tobin's Q ratio, RD: Research & Development, TL: total leverage, 
I: change investment on productive capital, D: dividends paid, D1: dividends paid 
excluding special dividends, size: log(total assets). TA: Total assets 
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics (average 1990-2000) 
Total leverage has a mean value of 0.18, which means that on average, debt 
for firms in this sample constitutes 18% of their total assets. More than 1.5% of 
the firms have, at least in one of the time periods under analysis, a ratio for total 
leverage greater than 1. As with Tobin's Q, this is after controlling for outliers. 
This situation might be observed in firms which have negative equity. 
Investment has a mean value of 0.04 and a lowest value of -2.7, which is not 
only due to negative equity, as with total leverage, but to firms that diminish 
their total assets considerably from one period to another. For some cases, a low 
investment ratio did not always mean a reduction in market value. The ratio of 
dividends to total assets has a mean value of 0.03, so firms in this sample pay 
an equivalent average of 3% of dividends in relation to the total assets of the 
company. 
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Year No. obs. R&D I D DI size L 
1990 536 0.128 0.039 0.291 0.048 -0.139 -0.067 
1991 548 0.192 0.084 0.208 0.030 -0.072 -0.129 
1992 556 0.202 0.055 0.325 0.042 -0.077 -0.145 
1993 579 0.202 0.044 0.229 0.094 -0.184 -0.096 
1994 633 0.205 0.109 0.345 0.180 -0.195 -0.178 
1995 686 0.306 0.040 0.115 0.042 -0.201 -0.098 
1996 776 0.262 0.076 0.228 0.140 -0.170 -0.152 
1997 871 0.347 0.042 0.108 0.074 -0.210 -0.085 
1998 871 0.325 -0.006 0.058 0.034 -0.120 0.019 
1999 868 0.306 0.019 0.020 -0.054 -0.153 -0.075 
2000 830 0.267 -0.053 0.019 -0.003 -0.115 -0.154 
all 7,754 0.290** 0.027* 0.099** 0.025* -0.143** -0.083** 
TQ: Tobin's Q ratio, RD: Research & Development, TL: total leverage, size: log(total assets), 
I: investment on productive capital, D: dividends paid, D1: Cash dividends paid. ** and * 
indicate coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5%, respectively (applied only to the last row). 
Table 2.3: Annual Correlation matrix of Tobin's Q and the explanatory 
variables 
Table 2.3 presents the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables with 
Tobin's Q for every year. One important aspect that can be observed is the 
behaviour of both of the variables constructed for dividends D and D1. The 
correlation of the former with Tobin's Q is much higher than when the special 
dividends are excluded. This issue is expected to have important effects in the 
regression results. Moreover, there is an important effect on both D and D1 
after 1997. For the former, the correlation decreases dramatically from 0.10 in 
1997 to 0.01 in 2000. Moreover, the correlation of D1 with Tobin's Q not only 
decreases but becomes negative from 1999. This behaviour might be explained 
with the 1997 UK tax reform. Before 1997, a feature that distinguished UK from 
other imputation tax systems was that the tax credit was fully refundable to 
tax-exempt shareholders. 13 
13Tax-exempt shareholders consist in pension funds, insurance companies, charitable bodies 
and individuals holding shares through Personal Equity Plans (PEPs). Partial refunds were 
also granted to non-resident investors. See Bell and Jenkinson (2002) 
for an analysis of the 
impact of this reform on the valuation of dividends on pension funds. 
58 
The correlation of Tobin's Q with R&D is consistently high, reaching up to 
0.35 in 1995. Therefore it is expected that a significant relationship can be found 
between these two variables. The correlation between investment and Tobin's 
Q varies from year to year. Generally speaking, a systematic pattern cannot be 
deduced, probably because investment includes all productive capital and not 
only investment in fixed term assets. Moreover, investment represents the change 
of this type of capital from one year to the next, which may be the reason for the 
observed variation. Size and leverage generally have a negative correlation with 
Tobin's Q. 
The next table contains the correlation matrix for pairs of explanatory vari- 
ables. The null hypothesis is the no (linear) relationship between a pair of random 
variables. The only pair of variables that cannot reject the linear relationship is 
investment with size, which coefficient is 0.016. The coefficient for the remainder 
of the variables reject the null hypothesis at the 1% and 5% significance levels. 
R&D ID size 
I -0.073** 1 
D -0.058** 0.024* 1 
size -0.083** 0.016 0.139** 1 
TL -0.072** -0.052** -0.185** 0.186** 
RD: Research & Development, TL: total leverage, 
I: investment on productive capital, D: dividends paid, 
size: log(total assets). ** and * indicate coefficient is 
significant at the 1% and 5%, respectively. 
Table 2.4: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter introduced the variables that are part of the models used to study 
the factors that determine Tobin's Q ratio throughout the thesis. The construc- 
tion of the general database has also been discussed in this Chapter, such as 
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the control of outliers, period under study and distribution of the panel data 
observations. The dataset described is then applied for the whole thesis with 
the required modifications to fit each of the Chapters' requisites. Three main 
aspects about financial variables have been discussed: First, a brief discussion 
of previous empirical literature for each of them. Second, the descriptive statis- 
tics which includes mean, quartiles, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
points. Third, the correlation of each of this variables with respect to the Tobin's 
Q ratio and the correlation between explanatory variables which might suggest 
possible endogeneity issues to be considered in the following chapters. 
Dividends paid, changes in productive capital, total leverage and size (natural 
logarithm of total assets) i. e. accounting variables, are expected to be important 
factors for the specification of the models. Although the study of their impact is 
not within the scope of this thesis, they are considered important elements which 
should not be ignored. These variables are expected to contain information about 
the performance and value of the firm which are not explained for other factors 
under study. The selection of these variables was based on previous empirical 
studies which aimed to explain value and performance of the firm. To date, 
however, their significance and impact have not been conclusive. 
The inclusion of these variables is by the creation of their ratio to total as- 
sets". They are included throughout the different chapters together with new 
characteristics that are the main topic of study of this research. Factors such as 
R&D, separation of ownership and control and investor protection characteristics 
are the main focus of investigation for the remainder of this thesis. 
la Note that leverage is itself constructed as the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
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Chapter 3 
Effects of R&D on Tobin's Q 
3.1 Introduction 
The importance of Research and Development (R&D) activities in the UK has 
become more significant a,. s technological developments in some industrial sectors 
lia%v increased, mainly in IT technology and pharmaceutical industries. Previous 
research has associated this type of investment with a positive impact on firms' 
vac lu ie, with most studies originating from the USA and only a few from the 
UK. For the UTNý, Toivaiien et al (2002) examined the reaction of the market to 
"new" newwws of IU &D expenditure. In particular, they argued that information on 
int iov it ion measured by RkD has a significant positive impact upon the market 
value of fiiriiis. For the US, Hirschey (1982) found that advertising and R&D 
expenditures have significant and positive market value effects for companies. 
I Ie plc lvocait ec l further investigations on this aspect by considering variations over 
tine and across industries (fixed effects). Studies by Megna and Klock (1993) and 
lylOrk sind Megiii1 (2000) have also found a positive and significant relationship 
of I1&-D and firms' value in two different industrial sectors: Semiconductor and 
Wireless communicat ioiis. Siiiiilar conclusions for the US are also given in Hall 
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(1993), Hall (1999), Chen and Steiner (2000), among others. 
Moreover, Akbar and Stark (2003), used four different deflators to measure 
the effect of dividends and R&D expenditure, among other variables, on corporate 
value in the UK. They found that the effect of R&D expenditure on corporate 
value remains positive and significant independently of the deflator used (similarly 
for dividends declared). Xu and Zhang (2004) argued that in Japan, the R&D 
effect on the stock market is different from that observed in the USA. They 
examined the R&D effect in explaining stock returns in the Japanese market and 
found a positive and significant R&D effect during the period 1993-2000 (post- 
bubble period), but an insignificant effect for previous periods. They analysed 
the risk-reward patterns of stock returns in the subsequent period rather than 
instantaneous responses of the stock prices to the R&D announcements. Their 
results showed that overall, returns are positively related to the level of the R&D 
intensity, and to a lesser degree, the total risk of returns is positively related to 
the R&D intensity. 
This chapter aims to follow this line of research with the objective of studying 
the impact of R&D on Tobin's Q ratio in the United Kingdom. The focus of 
this research is to measure the benefit, from a firm's value perspective, given 
by investments in R&D (as a proxy of innovation). In this respect, Tobin's Q 
represents both market value and good performance of the firm. The information 
about R&D activities might be an important factor for investors as there is an 
implicit risk about the future outcome of these activities. Firms that pursue 
R&D activities might be compensated in terms of higher value. More specifically, 
R&D might not only increase the future value of the firm due to the success of 
the project in question, but it could affect the present corporate value as R&D 
activities contain information about a possible future success. 
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Although this type of relationship has been previously studied, this chapter 
intends to assess the evidence of a positive effect of R&D activities on firms' value 
by considering some aspects which differ from previous research. To this extent, 
the contribution of this chapter to the financial literature can be summarised in 
two points. First, the model includes financial variables following empirical work 
analogous to Fama and French (1998). Financial variables such as dividends paid, 
leverage, investment in productive capital and size have been found to have sig- 
nificant effects on firms' value. Previous findings concerning to these variables 
are discussed in Chapter 2 as they are included in the models for the remainder of 
the chapters. Although, financial variables are not the main scope of research in 
this Chapter, they are considered to be part of the true model following financial 
theory. Moreover, very interesting results have been found to this respect. For 
instance, dividends paid was shown to be a highly significant variable to deter- 
mine market value, but only when "special dividends" are included, as it is fully 
discussed in the following sections. 
Second, by considering the statistical characteristics of the data, this chapter 
intends to use an appropriate econometric technique to measure this relationship. 
Previous studies have already found positive effects of R&D on Tobin's Q for 
different countries, as those mentioned in the paragraphs above. Nevertheless, 
the main contribution of this chapter is to assess the evidence on that respect by 
using econometric methods which vary from those applied in previous research 
(typically, OLS for cross sectional and fixed effects for panel data). Specifically, 
endogeneity and firm effects are recognized. 
The endogeneity problem of the data is controlled by the use of instrumen- 
tal variables with the application of the General Method of Moments (GMM). 
Endogeneity of the explanatory variables is likely in accounting variables as they 
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may be simultaneous, that is, that they might be jointly determined with the de- 
pendent variable. Endogeneity can also be caused by the correlation of regressors 
and error terms e. g. shocks affecting Tobin's Q are also likely to affect some of 
the regressors such as leverage, dividends and R&D. There are other advantages 
in favour of the use of GMM in a panel database. These include the possibility 
to control firm-specific effects by obtaining the first-differences, and to control 
period effects which originate from macroeconomic shocks common to all firms 
by the inclusion of time dummies. 
On the contrary, biasness of results is expected when simple regression spec- 
ifications are implemented, such as the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for cross 
sectional analysis or the Within estimator for panel data. Although the within 
estimator eliminates the individual effects of the observations, the results can still 
be biased unless the explanatory variables are proven to be exogenous. 
Studies applying GMM have been primarily focused on dynamic investment 
equations, as in Bond and Meghir (1994). Similar studies have compared the 
performance of GMM with OLS and the Within estimator. The performance of 
GMM has been demonstrated to be more appealing based on statistical tests, 
but has been shown to be very sensitive to the specification of the instrumental 
variables'. Furthermore, R&D has been studied by comparing it with tangible 
investment. From these studies, the simultaneous relationship of R&D and To- 
bin's Q with investment in tangible capital is suggested. Some of these studies 
have recognized the endogeneity problem and attempt to control it with the use 
of adequate econometric estimators. See, Mulkay et al (2000), Mairesse et al 
(1999), Bond et al (1999), Toivanen et al (1997)2. However, to date, there is not 
'See Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell et al (1992), Mairesse et al (1999), Bond et al 
(1997 and 1999), Mulkay et al (2000), Bond and Cummins (2000). 
2Some other empirical work with intangible capital has investigated the productivity of the 
firm via the Cobb Douglas production function, as in, Coto and Suzuki (1989), Griliches (1994), 
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specific recognition (and treatment) of the endogeneity problem in such a model 
as the one presented in this Chapter. 
An important aspect of the analysis in this chapter is that the measure used 
to explain R&D activities is in fact the R&D stock which accumulates and de- 
preciates previous R&D expenditures. This intends not only to capture the con- 
temporaneous reaction of the market to information about R&D activities but to 
evaluate the effect of past R&D expenditure on firms value. 
In the following section, the construction of the empirical model is explained. 
Section three contains the data description of R&D activities. The econometric 
results are presented in section four and section five contains the summary and 
conclusions. 
3.2 The empirical model of corporate value 
To date, most of the empirical work related with intangible capital has focused 
on the US due to the numerous sources of information that are available. In the 
present analysis of UK, a similar kind of research has been more restricted due 
to the limitations to obtain information to represent intangible capital. 
A model developed by Klock and Megna (1993) is used as a starting point, as 
it portraits the relationship that is aimed to examine in this chapter. The model 
assumes that firms operate in competitive markets and that capital stocks are at 
the optimal levels. 
Tobin's Q ratio represents the value of the firm and can be defined as, 
Wakelin (2000). 
Blundell et al (1999) examined the empirical relationship between technological innovations 
and stock market value. Although the GMM estimator is applied, their study did not include 
R&D activities as in this Chapter. 
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My 
K1 + K2 
(3.1) 
where Kl + K2 are tangible and intangible assets, respectively. My is the 
market value of debt and equity. 
The use of q for measuring intangible value is based on the assumption that a 
company's long-term equilibrium market value must be equal to the replacement 
value of its assets, giving aq value close to unity. Deviations from this relationship 
(where q is significantly greater than 1) are interpreted as an unmeasured source 
of value, generally attributed to a company's intangible value. Therefore, in this 
model, q is expected to be equal 1, where the market value of a firm is equal to 
the replacement cost of its assets, so the firm would represent its real value in 
the long term. However, the intangible capital is not observable, so the Q ratio 
which can be calculated with the observable capital is: 
My 
9= K1 
(3.2) 
As said before, in the long term, an equilibrium of q=1 is expected, so under 
that condition market value can be expressed as My = Kl + K2. From equation 
(3.2), My is substituted to obtain the following relationship with the observable 
q' : 
_ 
K1+K2 
+K2 qý Ki Kl 
(3.3) 
K2 represents all the j intangible characteristics for all the i available obser- 
vations for each period t, as shown in equation 3.4; 
n 
K2 =E Knit (3.4) 
j=l 
66 
Equation 3.3 can be rearranged to represent a linear model for a panel data 
set as follows: 
9Zt = a+ ßl 
K2Zc 
+'YjXit + 6it KlZt 
(3.5) 
where a represents the intercept, Klit is the value of the tangible capital 
represented by total assets per firm, K2it is the value of R&D which represents 
intangible capital and Xit represents the control variables, such as capital struc- 
ture characteristics. ßl and 7 give all the parameters of estimation for each of 
the variables included in the model. 
Literature related with performance of the firm suggests the importance of 
control variables that might be an influence for the Tobin's Q ratio. The descrip- 
tion of these variables is discussed in Chapter 2 as well as their stylised facts. 
These variables follow empirical research pursued by Fama and French (1998). 
The explanation of these variables is included in a separate chapter as they are 
utilized along the rest of the thesis, so the reader of each of the chapters may 
refer to them. 
These variables are: Total leverage (TL), Dividends paid (D), Investment (I) 
and size (log of total assets). 
Therefore, for estimation purposes, the following linear specification of the 
valuation function was adopted; 
R&Dit 
+ 02TL + ß3 
Dit 
+ 04 it q't = ßl TA- 
it TAit TAZt 
+ß5sizeit + ai + At + vit 
(3.6) 
where ai represents the firm individual effects, At represents the period effects 
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and vit is the error term. All regressions include time dummies as it is assumed 
that there are effects that vary through time but are fixed for all the firms in a 
given year, capturing mainly economic factors that are outside the firms' control. 
Similarly, the model considers individual effects, which are different for each firm 
but constant through time. 
Fixed effects are control by a first-difference transformation because of the 
likely correlation of the explanatory variables with firm-specific elements, situ- 
ation that would not provide efficient parameters estimates in a levels model. 
TA is total assets, which are also useful as a deflator, and helps to avoid some 
potential problems of multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. 
3.3 Data 
The analysis was performed using UK data. The unbalanced sample contains 
approximately 872 firms. As systematic disclosures of R&D expenditure were 
not a legal requirement in the UK until 19903, reliable information may not be 
available for earlier periods. Therefore, the study period is from 1990 to 2000. 
Variables were obtained from "Datastream" and include all the non-financial 
industrial sectors. The final sample contains 7,754 observations. Descriptive 
statistics of the control variables are discussed in Chapter 2. 
R&D is represented with the Datastream code X(119). This figure includes 
disclosed amounts of expenditure in the year which are not capitalized in the 
balance sheet. The stocks of R&D were constructed from this variable. R&D 
expenditure was accumulated for five years (starting from 1984 or the first year 
where information was available for a particular firm). Thereafter, a depreciation 
rate of 15% per year (6) was applied. This methodology has been popularized 
'See Al-Horani et al (2003). 
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by Hall (1990) and is based in a standard perpetual inventory equation with 
declining balance depreciation. The formula applied for the accumulation is as 
follows: 
RDstockit = (1 - 6)RDstockjt_1 + RDit 
where RDstockit is the end of period stock of R&D and RDit is the expendi- 
ture during the year. 
year Expenditure on R&D 
performed in UK 
Expenditure on 
R&D analysed 
in this Chapter 
% of R&D included 
in this research 
1990 8,054 4,662 58 
1991 7,842 5,177 66 
1992 8,166 5,359 66 
1993 8,717 4,455 51 
1994 8,842 4,042 46 
1995 9,116 5,126 56 
1996 9,297 6,464 70 
1997 9,556 6,828 71 
1998 10,133 7,149 71 
1999 11,302 8,847 78 
2000 11,510 9,267 81 
grand total 109,951 67,377 61 
Sources: Datastream and office for National Statistics, R&D of business enterprises. 
Table 3.1: Percentage of research and development analysed over the 
total population for UK ('millions of pounds) 
Table 3.1 presents the R&D expenditure of UK businesses, and is compared 
with the R&D expenditure analysed in this research. The data on UK-based 
R&D was obtained from the web-page of UK national statistics. 4 
4http: //www. statistics. gov. uk/. This web page contains a wide selection of data produced 
by the Government Statistical Service (GSS) and other statistical bodies in the public sector. 
R&D related concepts follow internationally agreed standards defined by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and published in the Frascati manual. R&D 
is defined as creative work undertaken in a systematic basis in order to increase the stock 
of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society and the use of the stock of 
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Following this comparison in Table 3.1, the percentage of firms that report 
information on R&D expenditures in datastream is increasing every year, so for 
2000, a high percentage of R&D is available for analysis. The firms included for 
analysis constitutes (for 2000) up to 81% of the total expenditure of R&D in UK, 
which is a good representative sample of R&D expenditure in UK. 
Table 3.2 indicates the industrial sectors with the highest expenditure on 
R&D, numbers are deflated to 1990 prices. ' 
The pharmaceutical sector has the highest R&D expenditure with 27% of the 
total. It has shown a continuous increase from 1990. The rest of the industrial 
sectors show a general continuous annual increase, except for the chemical sector 
which decreased its R&D expenditure by 65% from 1990 to 2000. 
knowledge to devise new applications. R&D performed by UK businesses excludes R&D funded 
by UK businesses that is performed overseas or in other sectors of the UK economy (such as 
higher education; government departments, agencies and non-departmental public bodies; local 
authorities; and private non-profit organizations). 
'A clear inconsistency in IT hardware for UK can be observed from the Table 3.2. This 
three-year decrease from 1993-1995 was due to a specific firm named "Marconi" (datastream 
code: 900498). Marconi reported zero R&D for three years (1993-1995) after having reported 
11,040 million in 1992 (current prices), which represents 98% of the total R&D for this sector 
and 1.5% of the total R&D expenditure in UK. 
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Sector (£millions, deflated to 1990 prices) 
Year Pharma- Aero- IT Food Chemicals Others Total 
ceutic space hardware prod. 
1990 400 933 853 421 667 1,389 4,662 
1991 450 878 992 415 753 1,402 4,890 
1992 545 770 960 432 798 1,375 4,880 
1993 1,109 620 20 490 449 1,307 3,994 
1994 1,238 154 29 502 288 1,326 3,537 
1995 1,519 581 36 527 288 1,386 4,337 
1996 1,522 570 977 520 294 1,457 5,339 
1997 1,543 643 929 466 299 1,587 5,468 
1998 1,571 562 881 463 279 1,780 5,536 
1999 2,509 798 863 506 238 1,830 6,746 
2000 2,514 996 451 488 232 2,184 6,865 
Total 8,491 7,506 6,991 5,229 4,584 17,025 56,255 
% 27 13 12 9 8 30 100 
Total no. 152 126 131 310 175 6,860 7,754 
of obs. 
% 1.9 1.6 1.7 3.9 2.2 88.5 100 
Obs. 2,489 
with 
R&D 32% 
% 6.1 5.1 5.2 12.5 7.0 67.1 100 
Table 3.2: Distribution of the highest expenses on Research and De- 
velopment per industrial sectors for UK 
An important observation is that the concentration of firms in sectors with 
the highest R&D is small in relation with the whole sample of observations. The 
number of firms that are included in the top five sectors with the highest R&D 
expenditures constitute a small percentage of the total number of firms in the 
sample. The range is from 1.6% to 3.9% The last two rows of Table 3.2 show the 
proportion of the number of observations per industrial sector that have R&D 
expenditure. From the whole sample only 32% of the total number of observations 
had R&D activities. Among this, the highest number of observation was on Food 
producers with 12.5%. 
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3.4 Regression Analysis 
The analysis in this section aims to explain the information contained within 
R&D activities to determine Tobin's Q ratio, which represents the performance 
and/or value of the firm. As mentioned in the introduction, previous literature 
has found evidence of a linear positive relationship between these two variables. 
Nevertheless, the analysis in this chapter includes financial variables in the model 
and applies a different econometric tecnique, which aims to control for endogene- 
ity issues, to assess the evidence found in previous literature. The empirical 
model as in equation (3.6) is analysed with panel data. This allows to exploit 
the advantages of having information that varies within firms and time periods. 
However, there are estimation problems that arise in the presence of endogeneity 
of the variables and/or individual fixed effects. Both OLS and Within estima- 
tors are biased and/or inconsistent under these circumstances. Individual fixed 
effects are treated here as stochastic, therefore in a dynamic model, the lagged 
dependent variable will necessarily be correlated with this type of effects, situ- 
ation that result in a biased OLS (similarly, this problem arises when variables 
are endogenous). The Within estimator can correct for individual fixed effects 
by transforming the equation to eliminate them. However, in the case of panels 
where the number of time periods available is small, this transformation induces 
correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the trans- 
formed error term. Moreover, when the explanatory variables are considered 
endogenous (probably, because shocks that are not included in the model affect 
both the dependent and independent variables), the correlation of the error term 
and the explanatory variables is expected. This correlation makes the Within esti- 
mator inconsistent. A solution for this problem is the application of instrumental 
variables that are correlated with the explanatory variable but uncorrelated with 
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the error term. In this study, instrumental variables are used by the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM), which can also eliminate the firm-fixed effects by a 
first-differences transformation. 
GMM in first differences is expected to be an adequate estimator, as it corrects 
for the presence of correlated firm-specific effects as well as the bias that originates 
from the endogeneity of explanatory variables with the error term. According 
to theory, the expected GMM estimator should be within the range suggested 
by OLS and the Within estimator, which are likely to be biased in opposite 
directions (see Bond 2002 for a complete discussion). The GMM estimator has 
been studied in empirical applications of the investment theory. Normally it is 
applied to dynamic models, since the correlation of the lag variable (yi, t_1) with 
the error term is implicit. For this research GMM estimator of the type developed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) is applied in a static specification. 
An important feature of GMM is the application of an adequate matrix of 
instrumental variables6, as they may be subject to large finite sample biases 
when the instruments available are weak. 
The first step to follow in the analysis of the data was to test for the presence 
of any type of effect (fixed or random) with the Lagrangian multiplier test, with 
the null hypothesis of no within unit correlation. High values for this test favours 
a model with effects. Furthermore, the Hausman test is implemented, with the 
null hypothesis of consistency and efficiency of the random effects; in other words, 
if the Hausman statistic is rejected, one must use a model with fixed effects. Table 
3.3 presents the results of these tests in the UK data. The Lagrangian multiplier 
test suggests the presence of firm effects in the model; the Hausman test suggests 
that such effects might not be random. These results are necessary for further 
6See Wooldridge (2000) for a full description of intrumental variables. The discussion of 
the criteria to select the instruments is followed in the section "R&D and corporate value". 
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specification of the model with the GMM estimator, where the fixed effects can 
be eliminated via first differences. 
RE FE 
R-square 0.121 0.088 
Lagrangian test 21704 
(. 000) 
Hausman test 61.7 
(. 000) 
p-values in parenthesis; Null hypothesis for Lagrangian 
test is Ho: sd(u2)= 0, no within unit correlation; Null 
hypothesis for Hausman test is Ho: difference in 
coefficients not systematic; All the regressions include 
time dummies. RE: random effects, FE: fixed effects. 
Table 3.3: Tests for Fixed and Random effects for the UK 
3.4.1 R&D and corporate value 
In this model it is assumed that firms can instantaneously adjust towards the mar- 
ket value due to changes in firm-specific characteristics and /or random shocks. 
In other words, the information carried out by the different explanatory variables 
will affect contemporaneously the increase /decrease of the Tobin's Q ratio of the 
company. 
The contemporaneous setting, as stated by Lev and Sougiannis (1996), in- 
dicates the extent of current recognition of information relevance by investors, 
while the dynamic analysis may suggest that the market reaction is slow, where 
investors fail to fully recognize the value-relevance of the information. 
Although, there are no dynamic effects in the static model, R&D stock con- 
tains information about past shocks, as it has been yearly accumulated and de- 
preciated. Managers' willingness to maintain R&D spending (so a more or less 
constant R&D stock), represents a vote of confidence that the firms' future op- 
portunities might improve. 
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In this model, although there are no lags of the variables, the GMM model is 
used because of the recognition of the endogeneity problem. Table 4.6 presents re- 
sults for the UK7. The results were estimated with Pcgive for the three estimators 
(OLS, Within and GMM). 
Column (1) in Table 4.6 presents the results for the OLS estimator. AR(2) 
shows the presence of autocorrelation of the disturbance term. This reflects biases 
of the coefficients. Column (2) in Table 4.6 presents the within estimator, which 
controls for fixed effects. The parameters of these two estimators are expected 
to define the range for a more efficient estimator with the GMM, or at least an 
estimator that is not very distant from either the OLS or within parameters. 
The methodology used to choose the instruments for GMM in columns (3) to 
(6) follows Blundell et al (1992). If vet in equation (3.6) is MA(1) (xt =1 vi, t_1 
+ vit), rather than serially uncorrelated, then only the values of untransformed 
regressors dated t-2 are valid instruments in the transformed equation for period 
t. If we treat the endogenous variables as predetermined, it would allow the use 
of t-1 as an additional instrument, as xit and vit are still uncorrelated, but xit 
may still be correlated with vt_1. Column (3) presents the results under the first 
assumption where endogeneity of the explanatory variables (Xis) is considered as 
well as the MA(1) of the disturbances (vit). Therefore the instruments available 
for the endogenous explanatory variables are from t-2 and further lags. In prac- 
tice very remote lags are unlikely to be informative instruments and in addition 
can result in overfitting bias. Some studies have shown that the loss of relevant 
information caused by omitting the more distant lags as instruments will often 
be very modest [see Bond (2002)]. To avoid the overfitting bias, the lags of the 
instruments considered in all the regressions are up to t-6 (as general overfiting 
7 See Appendix 1 for comparison with Univariate results. 
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bias was developed after including more lags). 
In column (3) the Sargan test is rejected, with the null hypothesis being the 
validity of the instruments. One likely reason for this result is that the endogenous 
explanatory variables are predetermined with respect to the disturbance (vet). 
Thereafter, the lags t -1 of the endogenous variables are included as instruments. 
In this case there is the possibility of biases due to correlation of the lag t-1 
and the first differentiated error-term Avis. If the estimate of ß for each of the 
endogenous variables decreases, a downward bias of the coefficient is implied. 
The possibility of bias was investigated in two different ways. Each of the 
endogenous variables were instrumented independently with t-1, while the re- 
mainder were instrumented with t-2. The coefficients obtained behave with the 
same tendency to increase or decrease for each of the variables as when all the 
endogenous variables were instrumented with t-1 at once. The results of the 
second approach are presented in column (4). 
The results show a downward bias in the coefficients for dividends, R&D and 
size. In the presence of measurement error neither t-2 nor t-1 are available 
instruments. Therefore, Column (5) present the results with the exclusion of t-1 
and t-2 as instruments for the specific variables where the measurement error 
was detected. These variables were instrumented by t-3 and further lags and 
those variables which did not register a downward bias kept instrumented by t-2 
and further lags. 
The Sargan test although improves, is still rejected at the 95% confidence 
level as in column (5). This finding may be a result of different factors. The 
misspecification of the model is a likely cause for three reasons; first, the difficulty 
in judging for the endogeneity of the explanatory variables; second, the omission 
of an important variable in the empirical model; third, instruments available for 
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the equations in first differences are likely to be weak when the individual series 
have near unit root properties. To this respect, instrumental variable estimators 
can be subject to serious finite sample biases when the instruments used are weak. 
The econometric literature has produced a variety of tests for unit roots in panel 
data when N is large an T is small (see Hall and Mairesse 2001), however, these 
types of tests are still being implemented and developed with comparisons of 
Monte Carlo experiments and real data. For this reason, they were not exploited 
for this research. 
A final check as to the validity of instruments was completed with the exclu- 
sion of all the lags t-2, so considering as valid instruments t-3 and further lags 
(column (6)). The validity of a particular assumption is tested using the Sargan 
test of overidentifying restrictions. Difference Sargan is useful in this context, 
where the set of moment conditions specified under the weaker assumption (e. g. 
contemporaneous correlation) is a strict subset of the set of moment conditions 
specified under a stronger assumption (e. g. no contemporaneous correlation, se- 
ries are predetermined), Bond (2002). 
Letting S denote the Sargan statistic obtained under the stronger assumption 
and Si denote the Sargan statistic obtained under the weaker assumption, the 
difference DS =S- SI is asymptotically X 2, and tests the validity of the addi- 
tional moment conditions used in the former case (Arellano and Bond (1991)). 
The degrees of freedom of the difference Sargan test equals the degrees of freedom 
of S minus the degrees of freedom of Si. 
Regression with both sets of instruments were tested (from t-2 and from 
t-3 and further lags). The difference Sargan test rejects the validity of additional 
moment conditions'. Given this result the set of instruments chosen are from t-3 
'For regressions where instruments are from t-2 the Sargan test (degrees of freedom) _ 
231.8 (170) 
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and further lags. For this case the Sargan estimator cannot be rejected at the 
95% confidence level. 
The interpretation of the results is based in the model which fulfils statistical 
requirements i. e. Sargan test and AR(2) as that in column (6). 
Not all the estimators obtained with GMM were between the OLS and Within 
estimators, which were expected to be the interval for an unbias and more precise 
estimator. The interpretation of the results should be taken with caution due to 
the sensitivity of the estimators and standard errors when GMM is applied. 
First of all, there is no intercept presented in the tables for the GMM esti- 
mation. As the models are in first differences in all the GMM regressions, the 
real effect of the constant is not the average Tobin's Q, but the change of Tobin's 
Q from one year to the other (given by the inclusion of time dummies)'. This 
means that a direct comparison with the intercept of the OLS estimation, which 
effectively represents the average Tobin's Q for the sample, cannot be made. For 
this reason, the intercept has been omitted from the tables in columns (2) to (6). 
For publicly traded companies, the cost and benefit of R&D activities must 
For regressions where instruments are from t-3 the Sargan test (degrees of freedom) = 151.2 
(125) 
Difference Sargan 231.8(170) - 151.2(125) = 80.6(45) 
p-value (. 000) 
9From 11 time periods only 10 time dummies are considered, the one excluded is that which 
represents the constant term. So in this case, the constant represents the change in Tobin's Q 
from 1990 to 1991. 
For example: Assuming a2 year dataset, the equation including period effects (as dummy 
variables (D1 and D2)) would be as follows: 
Yit = Qp + öoD2t + Q1xit + ai + vit 
To be able to differentiate, each of the equations can be written as follows: 
(t = 2) Yi2 = (ßo + 6o) + /31xi2 + ai + vie 
(t = 1) yil = Qo + ß1xi1 + a{ + vi1 
where, /3 is the intercept, 60 is the period effect for year 2 and ai is the fixed effect to 
eliminate. If we subtract the second equation from the first. 
(Yi2 - yil) = 
6o + ß1(xi2 - xil) + (viz - vil 
) 
The unobserved effect, ai, does not appear anymore, it has been "differenced away". Also, 
the intercept Jo is actually the change in the intercept from t=1 to t=2. ( See Wooldridge, 
pp. 440) 
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be reflected not only contemporaneously, but in future values of Tobin's Q ratio. 
The past behaviour of this variable is taken into account from its construction as 
it has accumulated previous R&D expenses to create a R&D stock. It is expected 
that R&D activities result in new technologies, products or production processes 
that would return successful increases in performance and value. On the other 
hand, R&D activities may not be successful, but as in the opposite case, this 
result may take a long time to show its effect. R&D investment, therefore carries 
a higher risk than investment in productive capital. Chan et al (1990) conducted 
an event study on the stock market reaction to the announcements of R&D ex- 
penditures, the results showed a positive significance of this announcement. This 
demonstrates that investors are keen to deal with uncertainty in future outcomes, 
so, an instantaneous response might also be expected. 
From column (6) in Table 4.6, it can be observed that the coefficient of R&D 
has a highly positive and significant influence at the 95% confidence level. This 
estimation, besides being of high impact on Tobin's Q (Q = 4.75), relies on 
the expected range created by the OLS and Within estimators. This supports 
the expectation of achieving an estimator that measures the influence of R&D 
activities to increase value. This means that firms are compensated in terms of 
higher value when R&D activities are pursued. These results are similar to past 
research where R&D has been found to be positively related to value of the firm. 
Xu and Zhang (2004) found an average cross-sectional impact of returns on R&D 
of 0=4.9 in an study of Japanese firms from 1985-2000. They also considered the 
past impact of R&D by creating a cumulative R&D intensity measure, where an 
average weight is given to the R&D expense carried out in three consecutive time 
periods. A similar measure was constructed by Chan et al (2001), where current 
and past R&D expenditure were considered. They suggested that their measure 
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of R&D stock was equivalent to that from Hall (1990), which was applied in the 
present study. Fama and French (1998) also found a positive coefficient for R&D 
expenditure; their measure refers to the yearly expenditure in these activities. 
They also considered the future effects of its first difference. The R&D slopes 
for their regressions are about 4.5. Their study was for USA firms for 28 years 
(1965-1992). 
The positive estimator of R&D is also consistent with previous hypotheses 
where R&D activities contribute substantially to the information asymmetry be- 
tween managers and investors. Under this perspective, managers exploit the 
opportunity to obtain gains from insider trade (Aboody and Lev, 2000). In this 
sense, independently of the likely benefit from innovations given by successful 
R&D activities, firms might obtain an extra benefit from the reaction of the mar- 
ket to the disclosure of such information. These results also agree with an study 
by Toivanen et al (2002). They argue that the "news" of new activities of R&D 
have a positive effect on the market value of UK firms. 
Total leverage, Investment and size were not significant to determine value. 
The insignificant result of leverage is in line with Cornett and Travlos (1989) who 
found no evidence of the benefits of debt on value. In contrast, this result does 
not support that of Fama and French (1998), who concluded that the level of 
leverage and longer-term changes in debt have reliable information about value 
missed by other control variables, such as investment and dividends. The positive 
correlation that exists between leverage and size may be the explanation for the 
high standard errors for both when included together. To investigate this further, 
the regressions were run without the measure for size. Leverage was found to be 
positively significant at the 90% confidence level. The remainder of the variables 
were consistent with or without the inclusion of size. In general, is difficult to 
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make a conclusion of how the level of debt of a company affects value. From these 
results, it is considered that the impact of debt on value can easily be affected 
by the way in which leverage is measured, as well as, by its jointly inclusion 
with other explanatory variables in the model. Fama and French (1998) also 
suggested that these factors may introduce different slopes and significance levels 
to the estimated coefficients for leverage. 
Dividends were shown to have a positive and significant influence on compa- 
nies' value. However the confidence level decreases in the last column of Table 
4.6. The reason for such a low confidence level might be the disappointing fea- 
ture of GMM when the selection of instruments causes large differences in the 
standard errors in comparison with other estimators. 
The estimators for dividends in each specification show unexpected behav- 
four. From Table 4.6 it is observed that the range constructed by Within and 
OLS estimators is between 5.33 to 9.77, respectively. However the estimators 
calculated with GMM have a much higher estimated coefficient, except when the 
instruments are from t-1, where the estimated coefficient lies between the range 
(ß = 7.37). The reason for these variations is likely to be due to the weakness 
of the instruments. Moreover, it also can be a cause of the first-difference trans- 
formation due to the high increases (decreases) of the variables from one year to 
the next. As explained in Chapter 2, the construction of dividends paid includes 
all the "special dividends", which cause a noticeable change of the conventional 
amount of dividends paid in some companies. 1° The effect of "special dividends" 
is expected to be significant for value as a structural change in the company of 
such high monetary impact may logically affect the value of its shares in the stock 
market. Due to the special dividends, dividends paid had extreme changes after 
'°See Chapter 2, section: "dividends paid" for a complete explanation of "special dividends" 
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the first-difference transformation which might cause a disproportionate effect on 
the results. " 
A further analysis with respect to this variable was followed using a different 
way to construct dividends paid: "dividends per share" times "number of shares" . 
This variable reflects the value of cash dividend excluding all forms of "special 
dividends". The effect of the regressions with this new variable gave the following 
results: 12 First, the impact of dividends paid is much lower and ranges from 2.19 
to 2.40 with the Within and OLS estimators, respectively, but in neither case 
the estimators were significant. Second, after following the GMM estimation 
with the selection of different set of instruments, the coefficients changed and 
were higher than the range given above. Third, although the significance of 
dividends improves when calculated with GMM, the Sargan test for the validity 
of the instruments is rejected for all of the sets of instruments chosen. This fact 
might corroborate the weakness of the instrument set for dividends given that 
the instruments and the residuals of the equation to be estimated might be not 
independent. 
The lack of effect of cash dividends could be related with the signalling ex- 
planation for dividend payments. Dividend signalling theories hold that dividend 
decisions are an important way for managers to signal to shareholders about the 
future firm profitability and good performance13. However, the results presented 
herein suggest that the expected effect of ordinary dividends is not related to 
the typical and stable policy of paying cash dividends, but to special irregular 
payments. Moreover, the contemporary effect of dividends as observed in Table 
"Some studies such as Virolainen (1998) opted for deleting observations with this extreme 
values, allowing for an specific limit of change. The study in this Chapter rather analyses the 
whole set of observations to avoid biasness in the selection process. 
12 Tables with results are not included. 
13 See Allen and Michaely's (1995) survey of the dividend literature, where they state that 
the empirical evidence on dividend signalling is far from conclusive. 
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4.6 might be the result of the announcement of the payment itself. A study con- 
ducted to explain why NYSE firms have largely abandoned the practice of paying 
special dividends, by DeAngelo et al (2000), supports this finding by suggesting 
that dividends are a useful signalling mechanism only when they send clear mes- 
sages to stockholders. They found that the stock market reacts favourably when 
a special dividend is declared (holding the regular dividend constant), but that 
the stock price has a positive reaction even when firms pay a lower special divi- 
dend and leave regular dividends unchanged. Their results indicate that investors 
respond favourably to the news of a special dividend payment, even when this 
special dividend is lower than in previous years. Similarly, they found that when 
firms increase the regular dividend but omit payment of a special, the average 
stock return does not differ significantly from zero, suggesting that the regular 
dividend increase compensates shareholders somehow for the news that the firm 
will not pay a special. 
So probably, the payment of a dividend is not what causes the increase in 
Tobin's Q, but the payment of a "special dividend" which is a substantial increase 
in these payments from those of previous years. In the study by DeAngelo et 
al it is mentioned that the Wall Street Journal reports indicate that 81% of 
the "special dividends" announced in the 1990's were due to the presence of 
takeover/restructuring pressures. The presence of these pressures suggests that 
managers of these firms felt it was important to distribute large amounts of 
cash to provide a credible indication of their faith in the planned restructuring. 
Therefore, the evidence found in this chapter suggests that the increase on the 
ratio of dividends paid/ Total assets in 1 unit, due to the announcement of a 
special dividend, might increase firms value in 13.9 units. 
The inclusion of firms' size in the model is meant to control for the hetero- 
83 
geneity of firms with respect to their total assets. This negative effect might be 
explained by the likely agency cost that raise in larger firms because of the diffi- 
culties to monitor the activities of managers. Also, it might suggest that smaller 
firms have better growth prospects as in Claessens et al (2002). 
Overall, the results in Table 4.6 can be summarised as follows. First, the choice 
of the preferred model (column (6)) was based on the validity of instruments (from 
t-3 and further lags for all the explanatory variables). Based on these results, 
R&D is positively associated with Tobin's Q. An increase in the proportion of 
R&D stock to total assets by one percent would be associated with an increase in 
the Tobin's Q ratio of 4.75 percent. As the R&D stock measure was accumulated 
over the years, the positive relationship reflects the impact of both current and 
past expenses of R&D. The result for dividends showed that they are significant 
only when the "special dividend" is included, therefore only high increases in the 
dividend payments from one year to another might be influential on Tobin's Q 
ratio. However, caution should be exercised in the interpretation due to the likely 
weakness of the instruments in this specific variable. 
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UK (872 firms, 7,754 observations 
OLS 
(1) 
Within 
(2) (3) 
GMM (first differences) 
(4) (5) (6) 
constant 2.59*** - - - - - 
(. 274) 
RDt/TAt 5.01*** 2.45* 3.69** 2.37 4.81** 4.75** 
(. 873) (1.30) (1.81) (1.76) (2.19) (2.16) 
It/TAt 0.53*** 0.36*** 0.34 0.37*** 0.36 0.30 
(. 171) (. 123) (. 294) (. 092) (. 362) (. 369) 
Dt/TAt 9.77*** 5.33*** 16.1** 7.37*** 15.4** 13.9* 
(1.71) (1.33) (6.84) (2.42) (7.53) (7.81) 
TLt -0.21 0.23 0.16 0.48 0.27 0.60 
(. 293) (. 345) (. 586) (. 522) (. 616) (. 881) 
Size -0.14*** -0.34*** -0.37 -0.46** -0.40 -0.41 
(. 024) (. 082) (. 272) (. 209) (. 265) (. 314) 
R2 0.139 0.062 
Wald joint 142 48.52 36.87 43.23 29.64 22.69 
(p-value) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) 
Sargan 231.8 312.2 183.8 151.2 
(p-value) (. 001) (. 000) (. 012) (. 055) 
AR(2) 6.73 -2.86 -1.78 -1.819 -1.66 -1.66 
(p-value) (. 000) (. 004) (. 074) (. 069) (. 096) (. 097) 
instruments t-2: I/TA, TL 
in levels from t-2 t1 t -3: D/TA, t-3 
RD/TA, Size 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; Sargan test for overidentifying instrumental variables; 
All the models include time dummies; results for GMM are from the 2-step estimation; 
Wald test for joint sig. of all the explanatory variables except for dummies; Sargan test for 
the validity of instruments; AR(2) tests for the autocorrelation of second order; 
Robust standard errors. TQ: Tobin's Q ratio, RD: R&D stock, TL: total leverage, 
I: investment on productive capital, D: dividends paid, TA: Total assets. 
Instruments to t-6; ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% or 10% 
Table 3.4: Estimators in OLS, Within and GMM for UK. Static model. 
3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter an empirical model of the effect of R&D activities on market 
valuation with firm level data was developed. The contribution to the financial 
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literature was defined by two points. Firstly, the model controls for accounting 
variables, which have been used for empirical studies in previous research, such as 
leverage, dividends and investment in productive capital. The aim is to highlight 
the importance of R&D activities as an information carrier of good performance 
and high value companies together with the inclusion of the control variables 
that have previously been shown to be important in determining corporate value. 
Secondly, the analysis applied the GMM estimation in first-differences after the 
recognition of the presence of firm-fixed effects and endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables. 
The results suggest that information about R&D activities plays an important 
role to determine the corporate value of UK companies. This finding revealed that 
the value of R&D activities is recognized by the market in both present and past 
R&D expenditures. 
Interesting results were found with respect to dividends paid, which was shown 
to impact significantly on firms' value (although the significance was only at 
90%). The positive impact of dividends suggests that investors react to irregular 
information of dividend payments. This effect may also be explained with the 
managers' choice of using dividends to send credible profitability signals to the 
market. It is likely that, in the case of a specific change inside the company, such 
as a restructure, managers would send information about the credibility for the 
future impact of such a change in the firm. This information is sent to investors by 
the payment of "special dividends". There is no evidence that leverage influences 
firm value. This result is in line with previous studies where the response of stock 
prices to changes in debt has been shown to be small and statistically unreliable. 
Generally, although the results found with the GMM estimator were statis- 
tical significant for some of the explanatory variables, they should be treated 
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cautiously, as instruments were shown to be sensitive to small variations in their 
selection. Nevertheless, the findings related to R&D activities remain consistent, 
significant and positive under the specified models. The results are in accordance 
with those that have been previously found in different countries using different 
estimation methods. 
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Chapter 4 
Corporate Value, Inside 
Ownership and Ultimate Control 
in the UK 
4.1 Introduction 
In ai publicly traded corporation, conflicts of interests among investors iiiaav orig- 
iiiaatce when cash flow ownership is different from controlling power, Jensen and 
1\ lvckling (1976). The excess of controlling power to cash flow ownership ob- 
twined by either managers or largest controllers might facilitate the extraction 
of i 'soilrces from ai company in detriment of non-executive shareholders and mi- 
nority invvcstors, respectively. As a result, firms' value might be negatively in- 
Huviic 1. For cxalinple, managers could pursue their own interests such as high 
"'alarics, business trips, etc., thereby obtaining a private benefit instead 
of nnaximisiii,; the firms' value. Particularly. as pointed out by Dyck and Ziii- ales 
cont rollers might. Beet private benefits from the firm, such as perquisites 
'ti 
or in some few cases outright theft. 
Empirical research has suggested that if managers are awarded with shares, 
the agency problem between managers and owners may be reduced. To this 
extent, a non-linear relationship between firms' value and managerial ownership 
has been proposed [Morck et al (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Short and 
Keasey (1999), Cui and Mak (2002), Kim et al. (2004), among others]. However, 
there are some controversies in the empirical research to this respect, particularly 
in the form of relationship (positive or negative) and, in the inflection points that 
make this relationship behave non -linearly. 
Endogeneity issues between managerial ownership and firms' value have also 
caused controversy in empirical studies. Endogeneity of the variables is a problem 
to be expected in the econometric methods. The positive alignment between 
Tobin's Q and directors' shareholdings could be due to the fact that a highly 
profitable firm would award their directors with shares. So the real effect would 
be the opposite, i. e. performance of the firm would influence the number of 
shares that directors hold. Several studies have tackled this problem with the 
use of simultaneous equations. For example, Chen and Steiner (2000) formulated 
an empirical model where both managerial ownership and Tobin's Q, as well as, 
analyst coverage were jointly determined. They found that managerial ownership 
enhance firms' value. Beiner et al (2004), also controlled for endogeneity by a 
simultaneous equation model. Instead of looking at a single control mechanism 
(managerial ownership), they used a broad corporate governance index for Swiss 
firms. Their findings support the hypothesis of a positive relationship between 
firm-level corporate governance and Tobin's Q. Schmid (2003), who used a 3SLS 
model, also in a sample of Swiss firms, found that managerial ownership has a 
positive effect on firms' value. Similarly, Chen et al (2003) concluded that after 
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treating Tobin's Q and managerial ownership as endogenous, there is significant 
evidence that Tobin's Q increases monotonically with managerial ownership in a 
sample of Japanese firms. 
By contrast, Cho (1998), found that any possible effect of director's share- 
holdings on value disappears once endogeneity is controlled. He examined the 
relationship among ownership structure, investment and corporate value, and 
found that corporate value affects ownership structure, but not vice versa. Him- 
melberg et al (1999), also recognized the endogeneity of the variables, but from a 
different perspective. They accounted for endogeneity induced by time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity. Once they controlled both firm effects and observed 
firm characteristics, with panel data, they could not conclude that changes in firm 
managerial ownership affect performance. Zhou (2001) suggested that the use of 
panel data might not be adequate for studies related with managerial ownership 
as the fixed effects may absorb the impact, if any, of the managerial ownership 
considering that it is stable over time. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) inves- 
tigated the relationship between ownership structure and performance, treating 
ownership as an endogenous variable with simultaneous equations, and concluded 
that coefficients of single equation models of the effect of ownership structure on 
performance may be biased, as they did not find any evidence of a relationship 
between these variables. 
Using a sample of UK firms, this chapter examines whether ultimate owner- 
ship is a determinant of corporate value (represented by the Tobin's Q ratio) . 
Specifically, whether shareholders may influence firms' value depending on their 
ownership stake, controlling power and/or executive participation inside the firm 
(managerial ownership). In this context, two particular relationships of ownership 
structure and firms' value are analysed. 
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First, the internal ownership, represented by directors' shareholdings, which 
aims to measure the way in which firms' value is affected when managers are 
also shareholders of the company. The empirical model includes a measure for 
firms' size and research and development stock (R&D), as well as, specifications 
with and without financial variables. In this respect, two types of endogeneity 
are recognized. One which is caused by the use of financial variables and another 
which is caused by "reverse" causality of managerial ownership and Tobin's Q. 
A methodology which follows Rajan and Zingales (1995) is followed to alleviate 
the endogeneity problem by the use of lagged explanatory variables as instru- 
ments. Similarly, Toivanen et al (2002) tackle endogenous variables in a model 
of corporate value by instrumenting them with their lagged values. 
Thereafter, the impact of ultimate controllers on corporate value is exam- 
ined. In particular, three different perspectives related to controlling power are 
considered. Initially, the effect of largest controllers who have different levels of 
ownership and control is analysed. In this sense, lower levels of cash flow rights 
with respect to voting rights are expected to be more prejudicial for firms' value. 
This may be caused by the abuse of power when control is concentrated in few 
hands. Subsequently, the level of separation of controllers' shares is substituted 
with data of the specific type of controller. A family that is the ultimate controller 
might have different objectives with respect to firms' activities than if the state 
is the ultimate controller. For example, Claessens et al (2002) found that family 
control might be more sensitive to divert benefits to themselves than other ulti- 
mate controllers, which in turn reduces firms' value. Finally, the devices through 
which control is exerted are analysed. In this context, pyramids, control chains 
and dual shares may affect firms' value. For instance, pyramidal structures give 
control rights through chains that are not evident to minority shareholders. 
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Few studies have focused on this side of the ownership structure (i. e. ultimate 
controllers) and firms' value in the UK. Probably, because of the lack of available 
data. However, some other studies have been conducted for different countries. 
Holderness (2002) concluded from a review of these types of studies, that the 
relation of blockholders (largest controllers) and firms' value in the US is not 
conclusive. Sometimes the relationship was found to be negative, other times 
positive and never very pronounced. Mehran (1995) found that the relationship 
of blockholders and firms' value was not significant. Similarly, he did not find 
support for a relationship between Tobin's Q and outside ownership for specific 
groups, such as, individual investors, institutional investors and corporations. By 
contrast, Claessens and Djankov (1999) found that firm profitability is positively 
related to ownership concentration for Czech firms; the more concentrated the 
ownership, the higher the firm profitability and labour productivity. They also 
found that certain types of owners, such as, foreign investors and non-bank funds 
are more strongly associated with improvements in performance. In addition, 
Claessens et al (2002) found, in a sample of East Asian corporations, that firm 
value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow 
ownership. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section two discusses 
the relationship between inside ownership and firm's value. Section three focuses 
in the discussion of the relationship between ultimate controller and firms' value. 
Section four describes the data used for this study and the construction of the 
variables, as well as, descriptive statistics of the data. Section five examines the 
results by empirical analyses of two relationships of ownership structure with 
firms' value, named, inside ownership and ultimate largest controllers. Finally, 
section six concludes. 
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4.2 Inside ownership and firms' value 
The relationship of Ownership and corporate value is empirically studied in this 
part of the chapter. Specifically, inside ownership refers to that fraction of equity 
held by managers, also known as inside equity. 
Jensen (1986), divided stockholders in two groups: i) inside equity (held by 
managers), and; ii) outside equity (held by anyone outside the firm). The effect 
of managerial control may be observed in two ways. First, managers could use 
the control for their own interests i. e. perquisites or high salaries, instead of 
maximising the firms' wealth. This is also known as the entrechment hypothesis, 
which predicts a negative relation between managerial ownership and the firms' 
performance. Second, managers may assume ownership as an incentive. In this 
context, firms and managers objectives would be aligned, i. e. the wealth maximi- 
sation of the firm. This is the alignment-of-interest hypothesis, which predicts a 
positive relationship between managerial ownership and firms' performance. This 
suggests that managers may choose the way of exerting their control, and this 
may depend on the number of shares that they own. In other words, this would 
imply a non-linear relationship between inside ownership and firms' value. 
The relationship between managerial ownership and firm's value has been 
studied in previous literature such as, Morck et al (1988), who found in a cross- 
sectional analysis a non-linear relationship between firm value -measured with 
Tobin's Q ratio- and ownership governance -measured with the number of shares 
possessed by the board of directors. Their findings for USA data were studied 
using a piecewise linear relationship with these two variables, where Tobin's Q 
increases and then decreases with increases in managerial ownership. They antic- 
ipated specific inflexion points for this relationship at 5% and 25%. McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) found a quadratic relationship with ownership and Tobin's Q, 
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where the relationship was found to have a U-shape. Short and Keasey (1999) 
found that management is aligned at low and possibly high levels but is en- 
trenched at intermediate ownership levels. They confirmed from their empirical 
analysis that UK managements become entrenched at higher levels of ownership 
than their USA counterparts. The inflexion points located by Short and Keasey 
(1999) were at 16% and 42%. Cui and Mak (2002) further investigated this rela- 
tionship and found that Tobin's Q initially declines with managerial ownership, 
then increases, then declines again and finally increases once more -a W-shaped 
relationship. Their USA data reduced the noise from industry, using only the 
seven industrial sectors which have the highest expenses on Research and De- 
velopment (R&D). More recently, Kim et al (2004) examined a sample of Thai 
firms, which findings were consistent with the relationship between firm perfor- 
mance and managerial ownership found by Morck et al (1988) and Short and 
Keasey (1999). They found a cubic relationship which inflexion points were lo- 
cated at much higher levels (31% and 71%). They suggested that the higher levels 
of inflexion given by the sample of Thai firms was because the study was based 
in IPO firms and an emerging market instead of a developed market. 
In this context, this chapter aims to test the hypothesis that managers without 
ownership would find a higher benefit in directing the free cash flow to situations 
that do not maximise the firms' value. Specifically, managers would pursue their 
own interests at expense of shareholders. Moreover, this situation may improve 
in favour of the firm if shares are awarded to managers to ensure that they would 
have incentives to make efficient investment decisions (Jensen (1986)). In line 
with Short and Keasey (1999), it is hypothesised that at low levels of ownership, 
market discipline will force managers to adhere to value maximisation, Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) and Fama and Jensen (1983). However, after a certain level of 
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equity owned by managers, they could increase their consumption of perquisites. 
and probably differ from the objectives of the firm. This effect is in line with 
Morck et al (1988), where medium levels of managerial ownership could cause 
a decrease in firms' value, as managers have sufficient control to fulfil their own 
interests. Moreover, after some level of inside ownership, managers might find 
higher benefits when their interests are aligned to those of the firm. Accordingly, 
the hypothesis followed in this Chapter is that inside ownership is likely to have 
a cubic relationship, where managers align their objectives to the firm at low 
and high levels of inside ownership, but at intermediate levels this effect might 
be the opposite. In trial regressions, the linear and the quadratic specifications 
of managerial ownership and firms' performance are also included. However, the 
results did not show evidence of any significant relationship to this respect. 
Firm's market value is represented by the Tobin's Q ratio as a measure of 
firm's performance. The measure for insider equity i. e. managerial control, is 
represented with director's shareholdings. Therefore, the relationship to be found 
in this part of the Chapter is between these two elements: Tobin's Q and director's 
shareholdings. The approach to follow is based in the likely non-linearity of this 
effect. R&D and size are used as control variables to specify the empirical model 
in this Chapter. The hypothesised relationship of Tobin's Q and inside ownership 
is as follows; 
TQj =a+ ß1Owni + ß2Own? + ß3Own3 + %controli + µi 
where Own is the ratio of director's shareholdings to total number of shares 
and control represents the control variables that conform the basic model under 
analysis. Nevertheless, a linear and a quadratic relationship between managerial 
ownership and firms' value are also examined. 
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4.3 Ultimate control and firms' value 
The separation of corporate ownership (cash flow rights) and corporate control 
(voting rights) is likely to create conflicts of interests among shareholders. This 
is an agency problem, which often arises because the decision made by the con- 
trolling shareholder might not be in the interest of minority shareholders, Becht 
and Mayer (2001). 
However, there are some legal rules in the UK that protect minority share- 
holders. Once an investor owns 30% of voting rights in a company, it has to make 
an offer of all the voting shares in the firm. The price of this offer has to be 
the highest price that the bidder paid for the target company's shares during the 
12 months preceding the date when the stake reached 30%. This action benefit 
minority shareholders because of the presence of equal price rules in the case 
of takeovers. Moreover, minority shareholders can make a claim to court when 
majority shareholders intend to make a profit at their expense, Barca and Becht 
(2001). 
Goergen and Renneboog (2001) suggested that the agency conflict caused by 
voting controls of shareholders in the UK differs from that found in Continen- 
tal Europe. In the later, expropriation of minority shareholders might be the 
key agency problem related to ownership concentration. As there is extensive 
protection to minority investors in the UK, the agency problem originates from 
the lack of ownership concentration and control, which requires codes to prevent 
managers from benefiting from shareholders. 
In this part of the chapter, an empirical analysis of the effect of separation 
of ownership and control on corporate value in the UK is pursued. In general, 
international evidence indicates that the accumulation of control rights in excess 
of cash flow rights reduces the observed market value of firms, Denis and Mc- 
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Connell (2003). This situation is given because of the creation of conflicts of 
interest among investors, mainly when the largest controller abuses its power. 
Specifically, this research questions whether largest controllers have any benefit. 
opposed to increasing firms' value, depending on their level of separation of voting 
and cash flow rights (i. e. no-separation, low, medium or high). 
Furthermore, the presence of an ultimate controller is expected to be nega- 
tively associated with value. In addition, the specific type of owner [i. e. family, 
state, bank, firm, miscellaneous (charities, foreigners, etc. )] might have an impact 
on Tobin's Q in different proportions. For example, Suehiro (2001) suggested that 
family type business in Thailand does not always demonstrate poor performance 
in comparison with other types of ultimate owners. Therefore, it is expected that 
corporate value might be influenced to different degrees, depending on who is the 
ultimate controller. 
Finally, the devices from which control is exerted are examined. Berle and 
Means (1932) pointed out that the control of a firm can be exerted by different 
devices, such as, pyramids, dual class shares (non-voting shares, limited voting 
shares) and cross-holdings. Like common stock, preference shares represent par- 
tial ownership in a company. Preferred stock shareholders do not enjoy any of the 
voting rights of common stockholders. Further analysis in this respect is pursued, 
specifically, the question of whether the way of controlling a firm has any effect 
on its value. For instance, pyramids can create an agency problem call "self- 
dealing", which gives the possibility for the firm to manipulate their operations 
by trading with companies owned by the firm itself. 
These devices cause differences in cash flow rights and voting rights in a 
company. Franks et al. (2004) suggested that there are few dual class shares in 
the UK. However, although, non-voting shares in the UK have been outlawed since 
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1968, firms may issue "preference shares" which have a prior claim on dividends 
but limited or non-voting rights at general meetings, Faccio and Lang (2002). 
This is a way in which owners may acquire controlling power to the detritment 
of minority shareholders. For instance, pyramidal structures might be created 
through publicly traded companies, which give an indirect shareholding. '. In this 
respect, preferred stock shareholders may not enjoy any of the voting rights of 
common stockholders. 
4.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
In this section, the characteristics of the datasets used for the analysis are dis- 
cussed. The original database is that one described in Chapter 2. Some ad- 
justments were done to allow the matching of the new information used for this 
Chapter. Data related with both managerial ownership and control is not avail- 
able in a panel structure. For this reason, this Chapter follows a cross sectional 
analysis. 
The control variables, such as R&D and size, as well as financial variables 
(for some of the regressions) were averaged over four years (1997-2000). The 
main reason is to mitigate problems of seasonal effects and to account for slow 
reactions of the market (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). This sample of firms was 
matched with data on director's shareholdings (managerial ownership), which 
was obtained from Datastream for the year 2000. Furthermore, the observations 
which contain information of all the previous variables were matched with data 
on ultimate control which corresponds to the year 1996. This data was obtained 
from a previous research by Faccio and Lang (2002). They collected data on 
ownership and control for 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries. 
'An example of a pyramidal structure in a British company is given in Appendix 1. 
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The dependent variable for this research is Tobin's Q which represent firms' 
value and performance. This variable was constructed with data for the year 
2001. In Chapter 3, the endogeneity problem was controlled by the application 
of GMM. However, the use of GMM is not possible in this chapter given that 
data related to managerial ownership and ultimate control is only available for a 
single year. Moreover, there is evidence that data on ownership and control stays 
stable over time, thus, the use of panel data might be not adequate, as controlling 
for fixed effects in the model could eliminated the managerial ownership effect 
(Zhou, 200; La Porta et al, 2000). Therefore, the lagged explanatory variables 
aim to reduce the problem of endogeneity. The use of past values reduces the 
likelihood of observed relationships of Tobin's Q on firm-specific factors'. 
ZRajan and Zingales (1995) followed a similar methodology. They averaged the explanatory 
variables one period to reduce the noise and to account for slow adjustments. They also 
lagged 
the explanatory variables to reduce the problem of endogeneity. 
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Variables Description 
Tobin's Q Ratio that represents firm performance, constructed 
(Dependent variable) as: (Total assets - Equity, capital and reserves + 
Market value) / Total assets 
R&D stock Ratio of research and development (R&D) stock to 
(base year 1984) total assets, R&D stock was constructed using the 
methodology popularized by Hall (1990) based on 
a standard perpetual inventory equation 
with declining balance depreciation 
lnassets Natural logarithm of total assets as a measure of size 
Own Percentage of shares held by directors 
CO/C Ratio of Corporate ownership (cash flow rights) to 
control (voting rights) for firms with a controller with 
at least 10% of total shares. 
No separation Dummy variable equal to one when there is a controller 
who has equal cash flow and voting rights 
Low separation Dummy variable equal to one when there is a controller 
whose control and cash flow rights differ in a low 
level. 0.75<CO/C<0.99 
Medium separation Dummy variable equal to one when there is a controller 
whose control and cash flow rights differ in a medium 
level. 0.50<CO/C<0.75 
High separation Dummy variable equal to one when there is a controller 
whose control and cash flow rights differ in a high 
level. O<CO/C < 0.50. 
pyramids Dummy variable equal to one when there is a 
pyramidal structure at the 10% cutoff. 
control chains Dummy variable equal to one when there is a control 
chain structure at the 10% cutoff. 
dual shares Dummy variable equal to one when the company have 
two types of shares: ordinary and preference. 
Table 4.1: Description of Variables 
The final sample for analysis consist of 632 observations for the UK. The 
definitions of the variables used for this research are described in Table 4.1. 
The ratio corporate ownership/control (CO/C) represents the separation of 
cash flow and voting rights for controllers with at least 10% of the stake. Control 
refers to the percentage of shares held by the owner of the majority voting rights or 
the owner who holds enough voting rights to have de facto control. It is specifically 
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the percentage of the largest shareholder's ultimate control stake. Corporate 
ownership refers to the percentage of the largest shareholder's ultimate cash flow 
stake. These two variables -control and corporate ownership- can diverge due to 
the fact that corporations issue different classes of shares that provide different 
voting rights for given cash flow rights (preference shares), and also due to the 
existence of pyramids and holdings through multiple control chains. When the 
ratio of corporate ownership to control is equal to one, the delegation of control is 
not manipulated inside the firm. By contrast, the way of controlling could have a 
negative effect on value. The data for this ratio (CO/C) is only available for firms 
where there is a shareholder with ultimate control of at least 10%. However, no 
data is available for some observations, as some firms are widely held at the 10% 
threshold. This is the reason for creating dummy variables with different levels of 
separation (low, medium, high and no-separation, see the table above) instead of 
accounting for the ratio itself. In this way the maximum number of observations 
available is exploited aiming to avoid selection biasness. 
Table 4.2 shows the concentration of firms within different ranges of directors' 
ownership. It can be observed that for 54.9% of firms in the sample, the concen- 
tration of shares owned by directors is between 0-5%. In this range, the average 
Tobin's Q is 1.47. The maximum average for Tobin's Q was reached by the only 
three firms in the sample that have managerial shareholdings higher than 70%. 
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Own No. of firms % of 
concentration 
TQ Std. Dev. 
0-5% 347 54.9 1.47 0.93 
5-10% 70 11.0 1.54 0.99 
10-15% 49 7.7 1.45 1.84 
15-20% 35 5.5 1.21 0.50 
20-25% 30 4.7 1.75 2.87 
25-30% 14 2.2 1.30 0.60 
30-35% 21 3.3 1.45 0.81 
35-40% 12 1.9 1.44 0.75 
40-45% 10 1.6 1.11 0.69 
45-50% 5 0.8 1.28 0.76 
50-55% 9 1.4 1.56 0.94 
55-60% 10 1.6 1.17 0.44 
60-65% 10 1.6 1.36 1.11 
65-70% 7 1.1 0.86 0.26 
70-75% 2 0.3 2.81 1.10 
75-80% 1 0.1 2.35 NA 
Total 632 100 1.46 1.15 
Source: the original information was obtained from Datastream and was 
grouped to construct the averaged measures. 
Table 4.2: Concentration of directors shareholdings 
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics for the main variables used for the 
empirical analysis. It reveals that the maximum concentration of shares owned 
by directors is 75.8%, while the mean is 11.6%. This description is very similar 
to that from Short and Keasey (1999), where the reported mean for the UK in 
1992 was 11.47% and the reported maximum was 75.2%. 
A relevant characteristic for the analysis can be observed in "control stake" 
and "cash flow stake". Data is only available for information where control stake 
is at least 10%, the rest of the observations have empty cells (26% of the total 
number of observations). Therefore, the presented statistics are values excluding 
the missing observations. This implies that if it is assummed that the 26% of the 
missing observations have a controlling stake of 5% (average value between zero 
and ten), the mean value in the total sample under study would be lower than 
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20%. In other words, the majority of the firms would be widely held at the 20% 
cutoff. This statistic is close to the mean reported by Goergen and Renneboog 
(2001) of 15.2% for the largest control stake (voting block) in 1992. Similarly, 
the median for control stake if > 10% is still below the 20% cutoff (17.9%). 
Consequently, a better appreciation of the largest shareholders can be observed 
at the 10% cutoff, where a largest shareholder is observed for more than 50% of 
the companies. 
Variables 
Panel A 
Tobin's Q 
% managerial own 
Control stake if >10% 
Cash flow stake if>10% 
Panel B (Control variables) 
R&D stock/Total assets 
size 
Investment /Total assets 
Leverage 
Dividends paid/Total assets 
UK 632 obs. 
Mean Min 25% Median 75% Max 
1.46 0.24 0.92 1.17 1.56 16.6 
11.6 0 0.39 3.5 16.2 75.8 
25.2 10 13.9 17.9 30.1 89.9 
22.8 0.02 11.8 16.1 29.9 84.5 
0.05 0 0 0 0.03 1.14 
11.5 6.7 10.3 11.3 12.7 17.8 
0.03 -0.63 -0.01 0.03 0.08 0.52 
0.18 0 0.07 0.17 0.25 1.08 
0.03 0 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.18 
Notes: This table shows the mean, median and quartiles of the variables that are analysed 
in this research. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the main characteristics of 
the data under analysis. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the control variables, 
including financial variables (investment, total debt and dividends paid) which are 
considered for some of the model specifications in the empirical analysis. The sample 
consists in 632 firms for the UK. 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for UK 
Table 4.4 shows the ultimate largest controllers at both the 10% and 20% 
thresholds. Family as the ultimate largest controller refers to an individual or a 
firm which is not listed on any stock exchange. Unlisted firms are considered as 
family as it was justified, with statistical support, by Faccio and Lang (2002)3 
3In the UK, there is a 3% disclosure rule for unlisted firms. However, Faccio and Lang were 
still unable to find ownership data for all unlisted firms. Any failed attempt to identify owners 
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Widely held financial are those companies controlled by a financial company, 
which does not have a controller at an specific cutoff. Widely held corporation 
refers to those companies controlled by a non-financial company which is also 
widely held. Widely held companies refer to those which do not have any owners 
with significant control rights at those particular stakes (10% and 20%). Mis- 
cellaneous refers to charities, voting trusts, employees, cooperatives, or minority 
foreign investors. State is when a national government (domestic or foreign), lo- 
cal authority or government agency, are the ultimate shareholders at any specific 
cutoff. 
At the 10% threshold, the highest proportion corresponds to firms controlled 
by families as ultimate owners. This is followed by companies which are widely 
held (26.1%) and widely held financial (17.4%). At the 20% cutoff, it can be 
observed that a very high percentage is for firms that are widely held (68.4%). 
This statistic is consistent with Faccio and Lang (2002), where from a sample of 
1,953 firms for the UK, 63.1% were widely held at the 20% threshold. This means 
that the majority of firms in the UK have a disperse ownership structure where 
the largest controlling stakes are probably less than 20%. 
10 % cutoff % 20 % cutoff % 
sample size 632 100 632 100 
Family 304 48.1 150 23.7 
Widely held financial 110 17.4 28 4.4 
Widely held corporation 4 0.6 3 0.4 
Widely held 165 26.1 432 68.4 
Miscellaneous 47 7.4 18 2.8 
State 2 0.3 1 0.1 
Notes: This table shows, by control stakes, the number of firms which are controlled 
by different categories of owners for the UK sample of 632 observations. 
Source: Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Table 4.4: Ultimate controllers at the 10 and 20 percent cutoff 
for unlisted firms was classified as family. They also offer statistical support for it. 
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Table 4.5 shows the characteristics of both the ultimate owner and the means 
to exert control, as well as some other characteristics of the data. Controller 
accounts for the observations with the presence of an ultimate controller; this is 
all the firms except for the widely held companies. In the UK, 73.8% of firms have 
an ultimate shareholder with at least 10% of the control stake and only 31.6% 
with at least 20% of the control stake. 
In addition, 23.3% of the shareholders, with at least 10% of the control stake, 
have different levels of voting rights and cash flow rights. For shareholders with 
at least 20% of the control stake, the statistic is much lower (6.6%). 
10 % cutoff % 20 % cutoff % 
Controller 467 73.8 200 31.6 
Separation 147 23.3 42 6.6 
No Separation 320 50.6 158 25.0 
Low separation 74 11.7 26 4.1 
Medium separation 26 4.1 8 1.3 
High separation 47 7.4 8 1.3 
Pyramids 147 23.3 36 5.7 
Control chains 36 5.6 22 3.5 
dual shares' 88 13.9 33 5.2 
'Non voting shares were outlawed from UK since 1968, so for this context it 
refers to firms that have both ordinary and preference shares. 
Source: Faccion and Lang (2002). 
Table 4.5: Characteristics of ultimate structure and ultimate owner at 
the 10 percent cutoff 
Pyramids and control chains refer to the ultimate structure of the firm. Pyra- 
mids represent the controlling shareholder who exercises control through at least 
one publicly-traded company. Firm Y is said to be controlled through a mul- 
tiple control chain if it has an ultimate owner who controls it via a multitude 
of chains. In table 4.5, it can be observed that the proportion of firms with a 
pyramidical structure is 23.3% at the 10% threshold and only 5.7% at the 
20% 
threshold. Dual shares refer to firms which have both preference and ordinary 
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shares, as preference shares have limited voting rights. The number of firms with 
dual shares at the 10% threshold is 13.9% and for the 20% threshold is 5.2%. 
Table 4.6 presents a more detailed description of separation of voting and cash 
flow rights. In the sample for analysis there are 147 firms that have separation 
of control and ownership at the 10% cutoff. It is possible to identify ultimate 
controllers for this firms. For instance, the highest percentage is for firms con- 
trolled by Family (22.1% and 7.7%, at 10% and 20% cutoff points, respectively) 
and for Widely held financial (15.7% and 3.8%, at 10% and 20% cutoff points, 
respectively). 
10 % cutoff % 20 % cutoff % 
Family 69 22.1 24 7.7 
Widely held financial 49 15.7 12 3.8 
Widely held corporation 3 0.9 2 0.6 
Miscellaneous 25 8.0 3 0.9 
State 1 0.3 1 0.3 
Notes: This table shows the number of sample companies, by specific type of owner, in 
companies where controllers have different cash flow and voting rights at the 10% and 
20% thresholds. The sample consists of 632 firms in the UK. 
Source: Faccio and Lang (2002). 
Table 4.6: Number of firms with separation of voting and cash flow 
rights per type of controller 
4.5 Empirical results 
The empirical analysis followed in this section have two main hypothesis. First, 
it investigates whether insider ownership is significant in determining corporate 
value and if this relationship is non-linear, and; second, it examines whether 
the ultimate controller of the firm at the 10% threshold has an impact on firms' 
value. The reason for choosing 10% as the cutoff point is related to the controlling 
structure of firms, as in the UK, firms tend to be widely held at higher cutoff 
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points. The data available for this purpose contains information of two different 
thresholds (10% and 20%). Therefore, the choice of 10% gives more opportunity 
to analyse the impact of largest shareholders, as at the 20% cutoff, the majority 
of firms (68.4%) do not have a controller. Moreover, the 10% cutoff has being 
previously used by other studies, such as Claessens et al (2002) and La Porta 
et al (2002). They have suggested that control can be exerted with, as low as 
10% of the voting rights. Also, La Porta (1999) presented evidence using a 20% 
cutoff. They found the same but statistically weaker results than for La Porta 
et al (2002), where the cutoff was at 10%. However, they pointed out that the 
difference was likely cause by the size of the sample, and not by the control cut-off. 
An initial problem in the data is the presence of endogenous variables. To 
correct for endogeneity, the explanatory variables have been lagged for one pe- 
riod, therefore, using the lagged explanatory variables as instruments. However, 
it is difficult to assure that with this procedure endogeneity has completely disap- 
peared. Testing for endogeneity might be useful in this context. The endogeneity 
test is based on estimating the reduced form of managerial ownership, which is 
assumed to be endogenous. A further assumption for this test is to consider that 
the rest of the variables are exogenous (i. e. size and R&D stock). This leaves as 
options the measure of size to determine managerial ownership (in the reduced 
equation)4, and R&D as the exogenous variable to determine Tobin's Q. There- 
fore, under these assumptions the test for endogeneity is carried out. The residual 
of the reduced form is then included in the original equation as an additional re- 
gressor, and its significance is tested with at statistic. If we reject the t statistic, 
it would be concluded that managerial ownership is endogenous because v and µ 
-'Size was insignificant to determine Tobin's Q in this particular case, probably because 
the sample size is smaller than that of Chapter 3. Therefore, it could be used as an exogenous 
variable to determine managerial ownership. Similarly, Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) specified 
the reduced form for managerial ownership with the measure of firm size. 
107 
are correlated. 
From Table 4.7, it can be observed that when Tobin's Q for 2001 is used, the p- 
value for the estimated parameter of v cannot reject that v is equal zero. In other 
words, managerial ownership might not be endogenous for this particular sample 
because v and µ are not correlated. By contrast, when Tobin's Q for the year 2000 
is used for the test, it is observed that managerial ownership is endogenous (Given 
that managerial ownership is also for the year 2000). Consequently, to control for 
endogeneity by lagging the explanatory variables for one period seemed useful in 
this particular case. 
Tobin's Q 2001 Tobin's Q 2000 
p-value for v (. 977) (. 029) 
Notes: This table presents the p-values from the endogeneity test. 
For the test puposes, the full equation is: 
T obinlsQ =a+ 01 R&D + ß2own +µ 
The reduced equation for managerial ownership is: 
Own =a+ ß1R&D + ß2size +v 
Because the first equation can be estimated with OLS, the reduce 
residual v can be obtained. The second equation is then 
estimated with v as an additional regressor by OLS. 
If the t statistic for v is rejected: managerial ownership might be 
endogenous because v and p are correlated. 
Table 4.7: Test for Endogeneity 
4.5.1 Inside ownership 
The initial aim of this section examines whether insider ownership is significant 
in determining firms' value and if this relationship, if any, is non-linear. Table 
4.8 shows the parameters for five different estimations. Column (1) is the lin- 
ear relationship, Column(2) adds the square of managerial ownership assuming 
a quadratic relationship as McConnell and Servaes (1990), Column 
(3) assumes 
a cubic relationship of inside ownership and performance following Morck et al 
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(1988), Short and Keasey (1999) and Kim et al (2004). Column (4) is the same as 
Column (3) but with the exclusion of the measure of size as it is highly correlated 
with managerial ownership and is not correlated with Tobin's Q. Kole (1995) 
suggested that the different findings of Morck et al (1988) (piecewise linear re- 
lationship) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) are attributable to differences in 
the size of the firms analysed. Column (5) is the same as Column (4), but with 
the inclusion of industry effects. 
From the results in Table 4.8, there is no evidence of a relationship between 
managerial ownership and Tobin's Q. The results are consistent with the inclu- 
sion of industrial dummies for Column (5). In general the results are not in line 
of those from Morck et al (1988), Short and Keasey (1999), Kim et al (2004). 
To investigate this issue further, financial variables, such as investment, leverage 
and dividends paid, were included in the model as in Column (6). The empirical 
results confirm that UK management becomes entrenched at low and possibly 
high levels of ownership and aligned at medium levels of ownership. The inflex- 
ion points for Column (6) are located at 17.4% and 54.5%. This suggests that 
managers who own up to 17.4% would align their interests to those of the firm, 
named value maximisation. In the case when managers own more than 54.5%, 
the benefits obtained from the value-maximisation of the firm are possibly higher 
than those that could be obtained for personal benefits. By contrast, when man- 
agers own between 17.4% to 54.5% there is a negative effect on value of -0.001. 
This means that an increase of one unit in shares between this range (17.4-54.5%) 
reduces value by 0.001 units. 
It can be observed that although there is a significant effect of the estimators 
for managerial ownership in Column (6), the impact is low in comparison with 
the control variables. Given the likely endogeneity of financial variables, the 
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positive results of Column (6) suggest that the significance of the coefficients for 
managerial ownership might be biased. This is in line with studies by Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) and Himmelberg et al (1999). However, the interesting 
matter in this research is that not only the likely reverse causality of managerial 
ownership and Tobin's Q could bias the estimators, but also the endogeneity of 
control variables that are included in the specification (such as financial variables). 
Therefore, both considerations should be made to achieve consistent results and 
the interpretation of significant evidence of managerial ownership on Tobin's Q 
in the presence of financial variables should be cautiously interpreted. 
In the previous chapter of this thesis, it was shown that the market value 
of the firm (Tobin's Q) is determined by R&D, dividends paid, investment and 
size. These are control variables to specify the empirical model in this Chapter. 
In addition, leverage is also included, although it was previously insignificant in 
determining firms' value. However, to be consistent with previous research, such 
as Fama and French (1998), leverage is also included as a control variable. The 
specification of the model is important as an underfitted model could bring biased 
as well as inconsistent estimators. In addition, the disturbance variance will be 
incorrectly estimated. In consequence, it is likely that the statistical significance 
of the estimated parameters may be misleaded5. For these reasons, the control 
variables mentioned above are included in Column (6). 
"Gujarati (1995) 
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(1) 
UK sample size = 632 obs. 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A (managerial ownership) 
Constant 1.30*** 1.27*** 1.15*** 1.27*** 1.06*** 1.07*** 
(. 313) (. 333) (. 346) (. 067) (. 376) (. 388) 
Own -0.0007 0.0014 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.03** 
(. 002) (. 008) (. 016) (. 015) (. 015) (. 015) 
Own2 -3.8e-05 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.001** 
(. 0001) (. 0007) (. 0007) (. 0006) (. 0006) 
Own3 9.8e-06 9.3e-06 7.6e-06 1.3e-05* 
(7.6e-06) (7.6e-06) (7.5e-06) (7.3e-06) 
Panel B (control variables) 
R&D 3.09*** 3.09*** 3.13*** 3.11*** 3.47*** 3.53*** 
stock (. 329) (. 331) (. 331) (. 325) (. 366) (. 360) 
size 0.0007 0.002 0.009 
(. 025) (. 026) (. 026) 
Leverage 0.04 
(. 316) 
Invest. -1.5*** 
(. 417) 
Divid. 9.0*** 
(1.66) 
Ind. dum 
. No No No No Yes Yes 
R-square 0.126 0.126 0.128 0.128 0.176 0.23 
Inflection 17.4% 
points 54.5% 
Notes: This table presents the results of six models estimated by OLS for the sample of 
632 companies in the UK. The dependent variable is the Tobin's Q ratio (firms' value) for 
the year 2001. Panel A presents the independent variables with respect to managerial 
ownership. Own, Own2 and Own3 are the percentage of directors shareholding for the 
year 2000. Panel B presents the control variables which are: R&D/TA (ratio of R&D stock 
to total assets), size (log of total assets), leverage (ratio of total debt to total assets), I/TA 
(ratio of the change of productive capital to total assets, D/TA (ratio of dividends paid to 
total assets). Independent variables in Panel B have been averaged for 4 consecutive 
years (1997-2000). Standard errors in parenthesis. 
***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% or 10% 
Table 4.8: OLS estimator for managerial ownership 
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Robustness of Results 
High R&D firms are more likely to have problems of agency costs and asymmetric 
information. Moreover, there is evidence of greater institutional ownership in high 
R&D firms (Bushee (1998); and Wahal and McConnell (2000)). 
The previous section in this chapter used data, which included all the non- 
financial industrial sectors available and both high and low R&D firms. To test 
for the robustness of results the methodology of Cui and Mak (2002) to select 
firms with high R&D was followed. 
The database is ranked with the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. 
Table 4.9 shows the concentration of the top 10% UK industries with the highest 
R&D expenditure. From a total of 15 industrial sectors, only 8 are present in the 
top 10% of R&D expenses. The second column in Table 4.9 shows the proportion 
of firms which are within the top 10% to the total number of firms in the sample 
in a particular industrial sector. The two industrial sectors with the top number 
of firms with high R&D are "Chemicals, healthcare and pharmaceuticals" and 
"computer, electrical & electronic equipment". The selection of the top eight 
industries decreases the sample for the year 2000 by 26%, from 632 to 467. 
As can be seen from Table 4.10, the results for a cubic relationship between 
managerial ownership and Tobin's Q remain consistent with the previous section. 
Columns (1) and (2), but not Column (3) include financial variables. The signif- 
icance of managerial ownership, as in Column (1) and (2), is likely to be biased 
due to the endogeneity of financial variables. AAlthough these variables have also 
been lagged for one period, it seems that the method is not sufficient to control 
for endogeneity. 
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Industry No. firms 
within the 
top 10% of 
R&D/TA 
Max. 
ratio of 
R&D/TA 
No. firms 
in the sector 
considering 
the whole 
sample 
% of Firms 
within the top 
10% to total 
no. of firms 
in the sector 
1. Automotive, aviation 2 0.41 46 4.3 
and transportation 
2. Chemicals, health care 15 0.43 51 29.4 
and Pharmaceuticals 
3. Computer, electrical & 39 0.24 82 47.6 
Electronic equipment 
4. Engineering, mining, 1 0.05 83 1.2 
and oil-gas exploration 
5. Leisure, hotels, pubs 3 0.19 50 6.0 
and restaurants 
6. Paper, forestry 1 0.08 55 1.8 
and photography' 
7. Services 1 0.06 52 1.9 
8. Textile, leather and 1 0.06 48 2.1 
clothing & footwear3 
Grand total 63 467 
1includes Packaging and Printing & Publishing; 2includes metallurgy; 3includes furniture 
Table 4.9: Distribution of high Research and Development industries 
In summary, the results for managerial ownership have been obtained after 
accounting for the endogeneity of the variables. However, it cannot be stated that 
the problem has fully disappeared, as the exclusion of financial variables increase 
the standard errors of managerial ownership. The results are robust to the the 
selection of industrial sectors with high R&D expenditures. Results from previous 
literature that have accounted for endogeneity through systems of simultaneous 
equations have found different results for the relationship of ownership with firms' 
value. For instance, Chen and Steiner (2000) found a quadratic relationship 
where as ownership increases in one unit, value increases in 0.08 units and then 
decreases. However, they included financial variables in all the specifications 
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without accounting for their potential endogeneity. Similarly, results in Chen et 
al. (2003), who found a linear relationship with managerial ownership and Tobin's 
Q, might be biased, as again, they controlled the endogeneity from "reverse" 
causality but ignored the endogeneity from financial variables. 
UK sample size = 467 obs. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A (ownership variables) 
Constant 
Own 
Own2 
Own3 
Panel B (control variables) 
R&D/TA 
Leverage 
I/TA 
D/TA 
Industry dummies 
R-square 
Inflection points 
0.85*** 
(. 156) 
0.04** 
(. 020) 
-0.0017* 
(. 0009) 
1.6-05 
(le-05) 
3.29*** 
(. 374) 
0.45 
(. 418) 
-1.34*** 
(. 518) 
9.4*** 
(2.21) 
No 
0.17 
16.8% 
53.5% 
0.89*** 
(. 219) 
0.05*** 
(. 020) 
-0.002** 
(. 0009) 
1.7e-05* 
(le-05) 
3.6*** 
(. 408) 
0.07 
(. 420) 
-2.1*** 
(. 549) 
9.1*** 
(2.18) 
Yes 
0.23 
18.6% 
55.6% 
1.31*** 
(. 143) 
0.028 
(. 020) 
-0.0012 
(. 0009) 
1.2e-05 
(1.04e-05) 
3.49*** 
(. 420) 
Yes 
0.145 
Notes: This table presents the results of three models estimated by OLS for the sample of 
467 companies, from the industrial sectors with the highest R&D stock, in the UK. 
The dependent variable is the Tobin's Q ratio (firms' value) for the year 2001. Panel A 
presents the independent variables with respect to managerial ownership. Own, Own2 and 
Own3 are the percentage of directors shareholding for the year 2000. Panel B presents the 
control variables which are: R&D/TA (ratio of R&D stock to total assets), size (log of total 
assets), leverage (ratio of total debt to total assets), I/TA (ratio of the change of productive 
capital to total assets, D/TA (ratio of dividends paid to total assets). Independent 
variables in Panel B have been averaged for 4 consecutive years (1997-2000). Standard 
errors in parentesis. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% or 10% 
Table 4.10: Managerial ownership in High R and D industries 
114 
4.5.2 Ultimate controller 
In this part of the empirical analysis of the impact of the ultimate controllers on 
firms' value is studied from three different perspectives: i) level of voting rights to 
cash flow rights, ii) largest ultimate controller (family, bank, state, etc. ), and. iii) 
devices to exert control (pyramids, control chains and/or different voting shares). 
The UK has laws that favour minority investors as rights to approve transactions 
between subsidiary and parent firms and equal price rules in takeovers. The 
protection to minority investors might bring as a consequence that the value of 
the firm is unaffected by the way that control is exerted, which in such a case, it 
could be implied that legal rules are beneficial to prevent for any negative effect 
on firms' value. 
Separation of voting rights and cash flow rights is measured with dummy 
variables in two ways. First, when the ratio of corporate ownership to control 
rights (CO/C) is different from one. In other words, this represents both the 
presence of a controller, and that such control is obtained due to an excess of 
voting rights with respect to cash flow rights. Second, Bebchuk et al (2000) argued 
that a controller who has separation of control and cash flow rights can create 
higher agency costs than a controller with no separation. In light of this argument, 
in this Chapter, ultimate control is classified in five different categories: a) firms 
with a controller without separation of ownership and control (ratio CO/C = 1), 
b) firms with a controller with low level of separation (0.75< CO/C <1), c) firms 
with a controller with medium level of separation (0.50< CO/C <0.75), d) firms 
with a controller with high level of separation (0< CO/C < 0.50), e) firms which 
do not have a controller (widely held). 
Table 4.11 shows the initial set of results. Column (1) presents the results 
when there is a controller and simultaneously there is separation of control and 
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ownership at the 10% cutoff. There is a significant effect on value for this variable, 
but with a very low significance level (10%). The low significance might be as 
a result of the high impact of UK regulations on firms' behaviour. Specifically, 
takeover rules have discouraged the accumulation of share blocks in excess of 
30%. This rule protects minority shareholders from actions made by dominant 
controllers, such as, influencing the decisions of the board of directors. As Becht 
and Mayer (2001) pointed out, the composition of the board of directors must 
be such that significant decisions with respect to the management of the firm are 
taken independently from the largest controller. 
Furthermore, the effect of separation of control and ownership is expected to 
be significantly negative for countries with low investors' protection, La Porta et al 
(2002), Kappler and Love (2004), Claessens et al (2002), among others. Therefore, 
the low significance of this variable for the UK, suggests that legal regulations 
have had a positive influence not only to protect minority investors, but to avoid a 
negative impact on firms' value. Nevertheless, it can be appreciated in Column (2) 
and (3) that when there is a controller whose control is exerted with a high level 
of separation (of at least twice as much voting power than cash flow ownership), 
the negative impact on firms' value is significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Only 7.4% of the observations have a controller with high level of separation. For 
this group of observations, separation is given mainly by pyramids (87%), and the 
ultimate controller is dominated by miscellaneous and widely held financial firms 
(45% and 40%, respectively). This evidence suggests that although the number 
of controllers with separation of ownership and control, for the UK, are very low, 
when there is such a characteristic, the influence is negatively associated with 
value. For instance, potential conflicts of interest between owners and controllers 
can be created, such as the use of control to extract corporate resources. Firms' 
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value might also be affected when controllers have incentives to spend resources 
to monitor and influence the activities of managers, Denis and McConnell (2003). 
In summary, the significant effect of a controller with high levels of separation 
may be interpreted as a decrease in the mean level of Tobin's Q by 0.36 units for 
firms with a controller who has twice as much voting rights than cash flow rights 
with respect to firms that do not have a controller (widely held firms). 
Although, the boundaries chosen to establish the low, medium or high levels 
of separation were chosen arbitrarily, the results showed evidence that having 
twice as much voting rights than cash flow rights is significant for firm's value. 
To check for the robustness of these boundaries, a different distribution was se- 
lected for firms with controllers that have different voting rights and cash flow 
rights. For this check, the dummies to represent high, medium and low levels 
of separation were set equal to one when 0<CO/C<0.33,0.33<CO/C<0.64 and 
0.64<CO/C<1, respectively; and zero otherwise. The results in this case showed 
that high separation was significant (at least three voting rights per one share)'. 
There was no evidence that low and medium levels impact on firms' value under 
this distribution. This suggests that the previous effect of controllers with at 
least twice as much control than cash flow rights might be lost when averaged 
together with lower levels of separation (as in 0.33<CO/C<0.64). Therefore, the 
boundary created for the dummy that represents at least twice as much control 
than ownership seems adequate to capture the corresponding effect. 
Column (4) is the same as Column (3) but with the inclusion of financial 
variables. Financial variables were not considered before because of the potential 
problems in obtaining consistent results due to endogeneity problems, as shown 
in the empirical analysis of inside ownership. In this section, financial variables 
'Significant at the 95% confidence level. This significance level is reduced when industry 
dummies were included in the model. 
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are lagged for one period with respect to the dependent variable, as was done for 
the remainder of the variables. After including financial variables, the coefficients 
of the ultimate ownership variables remain similar to those found before. How- 
ever, standard errors increase to the point that the confidence interval previously 
found for high levels of separation in Column (3) decreases from 95% to 90%. 
It can be observed that financial variables have a highly significant impact on 
firms' value (except for leverage, that was shown to be not significant). Never- 
theless, although the endogeneity problems may have been alleviated with the 
instrumental variables method, there is some evidence that it may still bias the 
results (given the increased standard errors for the remainder of the variables). 
Therefore, the results in Column (3) without financial variables is the preferred 
specification of the model. 
The percentages of managerial ownership have been excluded in this part of 
the analysis and only the measures for the controller with separation of owner- 
ship and control were considered. To investigate further the effect of managerial 
ownership as in the previous section, an attempt of combining both directors' 
shareholdings and controllers with separation of ownership and control was fol- 
lowed (results are not presented in the table). In particular, there was no evidence 
of an effect of managerial ownership on corporate value. This evidence is consis- 
tent to the functional form of directors' shareholdings such as linear, quadratic or 
cubic, and to robust standard errors. Also, consistent with the previous section 
this effect became significant when financial variables were included. In addition, 
the results remained consistent demonstrating that only controllers with a high 
separation of cash flow rights and voting rights are of significance to determine 
corporate value. 
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UK 632 obs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A (separation of ownership and control) 
Constant 1.35*** 1.41*** 1.17*** 1.16*** 
(. 052) (. 085) (. 383) (. 396) 
Separation -0.19* 
(. 101) 
No separation -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 
(. 103) (. 102) (. 100) 
Low separation -0.19 -0.14 -0.04 
(. 151) (. 149) (. 147) 
Medium separation -0.17 -0.13 -0.04 
(. 228) (. 226) (. 222) 
High separation -0.42** -0.36** -0.32* 
(. 178) (. 178) (. 173) 
Panel B (control variables) 
R&D 3.04*** 3.06*** 3.42*** 3.44*** 
(. 325) (. 325) (. 365) (. 360) 
Investment -1.39*** 
(. 413) 
Dividends 8.37*** 
(1.67) 
Leverage -0.03 
(. 316) 
R-square 0.131 0.134 0.179 0.23 
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents the results of four models estimated by OLS for the sample of 
632 companies in the UK. The dependent variable is the Tobin's Q ratio (firms' value) for 
the year 2001. Panel A presents the independent variables with respect to the separation of 
ownership and control with data from 1996. Separation is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the firm has a controller who has different cash flow and voting rights, and zero otherwise; 
No separation is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a controller who has the 
same cash flow and voting rights, and zero otherwise; Low separation is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm has a controller who has more voting than cash flow rights in the 
range 0.75<CO/C<0.99, and zero otherwise; Medium separation is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm has a controller who has more voting than cash flow rights in the range 
0.50<CO/C<0.75; High separation is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a 
controller who has more voting than cash flow rights in the range CO/C<0.5. Panel B 
presents the control variables, which have been averaged for 4 years (1997-2000). Standard 
errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% or 10%. 
Table 4.11: Separation of ownership and control 
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Another effect from the level of separation can be analysed from a different 
perspective. Table 4.12 presents results for the influence of the specific ultimate 
controllers at the 10% threshold. Firms' value could be affected in different levels 
depending on the type of ultimate controller (family, state, widely held financial, 
widely held corporation and miscellaneous). Previous literature has shown that in 
contrast with Continental Europe, where firms are mainly controlled by families, 
the UK has dispersed ownership (widely held), Barca and Becht (2001). The 
data available for this study allows an analysis to be made at the 10% threshold, 
where there is an ultimate largest controller for the 74% of the firms. 
The effect of an ultimate controller on firms' value could be given for different 
reasons than the voting power. For instance, firms controlled by families could 
nominate executive directors that are also family members. So the decisions of 
the directors could be influenced by the largest controller to pursue activities 
that would benefit the family and not the minority shareholders. Consequently, 
this is likely to reduce the firms' value. Nevertheless, a family could pursue 
activities that increases firms' value, as in Suehiro (2001), who analysed data of 
Thai firms, and concluded that family type business does not always demonstrate 
poor performance in comparison with other types of ultimate owners. Moreover, 
if different members of the family have controlling power, they could establish 
coalitions to have the facto control over the firm. However, this type of actions 
are not exclusive to family controlled firms, but they can be followed by any other 
type of controller. 
In Table 4.12, ultimate controllers were included in the regressions to see 
their effect on value. In this analysis, managerial ownership is not considered as 
previous results showed that it was not significant, so the analysis concentrates 
only on ultimate controllers and ultimate devices to obtain control. From all the 
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ultimate controllers in Table 4.12, Column (1), only miscellaneous showed to be 
significant at the 95% confidence level. Probably, this result is given because 45% 
of the total firms that have miscellaneous as an ultimate controller coincide to 
have a high level of separation, which was shown to be negatively significant in 
Table 4.11. The same model with the inclusion of financial variables is followed 
in Column (3). As before, results remain consistent but the significance level 
decreases from 95% to only 90%. Again this might be as a result of the endogenous 
financial variables. The significant effect found in Miscellaneous as an ultimate 
controller is different to that found in Claessens et al (2002) who found that for 
East Asian countries, the ultimate controllers that might have a decreasing effect 
on value are family and state. They explained that these types of controllers 
could have more reasons to divert benefits to themselves compared with other 
types of controllers. 
The third and last perspective to analyse is related with the devices to which 
control can be exerted. For instance, Widely held firms at the 10% cutoff, do 
not have any ultimate device to exert control. Hence, to study the effect of 
the ultimate structure on firms value, the dummy variables for controllers with 
different levels of "separation" are replaced by the mechanisms to exert control, 
as by definition, if there is a mechanism to control, there must be a controller 
(so both types of variables are collinear). Ultimate owners might use pyramidal 
structures to have an excess of control rights with respect to ownership rights. 
In this way they would be able to impose initiatives at the expense of minority 
shareholders. 
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UK 632 observations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A (ultimate controllers and devices to exert control) 
Constant 1.41*** 1.15*** 1.17*** 1.16*** 1.18*** 
(. 085) (. 382) (. 396) (. 377) (. 390) 
Miscellaneous -0.40** -0.36** -0.30* 
(. 178) (. 177) (. 173) 
State -0.51 -0.45 -0.47 
(. 768) (. 765) (. 746) 
Family -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 
(. 104) (. 103) (. 101) 
Widely held fin. -0.19 -0.13 -0.07 
(. 132) (. 132) (. 129) 
Widely held corp. -0.33 -0.18 -0.24 
(. 546) (. 542) (. 528) 
Dual shares -0.19 -0.13 
(. 124) (. 122) 
Pyramids -0.13 -0.13 
(. 102) (. 100) 
Control chains -0.14 -0.13 
(. 186) (. 182) 
Panel B (control variables) 
R&D 3.08*** 3.44*** 3.45*** 3.40*** 3.42*** 
(. 324) (. 364) (. 360) (. 364) (. 359) 
investment -1.41*** -1.43*** 
(. 413) (. 412) 
dividends paid 8.27*** 8.14*** 
(1.66) (1.66) 
leverage -0.06 0.003 
(. 314) (. 316) 
R-square 0.135 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.23 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents the results of five models estimated by OLS for the sample of 632 
companies in the UK. The dependent variable is the Tobin's Q ratio (firms' value) for the year 
2001. Panel A presents the independent variables with respect to the specific ultimate controllers 
and controlling devices (data for 1996). Miscellaneous, State, Family, widely held corporation, 
widely held financial are represented with a dummy equal to one if the firm is controlled by the 
corresponding category, zero otherwise; Panel B presents the control variables: R&D/TA 
(ratio of 
R&D stock to total assets), size (log of total assets), leverage (ratio of total debt to total assets), 
I/TA (ratio of the change of productive capital to total assets, D/TA (ratio of dividends paid to to- 
tal assets). Independent variables in Panel B have been averaged for 4 consecutive years 
(97-2000) 
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%. 5% or 10% 
Table 4.12: Ultimate Controllers and Controlling Devices 
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Column (4) in Table 4.12 shows this relationship. There is no significant evi- 
dence to support that the type of mechanism to exert control is a determinant of 
firms' value. This result is consistent with Claessens et al (2002) who, in a study 
for East Asian countries, did not find strong evidence on which mechanism sepa- 
rating ownership and control is associated with the value discounts. For Column 
(5), when financial variables are considered, results are still not significant, so the 
way that control is delegated do not seem to be a determinant of firms' value. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The results in this Chapter can be summarized in two parts. First, managerial 
ownership was shown to be insignificant to determine value after endogenous 
financial variables are excluded from the specification. The level of shares owned 
by managers may not determine the market value of the company. This result is 
consistent with and without the inclusion of industrial dummies. The robustness 
of the results was tested with the analysis of a subsample of the observations that 
included the top eight industrial sectors with the highest R&D expenditure. 
Second, with respect to the separation of ownership and control, there is 
significant evidence that companies that have a controller with high levels of 
separation (at least 2 votes per share) impact firms' value negatively. However, 
this situation has been limited in the UK due to legal regulations that protect 
minority shareholders. Therefore, it is suggested that controlling power with 
separation of control and ownership at high levels is a negative influence for 
firms' value, while at lower levels seems insignificant. The devices through which 
control is exerted (pyramids, control chains and dual shares) were not relevant in 
determining firms' value. 
Firms that are controlled by "Miscellaneous" were shown to have on average 
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lower Tobin's Q ratios than widely held firms. Moreover, it was found that 
firms with controllers with the highest level of separation are controlled mainly 
by miscellaneous and financial institutions and that the average control stake in 
those firms is only 15.5%. This suggests that it is likely that the negative effect 
of "Miscellaneous" is partially caused because of the high levels of separation of 
ownership and control in these types of firms. 
Generally, the results suggest that given the dispersion of shareholdings in UK 
companies, the separation of ownership and control may have limited potential for 
expropriation to minority shareholders. In addition, the regulations that protect 
minority investors in the UK might be have as a result that largest controllers 
have limited legal power to extract resources from the firm. Similar remarks are 
also sustained by Goergen and Renneboog (2001), who characterized the UK for 
having strong managers and passive institutional investors. 
The results of this research may vary according to country specific legal char- 
acteristics. Legal regulations to protect investors may be determinants of firms' 
value as they control for agency problems among shareholders. 
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Chapter 5 
Corporate Performance, 
Controlling Power and Law 
Protection for Investors in 
Western Europe. 
5.1 Introduction 
l'rvviolls research has suggested a relationship between the law and traditions of 
ai coluitrv and the value of corporations that belong to that country, La Porta cat 
id (1998,2002). Countries' laws regarding investors' protection may be rei, v-; mt 
for corporations in order to facilitate the access for external finance, Beck el al 
(220-1). In this respect, external investors are likely to be concerned about the 
risks involved in 1)uving stock from a firm which 1, s in a country with weak financial 
By contrast, iiivestors may prefer to finance firms in countries «-leere hxv 
are more protective to them. Therefore, firms which belong to countries with 
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strong shareholder protection are likely to be valued higher than those firms in 
countries with weaker laws. 
Nevertheless, firms in countries which have poor laws to protect investors 
might offer in exchange other types of incentives to overcome the risks that orig- 
inate from weak investor protection. It has been found that good corporate 
governance practices are more important in countries with weaker laws. Kappler 
and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2002). 
To this extent, the ownership structure of companies may be of relevance to 
external investors. For instance, minority investors might be aware of the agency 
costs created by the separation of ownership and control. Agency costs arise when 
the interests of the controllers are not aligned with those of minority shareholders, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Particularly, as pointed out by Dyck and Zingales 
(2004), controllers might get private benefits from the firm, such as perquisites 
or in some few cases outright theft. 
Previous literature has reported the impact of investors' protection as a deter- 
minant of countries economic growth and financial development. Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998,2002) found that the legal system is important to ease 
firms' growth. It has also been suggested that legal origin matters for financial 
development because legal traditions differ in their ability to adapt efficiently to 
evolving economic conditions (see for example, Beck et al (2003), La Porta et al 
(1997) and Berkowitz et al (2003), among others). Moreover, there is a connection 
between growth at a firm level and financial development. For instance, Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) found that financial development reduces, at least partially, 
firms' costs for external finance. 
More related to this chapter is the evidence of higher valuation of firms in 
countries with better protection to minority shareholders. For instance, La Porta 
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et al (2002) found evidence that poor shareholder protection is penalized with 
lower valuation, and that higher cash flow ownership by the controlling share- 
holder improves valuation, especially in countries with poor investor protection. 
Similarly, Kappler and Love (2004) found that the relationship of governance 
ranking and corporate value is stronger in countries with weaker legal systems. 
They suggested that adopting good governance practices might be of more im- 
portance to firms in countries with poor legal systems. 
This chapter aims to empirically examine if countries' financial laws and tra- 
ditions contribute to determine corporate value in Western Europe. Specifically, 
the extent to which investors' protection is valuable for firms in contrast with the 
ultimate controlling power. Some of the questions to be addressed are: Is corpo- 
rate value higher in countries where protection to investors is strong? If external 
investors prefer to finance firms in countries with strong shareholders' protection, 
what would be an alternative for firms from a countries' weak legal system to 
attract external finance? In particular, it is examined if the effect of low levels 
of separation of cash flow rights and voting rights in the largest controlling stake 
might be a substitute or complement for poor investors' protection. 
To explore these relationships, two sets of information are relevant. First, 
country level financial regulations which are consistent for all the firms that belong 
to a specific country, such as investors' rights, legal origin and law enforcement. 
Second, firm level variables that represent the controlling structure. Particularly, 
the separation of cash flow rights and voting rights in a controlling stake and 
the presence of a largest ultimate controller in the firm. Therefore, this chapter 
combines information at both country and firm levels. 
The initial model specified in this chapter assesses if the separation of cash 
flow rights and voting rights at a firm level is significant in determining firms' 
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value in Western Europe. The separation of ownership and control creates dis- 
crepancies between minority shareholders and controllers as their objectives inside 
the firm may diverge. For instance, large controllers might divert cash payments 
to minority shareholders and set high dividend payments to themselves (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Therefore, the excess of control rights of the largest share- 
holder with respect to cash flow ownership might have a decreasing effect on 
firms' value (Claessens et al, 2002). As they pointed out, the largest shareholder 
is frequently able to control the firm with a relatively small direct stake in its 
cash flow rights. Consequently, a controller with high levels of cash flow rights 
might be more concern with the firms' performance, which in turn would protect 
minority investors. 
Evidence found on expropriation of minority shareholders by controllers varies 
among countries. For example, Zingales (1994) found that in Italy, expropriation 
is large and consistent with voting power. By contrast, evidence from Sweden 
suggests that separation of ownership and control do not result in substantial 
expropriation by largest controllers, Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1990). 
In this context, this chapter aims to measure the effect of the largest share- 
holding stake with separation of ownership and control on corporate value by 
controlling country effects using both country dummies and clustered robust 
standard errors. The latter follows Nenova (2003), who uses such method as 
a substitution for country dummies or fixed/random effects. This method might 
be applied when variables without within-country variation are introduced in the 
model. 
Thereafter, country specific characteristics are incorporated to the model to 
assess the effect of both law and controlling power on corporate value. Initially, 
legal origin is included as a proxy of shareholders' protection. Previous research 
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has found that countries from a common law origin (English origin) have more 
investor-friendly laws than countries from a civil legal origin (French, German and 
Scandinavian origin) [La Porta et al (2002), Berkowitz et al (2003)]. Moreover, 
Beck et al (2004) found that firms from a French legal origin find more obstacles 
in obtaining external finance than firms from other origins. This suggests that 
corporate value might be influenced by these types of limitations. 
Legal origin is then substituted by another measure of shareholders' protec- 
tion, which is the index for antidirectors' rights obtained from La Porta et al 
(1998). A second index that measures creditors' rights is also used. These in- 
dices represent protection to different sources of finance in a firm, equity holders 
and bondholders, respectively. Therefore, the effect that they may have on firms' 
value is expected to differ accordingly. First, protection to shareholders rights has 
been found to be correlated with value in a positive way, La Porta et al (2002). By 
contrast, the effect of creditors protection might be different. Firms in countries 
with higher indices of creditors rights are more susceptible to hostile takeovers 
and bankruptcies which in turn might negatively impact value, Claessens and 
Kappler (2002), Rossi and Volpin (2004). 
Finally, another way to protect investors is by the enforcement of law. This is 
measured by the efficiency of judicial system as in Kappler and Love (2004), La 
Porta et al (2002). The level to which law is enforced may be independent from 
the level of investor's protection Therefore, both characteristics are examined 
together. 
The main findings in this chapter suggest that the presence of an ultimate 
controller is negatively significant in determining value. Moreover, firms whose 
shareholders have equal number of voting rights and cash flow rights were shown 
to have higher value than when there is separation of ownership and control. 
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The findings related to investors protection showed that shareholders pro- 
tection do have a significant effect on corporate value which disappears after 
controlling for ownership variables. The negative effect found in creditors protec- 
tion is explained as an indirect influence of the limitations given to shareholders. 
Therefore, the benefits of a protective law for creditors might be in detriment of 
shareholders, especially as these may apply in cases of bankruptcy or liquidation. 
Furthermore, firms that come from a French legal origin showed to have, on 
average, a higher value than those from any other legal origins. This result may be 
explained from two points of view that characterise firms from French legal origin. 
First, they have the lowest level of law protection for creditors, which may benefit 
shareholders. Second, they have the lowest levels of separation of ownership and 
control, a situation that was shown to be significant in determining firms' value. 
Enforcement of law, represented by the efficiency of the judicial system, was 
shown to have a negative effect on firms' value. This is probably because law 
is enforced in cases of financial distress, as in bankruptcy. Therefore, the ben- 
efit would be for creditors in detriment of shareholders, which in turn reduces 
corporate value. 
The next section explains the relationship of corporate value, ownership and 
country specific characteristics for this study. Section three describes the data. 
Section four presents the results for the model with the inclusion of legal origin, 
shareholder rights, creditor rights and enforcement of law. Section five presents 
the conclusions. 
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5.2 Ownership and country specific characteris- 
tics 
The separation of ownership (cash flow rights) and control (voting rights) might 
create an agency problem between controllers and minority shareholders, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). The agency problem arises as controllers (largest share- 
holders who have an excess of voting rights with respect to cash flow rights) may 
abuse their power for personal benefits instead of firms' wealth. Subsequently, 
the value of the firm might be decreased in situations where voting rights exceed 
cash flow rights. 
In some instances, the abuse of controlling power might be moderated by fi- 
nancial laws and other characteristics of the country where the firm belongs. In 
this respect, there are legal rules that set boundaries to the level of separation 
of voting and cash flow rights. For example, in Germany there is a legal restric- 
tion on non-voting (and limited voting) capital, where it may not exceed 50% of 
stock capital. Another example is in France, where there is a legal restriction for 
non-voting (and limited voting) capital, which may not exceed 25% of the stock 
capital, Faccio and Lang (2002). Moreover, Goergen and Renneboog (2001) sug- 
gested that the agency conflict caused by voting controls by shareholders in the 
UK differs from that found in Continental Europe. In the latter, expropriation of 
minority shareholders might be the key agency problem related to ownership con- 
centration. As there is extensive protection to minority investors in the UK, the 
agency problem originates from the lack of ownership concentration and control, 
which requires codes to prevent managers from benefiting against shareholders. 
In addition to the legal rules to establish the limits of controlling power, 
external investors could be protected by country laws. In particular, these laws 
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aim to protect investors and to enforce the application of the law itself. For 
this chapter, country specific characteristics refer to different factors that rule or 
impact on a country overall. In particular, the main interest is in the differences 
with respect to legal origin, investors' protection and law enforcement. These 
factors might influence the financial behaviour of firms, and more specifically 
their value. For instance, firms' opportunities for external finance can be limited 
depending on the legal protection given to investors and the effectiveness of law 
regulations. Investors' might prefer to direct their resources to firms in those 
countries where the risk of expropriation by the largest shareholders is low. 
Previous studies that have investigated the impact of country specific charac- 
teristics from a macroeconomic perspective, suggest that financial development 
is related to legal framework. For instance, Beck et al (2003) suggested that legal 
origin matters possibly because legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust 
efficiently to evolving socioeconomic conditions. For example, countries from a 
French legal origin tend to have lower levels of financial development. Beck et al 
(2003) defined financial development based on indicators of financial intermediary, 
stock market development and property rights protection. 
Berkowitz et al (2003) found that the way that the law is transplanted has a 
larger indirect effect on the effectiveness of legal institutions rather than the legal 
families. Subsequently, this contributes to the economic development of those 
countries. La Porta et al (1998) concluded, from a study of 49 countries, that 
investors' friendlier laws are a determinant of a more effective law enforcement. 
In their study, countries from French legal origin were found to have a lower law 
enforcement than English legal origin countries. 
Some other studies have focused on a firm level perspective. For instance, 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) investigated the role of property rights in the allo- 
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cation of resources in a firm. They found that firms grow faster, in countries where 
property rights are more secure against expropriation from powerful competitors. 
In this respect, property rights were more important for intangible assets than 
tangible assets. 
La Porta et al (2002), suggested that financial markets are more valuable 
where laws are protective to outsider investors. They explained that when laws 
are better enforced and a country has a high level of investors' protection, the 
financial assets are more valuable as external investors are willing to pay more. 
In this sense, investors' protection would limit controllers to expropriate external 
investors. By contrast, the traditional "law and economics" perspective of finan- 
cial contracting, may replace most regulations of financial markets, as contracts 
take place, La Porta et al (2000). 
Beck et al (2004) showed that firms in countries with French legal origin 
face higher obstacles to obtain external finance than those firms in common law 
countries (English legal origin). In general, they concluded that the legal system 
adaptability is important for corporate finance. 
Nevertheless, firms that belong to common law countries, face other type of 
obstacles in financial terms. For example, securing creditors' rights might not 
have the same effect as securing shareholders' rights. Investors might be con- 
cerned about the future of a particular firm, which may have a good performance 
in the short run but which could also have a high risk of future liquidation due 
to either reorganization or bankruptcy. In the presence of these types of specu- 
lations, shareholders' might prefer a firm where creditors' do not have as much 
protection, as rights may favour creditors instead of the shareholders themselves. 
For instance, Claessens and Kappler (2002), found that bankruptcies are higher in 
common-law countries and in market-oriented financial systems. As they pointed 
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out, this may be a consequence of stronger creditor rights, which are generally 
associated with higher use of bankruptcy. 
5.3 Data 
There are two sets of data used for this chapter. Each of them is applied to 
two main model specifications with respect to two different variables of ultimate 
ownership, named ultimate controller and separation of cash flow rights and vot- 
ing rights in the largest controlling stake. The number of observations available 
for each of the datasets are 1557 and 1319 observations, respectively. The coun- 
tries included in the study are from Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
UK. 
This data was obtained from three main sources. The accounting data to 
construct the Tobin's Q ratio has been obtained from Datastream and calculated 
for the year 2001. Tobin's Q is a ratio that represents investment opportunities 
and is constructed as: (Total assets - Equity, Capital and reserves + Market 
Value)/ Total assets. Moreover, a four-year average (1997-2000) of the natural 
logarithm of total assets is included to control for firms' size. Similarly, financial 
variables which are included in some of the model specifications follow the same 
construction. The four-year average is aimed to eliminate seasonal effects from 
extreme changes in the assets of the company. 
This set of observations was then matched with ultimate ownership informa- 
tion from Faccio and Lang's 2002 database (Appendix 5.4 contains the description 
of the variables). This data is normally for the year 1997, but for some countries is 
for 19961. Finally the country specific characteristics were added to this dataset 
'As in Zhou (2001), La Porta et al (2002), it is assummed that ownership remains stable 
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relying on data presented in La Porta et al (1998). More specific information 
about this data can be found in Appendices 5.1,5.2 and 5.3. 
Table 5.1 shows the total number of observations from Faccio and Lang (2002) 
that matched with the observations from Datastream. The sample for this study 
includes 38% of Faccio and Lang's (2002) total sample of non-financial firms. 
The country with the lowest number of matched companies is Spain, which has 
only 8% of the companies that Faccio and Lang included, with Austria being the 
highest with 77% of firms included. The matching of information intends to get 
as more observations as possible and is not limited to specific groups of firms. 
For instance, La Porta et al (2002), chose only, for a similar study, the largest 
companies by market capitalization. There are 15 non-financial industrial sectors 
in the data, which are controlled by the inclusion of industrial dummy variables 
for all the model specifications. 
Country No. of non-fin. ind. * No. obs. matched % included 
with datastream 
Austria 69 53 77 
Belgium 79 15 19 
Finland 116 80 69 
France 460 157 34 
Germany 554 288 52 
Ireland 58 22 38 
Italy 151 56 37 
Norway 130 40 31 
Spain 516 41 8 
Sweden 203 90 44 
Switzerland 161 83 52 
UK 1555 632 41 
Grand total 4052 1557 38 
*(Faccio & Lang (2002)); Notes: This table includes the distribution, by country, 
of the number of observations in both the sample examined in this paper and 
the sample from where data on ownership was obtained. 
Table 5.1: Number of observations included in the sample 
over time. 
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Table 5.2 presents the average values for some of the variables, as well as the 
number of non-financial firms included per country. Countries are also separated 
depending on their legal origin such as: French, German, Scandinavian or Eng- 
lish. Shareholders' rights represent the number of benefits for equity investors out 
of six different characteristics, which are: 1) Proxy by e-mail allowed, 2) shares 
not blocked before meeting, 3) cumulative voting or proportional representation, 
4) oppressed minorities mechanism, 5) pre-emptive rights and, 6) percentage of 
share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders' meeting. All these variables 
are described in Appendix 5.1. Creditors' rights represent the number of benefits 
for bondholders out of four different characteristics, which are: 1) no automatic 
stay on assets, 2) secured creditors first paid, 3) restrictions for going into reor- 
ganization, and 4) management does not stay in reorganization. Creditors' rights 
variables are described in Appendix 5.2. 
It can be observed that countries from a French legal origin have on average 
the smallest index of creditor rights. By contrast, countries from a German 
legal origin have the highest index of creditor rights. However, with respect to 
shareholder rights countries from a German legal origin have the lower index, 
while the highest index is for countries from a English legal origin. 
Moreover, it is shown that a low index of shareholder rights, not necessarily 
implies a low index of creditor rights, as these two variables may be independently 
determined by the country laws. The country with the highest average Tobin's 
Q value is Spain and the lowest ratio belongs to Austria. Although firms from 
both countries are mainly controlled by families, the principal difference between 
them is that in Austria, 17 % of the firms have miscellaneous (Charities, voting 
trusts, employees, cooperatives, or minority foreign investors) as an ultimate 
owner. Spanish firms have instead widely held financial (12%) and widely held 
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(17%) as ultimate controllers. This is shown in Table 5.3, where the rest of the 
countries are also described with their ultimate controllers at the 10% cutoff. 
Family as an ultimate controller has the highest percentage of observations per 
country, except for companies in Ireland that are mainly controlled by widely 
held financial institutions. 
Country No. obs. TQ size* Shareholder 
rights 
Creditor 
rights 
French legal origin 
Belgium 15 1.48 13.5 0 2 
France 157 1.46 13.0 3 0 
Italy 56 1.24 13.9 1 2 
Spain 41 1.53 12.9 4 2 
Average 269 1.43 13.3 2 1.5 
German legal origin 
Austria 53 1.00 11.9 2 3 
Germany 288 1.34 11.7 1 3 
Switzerland 83 1.43 12.6 2 1 
Average 424 1.26 12.1 1.6 2.3 
Scandinavian legal origin 
Finland 80 1.38 11.5 3 1 
Norway 40 1.06 11.9 4 2 
Sweden 90 1.42 11.7 3 2 
Average 235 1.30 11.7 3.3 1.6 
English legal origin 
Ireland 22 1.31 12.7 4 1 
UK 632 1.46 11.5 5 4 
Average 654 1.38 12.1 4.5 2.5 
Grand total 1557 1.41 12.3 2.8 1.9 
*The measure for size (log total assets) was calculated with the equivalent of 
British pounds for all the countries. TSource: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics (means) of the sample. 
Countries are categorized by legal origin. 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics 
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Country Widely held 
financial 
Family Widely held 
corporation 
Miscella- 
neous 
State Widely 
held 
French legal origin 
Belgium 13 67 0 7 7 7 
France 5 83 2 1 3 6 
Italy 5 75 0 2 16 2 
Spain 12 59 2 0 10 17 
German legal origin 
Austria 2 62 0 17 15 4 
Germany 6 83 0234 
Switzerland 7 67 062 17 
Scandinavian legal origin 
Finland 1 64 05 13 18 
Norway 8 52 25 20 11 
Sweden 8 66 0 14 2 10 
English legal origin 
Ireland 41 27 5 14 0 14 
UK 17 48 170 26 
Grand total 11 62 164 15 
Notes: This table presents the number of companies, categorized by country, that have an 
major shareholders with at least 10% of the control stake. Numbers are percentages with 
respect to the total number of observations per country. 
Table 5.3: Relative percentage of observations per ultimate controller 
at the 10 percent cutoff 
Table 5.4 presents the data with respect to ultimate control. It can be ob- 
served that observations that come from a French legal origin have, on relative 
terms, less firms with controllers who have separation of ownership (cash flow 
rights) and control (voting rights), with only 23.4% observations belonging to 
this classification. The exception is Italy, which in contrast to the other coun- 
tries from a French legal origin, has 60.7% of the firms with separation. This 
is due to the high percentage of Italian firms with pyramidal structures which 
are normally headed by families, coalitions or the State, Bianchi et al (2001). 
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This percentage is even higher than the rest of the countries, where the highest 
proportion is 48.2% in Switzerland. With respect to the presence of an ultimate 
controller, which possess at least 10% of the control staket, firms which come 
from an English legal origin have the lowest level. This means that at that level 
stake there are more firms widely held in comparison to the other legal origins. 
However, there is still a high number of firms with an ultimate controller (80%). 
Country No. obs Separationt % Controller % 
French legal origin 
Belgium 15 5 33.3 14 93.3 
France 157 19 12.1 148 94.3 
Italy 56 34 60.7 55 98.2 
Spain 41 5 12.2 34 82.9 
269 63 23.4 251 93.3 
German legal origin 
Austria 53 17 32.1 51 96.2 
Germany 288 97 33.6 277 96.2 
Switzerland 83 40 48.2 69 83.1 
424 154 37.9 397 91.8 
Scandinavian legal origin 
Finland 80 30 37.5 66 82.5 
Norway 40 18 45.0 38 95.0 
Sweden 90 41 45.5 81 90.0 
235 89 42.7 185 89.2 
English legal origin 
Ireland 22 9 40.9 19 86.4 
UK 632 147 23.2 467 73.9 
654 156 32.1 486 80.1 
Grand total 1557 462 34.0 1319 88.6 
TSource: Faccio and Lang (2002). 
Notes: This table presents the proportion of firms, by country, that have "separation" or/and 
a "controller". Separation refers to those companies with a controller who has different levels 
of voting rights with respect to cash flow rights. Controller refers to those companies which 
have a largest shareholder with at least 10% of the voting rights. Percentages are calculated 
with respect to the total number of observations per country. 
Table 5.4: Ultimate control 
Table 5.5 contains the country specific characteristics that describe law en- 
2 The reason for choosing the 10% threshold is given in the section "Empirical results". 
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forcement for each of the countries. These variables are fully described in Ap- 
pendix 5.3. Variables are indices per country from zero to ten, where the higher 
the index, the better the country enforces the law. Countries that come from 
a French legal origin have the lowest indices for law enforcement in comparison 
with the other legal origins. 
Country Efficiency 
judicial 
system 
Rule of 
law 
Corrup- 
tion 
Risk of 
exprop. 
Risk of 
contract 
repudiat. 
French legal origin 
Belgium 9.5 10 8.82 9.63 9.48 
France 8 8.98 9.05 9.65 9.19 
Italy 6.75 8.33 6.13 9.35 9.17 
Spain 6.25 7.8 7.38 9.52 8.40 
7.63 8.78 7.85 9.54 9.06 
German legal origin 
Austria 9.5 10 8.57 9.69 9.6 
Germany 9 9.23 8.93 9.90 9.77 
Switzerland 10 10 10 9.98 9.98 
9.5 9.74 9.17 9.86 9.78 
Scandinavian legal origin 
Finland 10 10 10 9.67 9.15 
Norway 10 10 10 9.88 9.71 
Sweden 10 10 10 9.40 9.58 
10 10 10 9.65 9.48 
English legal origin 
Ireland 8.75 7.8 8.52 9.67 8.96 
UK 10 8.57 9.1 9.71 9.63 
9.37 8.18 8.81 9.69 9.29 
Source: La Porta et al (1998) 
Notes: This table presents the indices of each of the characteristics related to law 
enforcement. Indices are scaled from 1 to 10. The higher the index is, the better the 
law enforcement of a particular country. 
Table 5.5: Law enforcement characteristics 
Table 5.6 presents the correlation matrix of the country specific variables 
used in this research. The coefficients were calculated at a country 
level. It can 
be observed that there are high levels of correlation among variables related to 
140 
enforcement of law. For instance, rule of law, corruption and efficiency of judicial 
system are all highly positive correlated. This may imply that countries with 
traditions of law and order have less levels of corruption, and consequently more 
efficient judicial systems. Generally, efficiency of judicial system is positively 
correlated with all the characteristics of law enforcement. This might suggest 
that the higher the indices of each of the variables, the greater the efficiency of 
the judicial system. Efficiency of judicial system represents investors' assessments 
of conditions of the country, probably related to corruption, rule of law, risk of 
expropriation and risk of contract repudiation, among other factors. 
Credit. Shareholder Effic. Rule Corrupt. Risk of 
rights rights judicial of exp. 
system law 
Shareholder 0.037 
rights 
Efficiency 0.173 0.065 
judicial sys. 
Rule of law -0.015 -0.368 0.744*** 
Corruption -0.146 0.230 0.865*** 0.696** 
Risk of exp. 0.026 0.036 0.052* 0.350 0.571* 
Risk of cont. 0.300 -0.285 0.761*** 0.703** 0.569* 0.577** 
repudiation 
Notes: This table presents the correlation matrix of country specific variables. Correlation 
indices were obtained using the country level indices. Total sample: 12 countries. 
*, **, ***, significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 5.6: Correlation matrix 
5.4 Empirical Results 
In previous chapters, conclusions were made on ultimate owners, ultimate struc- 
ture and the effect of financial structure on firms' performance in the UK. The 
analysis in this Chapter considers the preceding results in order to study both 
the impact of a controller with separation of "voting rights and cash flow rights" 
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and country specific effects of investors' protection for Western Europe. 
It is assumed that there is an ultimate largest controller when it possesses 
at least 10% of the voting rights. The threshold of 10% is chosen for two main 
reasons. First, in the previous chapter, it was found that for the UK (which 
constitute a third of the full sample), the ultimate control stake is limited because 
of law regulations. As a consequence, the majority of controllers possess, on 
average, less than 20% of the control stake. Second, Claessens et al (2002) and 
La Porta et al (2002) also establish a threshold of at least 10% as information of 
lower stakes is not available because of disclosure rules. Moreover, La Porta (1999) 
presented evidence using a 20% cutoff, and found the same but statistically weaker 
results than for La Porta et al (2002), where the cutoff was at 10%. However, 
they pointed out that the difference was likely to be due to the size of the sample, 
and not to the control cutoff. 
All the model specifications include industry dummies and the natural log- 
arithm of total assets to control for firms' size. In addition, all the models are 
specified with and without financial variables. This aims to show whether endo- 
geneity of the financial variables might create biased estimators. Nevertheless, 
the endogeneity of financial variables is alleviated by instrumenting with the one 
period lagged explanatory variables, following Rajan and Zingales (1995). How- 
ever, there is no certainty that the endogeneity problem can be fully controlled 
with this procedure. 
There are two characteristics related to the ownership structure of firms. First, 
the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights (corporate ownership to control, 
herein CO/C) intends to measure the level of separation of cash flow rights and 
voting rights in the controlling stake. It is expected that as CO/C tends to one, 
corporate value would increase. The model specifications that include CO/C as 
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a variable, have a reduction in the sample size because of the exclusion of firms 
that are widely held. 
Second, a measure to capture the presence of a controller - independently if 
there is separation of ownership and control - is included. The presence of a 
controller is represented with a dummy variable which is equal to one when there 
is an ultimate controller. The specific ultimate controllers are also included in the 
analysis as in Column (7) in Table 5.7. It is referred as an ultimate controller to 
the largest shareholders, such as, Family, State, Widely held corporations, Widely 
held financial institutions and Miscellaneous (charities, voting trusts, employees, 
cooperatives or minority foreign investors)'. The model specifications that include 
ultimate controller as a variable, uses the whole sample, including those firms with 
widely held ultimate control. 
The initial model is a linear relationship with the ultimate ownership vari- 
ables. To consider specific differences among countries there are different options 
to follow. The inclusion of country dummies is a way to capture the country 
specific effects. This is a possibility when particular country characteristics are 
not included. Once the specific characteristics are in the model, country dummies 
cannot be used due to perfect collinearity with the specific country variables. 
Another way to control for specific country effects is by using panel data 
with fixed or random effects. As La Porta et al (2002) pointed out, the natural 
alternative to eliminate the country effects is with fixed effects. However, as they 
mentioned, fixed effects are not feasible given that there is no within-country 
variation in the legal variables. Therefore, the same problem as with country 
dummies would arise. The random effects model could also be applied to eliminate 
effects of omitted country-specific variables [as La Porta et al (2002), Claessens 
3 See appendix 5.4 for the full definitions of each of these variables. 
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et al (2002)1. In this context, models with random effects use both within and 
between country variation in the firm-level variables to estimate firms' value, 
but do not treat firms in a given country as independent observations. Instead, 
standard errors are adjusted to reflect the cross-correlation between observations 
due to common country components. However, in this chapter, the Breusch 
and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
errors are independent within countries, suggesting that a Random Effects model 
might not be an adequate specification. 
Given the problems associated with the aforementioned methods, the method- 
ology to control for omitted country variables follows Nenova (2003). In her study 
of the value of control-block votes, possible within-country correlation was con- 
trolled by the use of OLS firm-level regressions with clustered robust standard 
errors. Under this method each country is defined as a cluster, where weights are 
sums over each cluster. To this extent, observations may be correlated within 
countries, but would be independent between countries. The estimated stan- 
dard errors take into account that firms within countries are not independent. 
Since country-level values should be independent (supported by the Breusch and 
Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test), standard errors are computed based on 
aggregated firm's values for each of the countries. This method corrects the stan- 
dard errors, but fails to correct the coefficients. An useful check to observe how 
coefficients might be affected, is to compare in a model without specific coun- 
try characteristics both regressions with country dummies and regressions with 
clustered standard errors. 
The results of this initial model are presented in Table 5.7. These results follow 
the same specification of that in Chapter 4, but now using 12 different countries. 
As at this point specific country effects have yet not been included, regressions 
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with country dummies to control for specific fixed effects can be applied. Column 
(1) and (2) present the model with country dummies and clusters standard errors, 
respectively. To this point, country dummies are acceptable as all variables have 
within-country variation. It can be observed that the coefficients behave very 
similarly in both columns, and the real variation is only observable in the standard 
errors as this method presupposes. 
The results suggest that the presence of a controller in a firm is highly signif- 
icant, implying that firms that have a controller have, on average, a Tobin's Q 
ratio 0.21 units lower than those firms that are widely held. 
In Column (7) the ultimate controllers were specified in more detail. It is 
shown that the highest influence for Tobin's Q is given by "Miscellaneous", sug- 
gesting that firms whose ultimate controller is in this classification have a market 
value 0.29 units lower than those firms that do not have a controller with at 
least 10% of the voting power. Generally, the evidence suggests that having any 
controller in a firm is a negative influence for corporate value against firms which 
are widely held. 
The effect of size is negative but not very significant. This might suggest 
that the greater the firm, the lower the market value. Similarly, Claessens et al 
(2002) explained that the negative effect of size on firms' value might suggest 
that smaller firms have better growth prospects. Another possible suggestion to 
explain this effect might be that larger firms have greater agency problems, as it 
is more difficult to monitor the activities of managers. 
Column (4) and (5) specify a different model using the ratio CO/C. The 
omitted country effects are controlled in different ways as indicated in Column 
(4) and (5), by country dummies and clusters, respectively. It can be observed 
that the closer that this ratio is to unity, the higher that the impact on firms' 
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value would be. This implies that when voting power is greater than cash flow 
ownership, the corporate value would be negatively affected. In other words, the 
smaller the difference of control and ownership, the higher the Tobin's Q ratio. 
Therefore, as the ratio CO/C increases by one unit (towards one), the Tobin's 
Q of the firm would increase by 0.17 units. This result is in line with that of 
Volpin (2002), who found that the larger the fraction of cash-flow rights owned 
by the controlling shareholder, the more sensitive turnover is to performance. 
This finding was based on a 12 year period sample of 205 Italian firms, and was 
also confirmed by the analysis of the firms' Q ratio, which increased with the 
fraction of cash flow rights owned by the controlling shareholder. 
It can also be observed in Column (4) that by the inclusion of country dum- 
mies CO/C reduces its significance level to 10%. This may be a result of some 
correlation between country specific characteristics and the separation of owner- 
ship and control. This effect can be better appreciated in the following sections. 
In Chapter 3, it was observed that financial variables contribute to deter- 
mine the value of the firm. The nature of the dataset in Chapter 3 allowed the 
application of GMM to control for endogeneity problems that arise from either 
simultaneity among variables or omitted variables that might be correlated with 
more than one of the explanatory variables. Chapter 4 illustrated the problems 
of endogeneity when it is not fully controlled. There was an attempt in Chapter 
4 to alleviate this problem by lagging the explanatory variables for one period, so 
using the lagged variables as instruments to determine the firms' value. However, 
the results of director's shareholdings were shown to be inconsistent when finan- 
cial variables were taken into account. This situation is important to consider as 
results might be biased when financial variables are included and endogeneity is 
not fully controlled. 
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Dependent variable Tobin's Q 2001 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A 
Constant 2.1*** 2.2*** 2.1*** 1.6*** 1.6*** 1.6*** 2.2*** 
(. 378) (. 347) (. 411) (. 333) (. 271) (. 346) (. 370) 
CO/C 0.14* 0.19** 0.18*** 
(. 088) (. 063) (. 049) 
Controller -0.21** -0.21*** -0.18** 
(. 094) (. 059) (. 077) 
Family -0.20** 
(. 085) 
State -0.20* 
(. 103) 
Widely held -0.26*** 
financial (. 068) 
Widely held -0.26*** 
corporation (. 052) 
Miscellan. -0.29*** 
(. 068) 
Panel B (control variables) 
size -0.04** -0.04* -0.02 -0.04* -0.03 -0.02 -0.04* 
(. 022) (. 019) (. 021) (. 022) (. 018) (. 023) (. 019) 
Investment/TA -0.57 0.12 
(. 432) (. 248) 
Dividends/TA 3.48 3.04* 
(1.99) (1.63) 
Leverage -0.63*** -0.82*** 
(. 194) (. 129) 
Country dummies Yes No No Yes No No No 
No. of obs. 1557 1557 1557 1319 1319 1319 1557 
R-square 0.070 0.063 0.094 0.081 0.073 0.106 0.064 
F-test 6.13 44.4 31.23 6.1 31.9 24.1 46.3 
p-value (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) 
Models estimated by OLS with clustered standard errors (where each country is a cluster) or by 
OLS with robust standard errors using country dummies. CO/C is the ratio of corporate 
ownership stake to control stake; Controller is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a 
shareholder with at least 10% of the control stake, zero otherwise; Family, State, Miscellaneous, 
Widely held corporation and Widely held financial are dummy variables that equal one if the firm 
is controlled by the corresponding category, zero otherwise. TA: Total assets. Industry dummies 
in all the models; Standard errors in parenthesis. '`' *"`' *** significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Table 5.7: Initial specification. Ultimate ownership 
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Therefore, in this Chapter results are presented with and without financial 
variables in order to distinguish the effects they might have on the results. It 
can be observed that although the significance of the "controller" and "CO/C" 
remains, the coefficient is slightly lower. Moreover, the significance of sizc d i>- 
appears when financial variables are considered. With respect to the financial 
variables themselves, the results seem different to those obtained in Chapter 3. 
The estimated coefficient for dividends is lower and less significant; Leverage be- 
came a significant variable, whereas it was not in Chapter 3; and, investment does 
not significantly determine Tobin's Q4. These differences might be the result of 
the scope of the data, as previous chapters were based only on UK data. 
5.4.1 Legal origin 
Given that a first insight of country specific influence on value was mostly signif- 
icant, a broader classification is followed, by grouping the countries according to 
their legal origin. Legal origin is used as a proxy for shareholders' protection in a 
country, as previously suggested in La Porta et al (2002), Berkowitz et al (2003), 
Beck et al (2004). 
Countries are classified in 4 broad families: French, German, English and 
Scandinavian. The results with the inclusion of dummies for different legal ori- 
gins are showed in Table 5.8. The initial specification presents results with t lie 
inclusion of dummies for three legal origins: Scandinavian, German and French. 
This were included together as they originated from civil law, which is 
different 
from the English origin, which originated from common law. 
Results in columns (1) and (3) showed that companies which come 
from a 
Bench legal origin have a higher market value than those 
firms from English 
4Note that R&D is not included in this chapter at all, as 
data to that extent was. O"IN' 
available for the UK and partially available for the other countries. 
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legal origin. Moreover, if French legal origin is replaced in the model by English 
legal origin, as in column (5) and (6), results suggest that there is a significant 
difference on the average Tobin's Q in firms from French legal origin and the 
others. Specifically, it confirms that firms from a Rench legal origin have on 
average a higher Tobin's Q than any other legal origin. By contrast, there is not 
significant difference in the average corporate value among firms from English and 
German legal origins. Therefore, the question is what is the difference between 
French legal origin from the others that causes a higher average corporate value?. 
The results in Table 5.8 contradict previous findings by La Porta et al (2002). 
Their results for the coefficient for common law origin (English legal origin) was 
positive and significant, which implied that countries with better shareholder 
protection (as those from English legal origin) are associated with higher valuation 
of corporate assets. A possible explanation that could be given for the opposite 
results in Table 5.8 is that the sample used in this chapter concentrates only 
in Western Europe as opposed to that in La Porta et al (2002) where there are 
countries from all over the world. Additionally, in Western Europe, firms from a 
Bench legal origin have a lower proportion of separation of ownership and control 
(CO/C = 1) than those from other legal origins, therefore this effect might be 
more important than the legal origin itself. One way to explain this behaviour 
is that firms in countries with poorer laws would have in exchange better firm- 
level governance (reflected somehow in the average similarity of voting rights and 
cash flow rights) to signal their intentions to external investors, as suggested 
by Kappler and Love (2004). They found in a study of 14 emerging countries 
that good governance practices are more important in countries with weaker 
laws. Similarly, Durnev and Kim (2003) found that the quality of the governance 
mechanisms in a firm is positively associated with ownership concentration, need 
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of external finance and growth opportunities. Thus, as a consequence, firms 
seem to adjust to weak legal environments by creating more efficient governance 
practices. In addition, firms with better corporate governance were shown to have 
higher corporate values. In this Chapter corporate governance is represented with 
only one characteristic that is normally used to compute a corporate governance 
index. This characteristic is the protection to minority shareholders by limiting 
the controlling power of largest shareholders. In other words, when one share is 
equivalent to one vote, control is equivalent to cash flow ownership which might 
stop largest shareholders from pursuing activities for personal benefits instead of 
firm's wealth. 
Furthermore, an important effect may be observed in the ultimate ownership 
variables. The ratio of corporate ownership to control was positive and significant 
in the previous section of this chapter. However, once legal origin is included, it 
becomes insignificant in determining corporate value. This is probably because 
French legal origin firms are characterised by a high average ratio of CO/C, 
which means similar number of voting rights and cash flow rights. For instance, 
as shown in Faccio and Lang (2002), in countries from a French legal origin 
there are restrictions to issue non voting and limited voting shares. In Spain and 
Italy, non voting and limited voting shares may not exceed 50% of stock capital. 
This percentage is even lower in France where the limit is 25%; Belgium has the 
restriction of one-share-one-vote. 
A relationship of legal origin and ownership concentration has been previously 
suggested. For instance, Carlin and Mayer (2003) used the variable English legal 
origin as a instrument for ownership concentration. They found that there is 
a negative and significant correlation between these two variables. Likewise, 
large equity markets and dispersed ownership structure have been found to be 
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complements and joint outcomes of strong investor's protection, Leuz et al (2003). 
Moreover, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) pointed out that ownership structure 
may vary systematically across countries, depending on their legal systems. This 
might suggest that the origin of law may determine the level of ownership in 
a firm of a specific country. Furthermore, Francis et al (2001) suggested as a 
result of strong investor protection (common law countries), agency problems are 
more likely to exist, as a consequence of greater external financing, higher level 
of separation between ownership and management, and more diverse ownership 
structures. 
In summary, firms from a French legal origin have an average value 0.13 units 
higher than those from other origins. The reason is likely due to the low level of 
separation of ownership and control that exists in firms from this origin, which 
is a positive factor for value. Cash flow ownership may be seen as a financial 
incentive to moderate the expropriation of minority shareholders as expropriation 
is costly, Burkart et al (1998). Therefore higher cash ownership should lead to 
lower expropriation, as La Porta et al (2002) pointed out. 
Column (2) and (4) present the results with the inclusion of financial variables. 
The main differences encountered are as those from the previous section. With 
respect to legal origin, countries from a French legal origin still seem to have 
higher market values than the rest of the countries, but now the coefficient is 
higher and the significance level is greater. 
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Dependent variable Tobin's Q 2001 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A 
Constant 2.35*** 2.24*** 1.81*** 1.78*** 2.46*** 1.93*** 
(. 331) (. 373) (. 247) (. 309) (. 346) (. 264) 
CO/C 0.15 0.14* 0.15 
(. 086) (. 080) (. 086) 
Controller -0.21*** -0.19** -0.22*** 
(. 056) (. 065) (. 056) 
English legal -0.12** -0.12** 
origin (. 043) (. 039) 
French legal 0.12** 0.17*** 0.12** 0.15*** 
origin (. 043) (. 041) (. 039) (. 038) 
German legal -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.14** -0.14** 
origin (. 044) (. 042) (. 042) (. 050) (. 048) (. 048) 
Scandinavian -0.08** -0.01 -0.09* -0.04 -0.20*** -0.21*** 
legal origin (. 038) (. 038) (. 047) (. 040) (. 058) (. 065) 
Panel B (Control Variables) 
size -0.05** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03 -0.05** -0.04** 
(. 017) (. 017) (. 016) (. 020) (. 017) (. 016) 
Investment/TA -0.60 0.13 
(. 453) (. 266) 
Dividends/TA 3.85* 3.33* 
(2.05) (1.72) 
Leverage -0.61** -0.79*** 
(. 195) (. 136) 
No. observations 1557 1557 1319 1319 1557 1319 
R-square 0.066 0.099 0.076 0.111 0.066 0.076 
F-test 225 68.5 10 15.1 18.7 10.5 
(. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) 
Results estimated by OLS with clustered standard errors, where each country is a cluster. 
CO/C is the ratio of corporate ownership to control; Controller is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm has a shareholder with at least 10% of the control stake, 
zero otherwise; French legal origin, German legal origin, Scandinavian legal origin and 
English legal origin are dummy variables that equal one if the firm belongs to a 
country from such origin, zero otherwise. TA: Total assets. Industry dummies in 
all the models; Standard errors in parenthesis. 
* ** *** significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 5.8: Impact of legal origin and ultimate controller when there is 
separation of cash flow and voting rights 
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Furthermore, the presence of a controller is still negatively significant, as in 
the previous section. The conjecture of this result is that having a controller 
might have negative impact on corporate value, as monitoring activities from 
minority shareholders may be limited. Moreover, when monitoring is limited, 
controllers may abuse their power at the expense of the firms' wealth. As cor- 
porate governance refers to the ways that investors recover their money directed 
to the company, large investors might possibly expropriate resources from the 
firm rather than distribute them around minority investors. Furthermore, they 
may not be sufficiently prepared to deal with the managerial activities of the 
company, which is another type of expropriation against minority investors. This 
characteristics affect the corporate performance of businesses. Fundamentally, 
large investors represent their own interests, which may differ from those of the 
firm itself, so large investors have the power of expropriation in the firm, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997). 
5.4.2 Investors' protection 
There are mainly two types of investors in a company: shareholders and bond- 
holders (creditors). Law may be protective of any of them in different levels. 
The protection given by law to both types of investors might be independent, 
which means that if in a particular country there is a high level of sharehold- 
ers' protection, that does not necessarily imply that creditors would be highly 
protected. 
Shareholders' rights are represented by the index for antidirector rights. It is 
the index representing an aggregate of six characteristics of shareholders' rights, 
the higher the index, the greater the rights that shareholders have. Creditor's 
rights is an index that aggregates four different characteristics that protect bond- 
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holders. 
From Table 5.9, Columns (1) and (4), it can be observed that there is not 
a significant effect of shareholders' rights on firms' value. The insignificant esti- 
mator for shareholder rights is not in line to previous findings by La Porta et al 
(2002), where the effect of shareholder rights was positive and significant. This 
difference may be caused by the nature of the sample. In La Porta et al (2002), 
the sample covers 27 countries over the world, while in the sample in this research 
is exclusively for 12 countries in Western Europe. Therefore, the effect in specific 
regions of the world may vary with respect of the effect of Western European 
countries. Moreover, La Porta et al (2002) chose the largest 20 firms by market 
capitalization for each country, while herein there is not such a selection, so the 
number of firms in each country vary independently of its size. 
To further investigate, a regression with only the shareholder rights was fol- 
lowed as in Column (3), the results show that shareholder rights have a positive 
and significant effect on value. This time being consistent with La Porta et al 
(2002) as opposed with the results, in Columns (1) and (4). The implication of 
this finding might be similar to that from legal origin. Firms with low indices of 
shareholder rights tend to have low levels of separation of cash flow ownership 
and control. Therefore, the significance level of these variables when included 
together is altered due to high correlation. The separation of ownership and con- 
trol then absorbs the positive effect that might be found by the protection to 
shareholders. This finding is important as it suggests that it is likely that firms 
with low protective laws tend to take measures to overcome risks that might 
decrease corporate value. This result is in line with Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
who observed that countries with low investor's protection are more exposed to 
agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control, therefore 
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firms in such countries might consider a good practice to limit shareholdings with 
excess voting rights to cash flow rights. This is also consistent with Doidge et 
al (2004), who showed that a greater proportion of equity financing that comes 
from abroad is for countries with poor investor's protection. They implied that 
financial globalization reduces the importance of country characteristics and in- 
creases the incentives for good governance in order to attract external financing. 
Similarly, Durnev and Kim (2003), suggested that firms rely on ownership con- 
centration to resolve agency conflicts between controllers and other shareholders 
in response to weak investor's protection. 
In Column (4) creditor rights have a significant and negative impact on firms' 
value, but at a very low level. This result is different when financial variables 
are included, where the significance level is much higher, as in columns (2) and 
(5). A possible explanation for the effect of creditor rights on firms' value is that 
benefits for creditors are disadvantages for shareholders, especially in the case of 
bankruptcy or reorganization. Creditors' legal rights are enforced in a costly and 
inefficient way, such as bankruptcy. Therefore, it could be argued that creditors' 
rights influence value indirectly, not from the benefit that creditors' received 
but from the limitations given to shareholders. The result implies that firms in 
countries with higher protection to creditors would have on average lower Tobin's 
Q levels in approximately 0.05 units. This result is in line with Claessens and 
Kappler (2002), who found that bankruptcies are higher in common law countries, 
where there are both stronger creditor rights and greater judicial efficiency. It 
is also in accordance with Rossi and Volpin (2004), who found that attempted 
hostile takeovers are associated with better investor protection. This suggests 
that firms in countries with higher indices of creditors rights are more susceptible 
to hostile takeovers which in turn might negatively impact their value. 
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To investigate further whether the negative effect of high levels of creditor 
rights on firms' value could be originated from higher number of bankruptcies in 
the corresponding country, an interaction term is included in the regression as 
in Column (6). The interaction term is constructed as leverage*creditor rights. 
It implies that creditor rights could be more prejudicial for firms' value in cases 
of higher leverage, which subsequently have higher risks for bankruptcy. The 
interaction term was shown to be positive and significant. This suggests that 
creditor rights are more important for firms with overall higher leverage. In other 
words, the negative impact of creditor rights on corporate value increases when 
leverage is higher. 
Once again, the effect of size fully disappears when financial variables are 
included. The impact of the presence of a controller and the ratio CO/C are 
fairly consistent with and without financial variables. An important difference 
can be observed with respect to shareholder rights. Previously, it was found that 
it was significant only when included by itself (always accounting for differences in 
industrial sectors), similarly it is when included together with financial variables. 
This suggests that there may be some bias originated from the endogeneity of 
financial variables, which could generate inconsistent results. 
Generally, it can be implied that indices for investors' protection are sensitive 
to the inclusion of financial variables. For instance, the impact of shareholder 
rights may be a consequence of omitted effects which are correlated with the 
financial variables. 
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Dependent variable Tobin's Q 2001 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A 
Constant 
co/c 
Controller 
Shareholder 
rights 
Creditor 
2.3*** 
(. 340) 
-0.21*** 
(. 059) 
0.009 
(. 012) 
-0.02 
1.5*** 
(. 204) 
0.017** 
(. 007) 
rights (. 014) 
Cred. rights 
*leverage 
Panel B (Control Variables) 
2.3*** 
(. 366) 
-0.18** 
(. 067) 
0.03** 
(. 012) 
-0.06*** 
(. 012) 
1.7*** 
(. 276) 
0.18** 
(. 078) 
0.009 
(. 010) 
-0.03* 
(. 013) 
1.8*** 
(. 328) 
0.17** 
(. 075) 
0.02* 
(. 012) 
-0.05*** 
(. 011) 
1.97*** 
(. 363) 
0.16** 
(. 074) 
0.03** 
(. 011) 
-0.12*** 
(. 020) 
0.30*** 
(. 068) 
Size -0.04** -0.03 -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 
(. 018) (. 018) (0.017) (. 020) (. 020) 
Invest. /TA -0.68 0.02 0.05 
(. 426) (. 243) (. 237) 
Leverage -0.65*** -0.84*** -1.64*** 
(. 194) (. 133) (. 267) 
Divid. /TA 3.9* 3.4* 3.3* 
(2.1) (1.7) (1.7) 
No. of obs. 1557 1557 1557 1319 1319 1319 
R-square 0.064 0.055 0.099 0.073 0.111 0.115 
F-test 45.4 70.4 102.9 30.8 38.3 45.8 
p-value (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) 
Models estimated by OLS with clustered standard errors, where each country is a cluster. 
CO/C is the ratio of corporate ownership to control; Controller is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm has a shareholder with at least 10% of the control stake, 
zero otherwise; Shareholder rights is an aggregate of six characteristics of shareholders' 
rights; Creditor's rights is an index that aggregates four different characteristics that protect 
bondholders. Both indices were obtained from La Porta et al. (1998). The higher the index 
the greater the rights. TA: Total assets; Creditor rights*leverage is the interaction term 
between these two variables ndustry dummies are included in all the models; Standard 
errors in parenthesis. significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 5.9: Investors' protection and firms' value 
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5.4.3 Enforcement of law 
Enforcement of law for this research is measured with the index of efficiency of 
judicial system. There are other indices that might also represent law enforce- 
ment, such as, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation and risk of contract 
repudiation. These are fully explained in Appendix 3. In the correlation matrix 
presented above, it was shown that the available variables to measure enforcement 
of law are highly correlated. Under this case, the standard errors may be biased 
when all the characteristics are included together, this situation might lead to 
inconsistent results. 
Efficiency of judicial system is shown to be highly correlated with each of 
the other variables. Therefore, it could well represent the general quality of law 
enforcement of a country. This variable is constructed by investors' assessments 
of conditions in the country in question. It is likely that investors' have assessed 
the judicial system of the country based on any of the other characteristics, such 
as rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation and risk of contract repudiation. 
Moreover, efficiency of judicial system has also been chosen as a representative of 
law enforcement in previous literature. For example, Kappler and Love (2004), 
use judicial efficiency to represent legal efficiency to explain Tobin's Q. Similarly, 
La Porta et al (2000) used judicial efficiency to represent enforcement of law in a 
study of Investor's protection and corporate governance. 
As the indices for investor's protection (named creditor's rights and share- 
holder's rights) used in the previous section of this chapter do not show any 
correlation with the enforcement of law variables, it is assumed that both types 
of variables may be independent. This means that countries with high level of 
protection to investors do not necessarily fully enforce law. Therefore, in this 
section both indices of investor's protection (for shareholders and creditors) and 
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efficiency of judicial system are included together. 
The level to which law is enforced may be an influential factor for corporate 
value. Investors' may prefer countries that enforce law, as the risk of losing 
their investment might be diminished. Therefore an effective implementation 
(efficiency of judicial system) of both shareholders' rights and creditors' rights 
is expected to impact on firms' value. As in the previous section, the effect 
might vary depending on the level of benefits provided to either shareholder's or 
bondholders. For instace, creditors are given more priority in the distribution of 
the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. 
In Columns (1) and (3) from Table 5.10, it can be observed that efficiency of 
the judicial system is negative and significant for determining corporate value. 
The negative sign of law enforcement may be originated as countries which have 
higher levels of law enforcement might give to creditors the ability of enforcing 
their rights. This in turn might increase the use of bankruptcy, which conse- 
quently impacts negatively on firms' value. This result is in line with Claessens 
and Klapper (2002), who suggested that the use of bankruptcies is significantly 
less in countries with less efficient judicial systems (such as French legal origin 
countries). They found that creditors are more likely to use formal and costly 
bankruptcy proceedings in the case of default when the speed and success of 
collecting in the court is more efficient. 
Furthermore, French legal origin countries have the highest market values and 
the lowest indices for efficiency of judicial system, but they also have higher lev- 
els of ownership concentration as pointed out by La Porta et al (1998). They 
suggested that quality of law helps to determine ownership concentration, as the 
lack of protection might be substituted by better corporate governance. There- 
fore, heavily concentrated ownership with respect to control may be a result of 
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weak investors' protection and law enforcement. Burkart and Panunzi (2004) 
suggested that ownership concentration and legal shareholder protection can be 
both substitutes (when legal protection is of intermediate quality) and comple- 
ments (when legal protection is weak) . 
For this reason, as mentioned by Bukart 
and Panunzi (2004), a more efficient legal protection may exacerbate rather than 
alleviate the conflict of interests between large and small shareholders. In partic- 
ular strengthening creditors legal protection might have an adverse effect on the 
incentives to increase firms value. 
As in the previous section the inclusion of financial variables decreases the 
standard errors of the coefficients. This situation suggests that it is likely that 
endogeneity may be introduced by the financial variables. However, the efficiency 
of the judicial system remains significant in both models, with and without fi- 
nancial variables. 
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Dependent variable Tobin's Q 2001 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A 
Constant 2.77*** 2.69*** 2.24*** 2.17*** 
(. 412) (. 425) (. 324) (. 363) 
Controller -0.22*** 0.19** 
(. 060) (. 067) 
CO/C 0.16* 0.15* 
(. 082) (. 078) 
shareholders rights 0.02 0.03*** 0.02* 0.03** 
(. 010) (. 011) (. 009) (. 011) 
creditors rights -0.01 -0.05*** -0.02 -0.04*** 
(. 011) (. 010) (. 012) (. 012) 
efficiency. judicial system -0.05** -0.04*** -0.05** -0.04** 
(. 018) (. 012) (. 019) (. 016) 
Panel B (control variables) 
size -0.04** -0.03* -0.04** -0.03 
(. 018) (. 017) (. 016) (. 019) 
Investment/TA 0.67 0.03 
(. 423) (. 237) 
Dividends/TA 3.9* 3.4* 
(2.1) (1.7) 
Leverage -0.63*** -0.82*** 
(. 194) (. 135) 
No. of observations 1557 1557 1319 1319 
R-square 0.065 0.101 0.074 0.111 
F-test 315 38 31 34 
p-value (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) 
Models estimated by OLS with clustered standard errors, where each country is a cluster. 
CO/C is the ratio of corporate ownership to control; Controller is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm has a shareholder with at least 10% of the control stake, zero 
otherwise; Shareholder rights is an aggregate of six characteristics of shareholders' rights; 
Creditor's rights is an index that aggregates four different characteristics that protect 
bondholders. Both indices were obtained from La Porta et al. (1998); The higher the 
index, the greater the rights; Efficiency of the judicial system is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm belongs to a country which enforces law, zero otherwise. Industry 
dummies are included in all the models; Standard errors in parenthesis. 
significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 5.10: Law enforcement and firms' value 
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5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
An empirical analysis of the effects of country specific characteristics with samples 
of 1557 and 1319 observations from 12 countries of Western Europe was pursued. 
The results, with the inclusion of country dummy variables to a model that con- 
trolled for ultimate ownership effects, showed that country specific characteristics 
are important aspects in determining corporate performance. The specification of 
the model with country dummies was limited to the inclusion of specific country 
characteristics as there was not within-country variation in these variables. Due 
to this aspect, firm-level OLS with clustered robust standard errors, where each 
country was a cluster, was applied. This method aimed to control for specification 
problems that might arise due to omitted country variables. 
Ultimate ownership characteristics were shown to affect corporate value, in 
both the presence of a controller with a negative effect and the "less" separation 
of control and cash flow rights (CO/C) with a positive effect. However, the ratio 
CO/C was shown to be more sensitive to the specification of the model, probably 
due to the correlation with country specific characteristics. Firms from a French 
legal origin were shown to have the lowest indices for both investors' protection 
and law enforcement. However, firms from this legal origin had on average higher 
Tobin's Q ratios than firms from other origins. Firms from French legal origin 
also have the lowest level of separation of ownership and control, this situation 
might result in higher corporate values. Although countries from a French legal 
origin have the lowest investors' protection and law enforcement, the corporate 
governance practices might offer what investors need in a weak system in order to 
protect their investments. Consequently, this might have a positive and significant 
effect on firms' value. In other words, the lack of investors' protection and law 
enforcement seems to be compensated with a corporate governance practice where 
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cash flow rights and control rights are not separated. This result is confirmed with 
the significant effect of the index for shareholders' protection when included by 
itself. Once the size of the firms and the ratio CO/C are added to the model, 
the effect of shareholder rights becomes not significant. Firms with high indices 
of shareholder rights tend to have low level of separation of cash flow ownership 
and control. The separation of ownership and control then absorbs the positive 
effect that might be found by the protection to shareholders. By contrast, a 
negative and significant effect of creditors' protection was found, this effect is 
more significant when financial variables are included. This shows that it is 
likely that financial variables (eventhough they were instrumented by their lags) 
introduce some endogeneity to the model. Nevertheless, the significant effect of 
creditor rights (such as, secure payment in cases of bankruptcy or restructuring) 
might be enforced by an efficient judicial system, in detriment of shareholders. 
In addition, it was found to be more important in firms with high leverage. 
Therefore, corporate value may be decreased under this circumstances. 
Generally, it is likely that firms tend to adjust their corporate governance 
practices to overcome the value decreasing risks associated with low protective 
country laws for minority investors and in that way be more attractive for external 
investors. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis has been to explain the excess market value of the firm, in 
relation to its book value, with the objective of understanding how the market 
reacts to certain characteristics or information about the firm. For this purpose, 
the measure utilized to model coporate value was Tobin's Q ratio. This decision 
was based on empirical research conducted by McFarland (1988) and Campbell 
and Shiller (1998), who argued that Tobin's Q ratio is the only measure of cor- 
porate value which is useful for forecasting, as other measures such as the rate of 
return and the dividends-price ratio, have more limitations. 
The examination of the divergence between market value and book value of 
a firm was initiated in Chapter 3. The goal of this chapter was to measure the 
effect of intangible aspects on market value, specifically R&D activities at a firm 
level. To accomplish that, the characteristics of the data were taken into account. 
For instance, endogeneity developed from simultaneous variables and fixed effects 
was considered. The data under analysis was an unbalanced panel of UK firms, 
which aimed to make full use of the available information. 
Results presented interesting features. First, after controlling for the endo- 
geneity problem and the fixed effects by the use of GNINI, R&D activities were 
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shown to be an important component in determining firm's value; this finding is 
consistent with other empirical work in this area. This result was found by the 
construction of a R&D stock where expenditures were accumulated and depreci- 
ated over time to recognize present and past effects on corporate value. 
A very interesting feature was found in the results with respect to dividends 
paid. Results demonstrated that probably dividend payments are relevant to 
determine value only when there are "special dividends". This means that the 
market reacts positively to "news" of a special dividend being paid, rather than 
to frequent or stable cash dividends. The interpretation of this result could 
be related to the reestructuring or reorganization of a company, as generally 
under this circumstances is when a special dividend is paid. Nevertheless, the 
significance of this result was low, probably due to the weakness of the instruments 
for this specific variable. 
Size of the firm and investment in productive capital were also found signif- 
icant elements to determine firm's value. They contain information about value 
and /or performance of the firm, which is not captured by the other explanatory 
variables in the model. It was found that an increase in investment in productive 
capital has a positive impact upon market value. This result, together with the 
positive influence of R&D, suggests that the introduction, as well as the genera- 
tion, of new technology is valued by the market. 
The next step of this thesis was to relate corporate value with the character- 
istics of equity ownership in the UK. For this instance, two types of ownership 
were studied. First, the managerial ownership, represented by director's share- 
holdings. Second, the separation of owneship and control and the structures 
given by this aspect, such as, level of separation, ultimate controlers and ways to 
delegate control. 
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The main difference from the preceding chapter is that the analysis was per- 
formed with a cross-sectional study, instead of a panel data technique. Therefore, 
the use of GMM to control for endogeneity problems was not feasible. However, 
endogeneity was alleviated by using lagged explanatory variables as instruments. 
The following results were found. First, the level of shares owned by managers 
may not determine the performance of the company. By contrast, when financial 
variables are included in the model, a cubic relationship of the managerial own- 
ership on corporate value was found, where management is aligned to the firms' 
objectives at low and possibly high levels but is entrenched at intermediate own- 
ership levels. As this result was sensitive to the inclusion of financial vaxiables, it 
may seem that there is some biasness in the results, probably because endogeneity 
was not fully corrected (mainly in the financial variables themselves). The behav- 
iour of financial variables was also consistent with the previous chapter. R&D, 
dividends paid and investment were significant to determine corporate value. 
Second, it was found that the level of separation (high, medium, low or none) 
between ownership and control might be an influece to the companies' market val- 
ues. Specifically, for the UK case, it was found that when a firm has a controller, 
only high levels of separation of ownership and control affect negatively corporate 
value (at least two votes per share). This situation may be explained by the UK's 
laws which protect minority shareholders, as they might stop largest shareholders 
of expropriating resources from the firm. However, in such cases where voting 
rights are twice as much than cash flow rights, laws are not probably enough to 
stop largest controllers from abusing their power. Consequently, the value of the 
firm seem to be lower in these cases than for those firms which have controllers 
and where separation of ownership and control is lesser or non-existent. Some ex- 
amples of the abuse of power by largest controllers can be perquisites or personal 
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benefits, such as high salaries or expensive business trips; designation of inap- 
propriate managers for the company based on personal preferences; self-dealing 
activities for the benefit of companies other than that under discussion; etc. 
The ownership structure was also analysed from a different perspective. The 
addressed question to this respect was: is there any difference in firms' market 
values depending on who is the ultimate controller?. The findings showed that 
only firms where the largest ultimate controller is "Miscellaneous" have lower 
market values than firms which are widely held. Likewise, it was found that firms 
that have miscellaneous as an ultimate controller coincide with the characteristic 
of having high levels of separation between ownership and control. Therefore, 
this might be the reason for the negative effect of miscellaneous as an ultimate 
controller. 
Finally, the means to which control is delegated were also analysed. The 
findings showed that there is not evidence that corporate value is affected by the 
way to which largest shareholders obtain controlling power. 
The last chapter of this thesis, increased the scope of the data by including 
11 countries more from Western Europe. To this extent new effects were incorpo- 
rated to the analysis. Specifically, country specific characteristics, such as legal 
origin, investor's protection and law enforcement. 
The novelty of this chapter was the construction and analysis of a unique 
dataset which combines firm level characteristics with macroecomic variables. 
This database was constructed with three different sources of information: i) 
datastrearn for financial variables, ii) Faccio and Lang (2002) for information 
related with ownership and control, and, iii) La Porta et al (1998) for information 
at a country level. 
The findings in Chapter 5 were as follows. Consistent with the previous chal>- 
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ter, the presence of a controller was negatively associated with firms' value. The 
separation of ownership and control was positive and significant for determining 
corporate value. However, to this extent, the significance deacreases or dissapears 
when country specific characteristics were included in the model specification. 
Firms from countries that come from a Rench legal origin were shown to have 
higher market values than countries from any other legal origin. Although, this 
finding contradicts previous literature, it can be explained by the characteristics 
of the data. Particulary, firms from a Rench legal origin coincide to have the lower 
levels of separation of ownership and control, situation that might be positive for 
corporate value. Specifically, firms from a French legal origin have the lowest 
indices of both investor's protection and law enforcement. This situation seems 
to be compensated somehow with an ownership structure where cash flow rights 
and control rights are similar. 
Furthermore, shareholder rights were shown to be positively associated with 
market value, but insignificant when the specification of the model includes the 
separation of ownership and control. This might be explained as firms with high 
indices of shareholder rights tend to have low level of separation of cash flow 
rights and voting rights. Therefore, when both variables are considered together 
in the model, it seems that the separation of ownership and control absorbs the 
positive effect that might be found by the protection to shareholders. 
By contrast, a negative and significant effect of creditors' protection was found, 
but only very significant when financial variables are included. This shows that it 
is likely that financial variables (eventhough they were instrumented by their lags) 
introduce some endogeneity to the model. The negative effect of creditor rights on 
firms' value could be explained by the association of bankruptcy and high levels of 
creditor protection that has been pointed out in previous literature. Thefore, as 
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creditors get more benefits, shareholders might be more limited, specifically in the 
case of bankruptcy or liquidation. So, investment which comes from shareholders 
is more valuable in terms of adding value. 
On the whole, this thesis has offered some contributions to study the behaviour 
of firms with the objective to increase corporate value. Interesting implications, 
such as the influence from differences among countries, were shown to be a fun- 
damental aspect in corporate governance. This can be an exception when the 
nature of the experiment is a specific study of a single country. Generally, the 
three factors under analysis: intangible capital, corporate governance and coun- 
try specific characteristics, have an influence in determining the market value of 
a firm. 
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Appendix 2.1. Datastream codes 
Datastream code Variable 
X(305) Equity, Capital and Reserves 
X(392) Total assets 
X(136) Depreciation 
X(MV) Market Value 
X(339) Net Fixed assets 
X(321) Total loan capital 
X(309) Borrowing <1 year 
X(330) Total fixed assets 
X(338) Total depreciation of fixed assets 
X(306) Preference capital 
X(389) Current liabilities 
X(263) 1-2 years liabilities 
X(264) 2-5 years liabilities 
X(319) more than 5 years liabilities 
X(267) leasing 
X(397) Revaluation Reserve 
X(1099) Surplus or deficit for revaluation 
X(197) Additional depreciation (provision for permanent diminution) 
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Appendix 3.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 6.1 contains the regression results from the univariate analysis of each of 
the variables on Tobin's Q. Considering the endogeneity problem, the method- 
ology for the analysis follows the comparison of OLS and Within with GMM. 
The expectation is that GMM is the most adequate estimator as it controls for 
endogeneity and fixed effects by the first differentiation. However, it is impor- 
tant to consider that the specification of the model is also an influential factor 
for the calculation of correct estimators. In this case, each variable is included 
independently so there is the risk that the model is misspecified. 
All the variables except for Investment were significant at the 95% confidence 
level using the OLS estimator. After controlling for fixed effects, leverage became 
insignificant. This might suggest that the level of debt of a company might depend 
on its individual characteristics, for instance the industrial sector to which they 
belong. 
An important feature of the univariate analysis is the test for the validity of 
instruments. Leverage and size axe the only two variables that do not pass the 
Sargan test at the 95% of confidence level, however they are valid at the 90% 
level. They are also insignificant with the GMM specification. In fact, the only 
significant coefficients calculated with GMM are R&D and Dividends; this result 
is the same as in the full regressions in Section 4. The AR(2) is rejected by 
Dividends at the 95% of confidence. This means that even though it passes the 
Saxgan test, it is likely that the instruments for this variable are weak due to a 
persistent behaviour (unit root). 
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UK (872 firms, 7,754 observations 
OLS Within GMM Sargan AR(2) 
(1) (2) (3) test 
R&D stock 5.03*** 2.88** 7.45*** (. 188) (. 194) 
(. 885) (1-30) (2.17) 
Dividends 7.35*** 5.69*** 37.5*** (. 233) (. 023) 
(1.92) (1.32) (13-55) 
Leverage -1.24*** -0.01 -0-57 (. 010) (. 068) 
(. 318) (. 364) (1.01) 
Investment 0.30* 0.16 0.18 (. 228) (. 058) 
(. 163) (. 121) (. 421) 
Size -0-15*** -0.40*** -0.24 (. 022) (. 069) 
(. 027) (. 080) (. 269) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; p-values for Sargan test and AC(2); All models 
include time dummies; AR(2) tests for the autocorrelation of second order; 
Sargan test for the validity of the instruments; Dependent variable: Tobin's Q; 
Ratios (all variables divided by Total Assets) except for size (natural logarithm 
of total assets) 
Table 6.1: Univariate Analysis in OLS, Within and GMM for UK. 
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Appendix 4.1 Example of separation of control 
and cash flow rights by a pyramidal structure 
Figure 6.1 shows the largest shareholders for Royýfl Dotilton. The ultinmic 
largest controller can be found through the largest control slakes- W(Aterford n 
Wedgwood with 21.16% of shares, then Stoneworth Investment Limited with 
16.67o. The last shareholders in the chain own the same proportion of slmrcs 
(19V), but Sir Anthony O'Reilly has another direct stake of 2., 'ý, (; ' . Therefore. 
'I Sir Anthony O'Reilly is the largest shareholder with 4.58'//( of cash flow rights 
(0.2116*0.166*0.49+0.0286) and 19.46/(ý of control right,, (tlie Nvcýikcst Iiiik along 
the control chain, 16.6%, plus the direct control of 2., S(; '/(). The control 1, sepil- 
rated from ownership bY it pYramidal stnicture as there is at ()it(, publicly 
traded firm in the chiin (Waterford Wedgwood). Morcover, in flils ('Xý11111)1(' it 
would be said that, at the 2()/( threshold, Rovýil Doulton is' a Widcl, v held ('()iii- 
pany, but at, the 10% threshold the largest controller would bc cLussificd ius Mis- 
cellmiewis (Charities, voting trusts, emplovecs, coop erat i or m1nority forep)n 
im, cstors), given that Sir Anthony O'Relll, y is ýi foreign hivestor 
Figure 6.1: Royal Doulton 
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Appendix 5.1 Shareholders' rights 
4 
Appendix 5.2 Creditors' rights 
1 ) 
Appendix 5.3 Law Enforcement 
17(i 
Appendix 5.4 Description of Ultimate Controller 
variables 
Variables Description 
Ratio CO/C Ratio of corporate ownership to control 
Controller Dummy variable equal to one when there is an ultimate controller 
at the 10% cutoff. 
Family Individual or firm that is unlisted in any stock exchange. A 
discussion to include the later as family can be found in 
Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Widely held Companies controlled by a financial institution which is also 
financial widely held 
Widely held Companies controlled by a corporation which is also 
corporation widely held. 
Miscella- Charities, voting trusts, employees, cooperatives, or minority 
neous foreign investors. 
State National government (domestic or foreign), local authority or 
government agency 
Source: Faccio and Lang (2002) 
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